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Abstract
Cryptographic primitives such as oblivious transfer and bit commitment are
impossible to realize if unconditional security is required against adversaries
who are unbounded in running time and memory size. Therefore, it is a great
challenge to come up with restrictions on the adversary’s capabilities such that
on one hand interesting cryptographic primitives become possible, but on the
other hand the model is still realistic and as close to practice as possible.
The bounded-quantum-storage model is a prime example of such a crypto-
graphic model. In this thesis, we initiate the study of cryptographic primitives
with unconditional security under the sole assumption that the adversary’s
quantum memory is of bounded size.
Oblivious transfer and bit commitment can be implemented in this model
using protocols where honest parties need no quantum memory, whereas an
adversarial player needs to store at least a large fraction of the total number of
transmitted qubits in order to break the protocol. This is in sharp contrast to
the classical bounded-memory model, where we can only tolerate adversaries
with memory of size polynomially larger than the honest players’ memory size.
On the practical side, our protocols are efficient, non-interactive and can be
adapted to cope with various kinds of noise in the transmission. In fact, they
can be implemented using today’s technology.
On the theoretical side, new entropic uncertainty relations involving min-
entropy are established and used to prove the security of protocols in the
bounded-quantum-storage model according to new strong security definitions.
The uncertainty relations lower bound the min-entropy of the encoding used in
most quantum-cryptographic protocols and therefore contribute to the under-
standing of the quantum effects which these protocols are based upon. The most
direct way to make use of these lower bounds is by assuming a quantum-memory
bound on the adversary. For instance, in the realistic setting of Quantum Key
Distribution (QKD) against quantum-memory-bounded eavesdroppers, the un-
certainty relation allows to prove the security of QKD protocols while toler-
ating considerably higher error rates compared to the standard model with
unbounded adversaries.
In addition, though not directly related to the bounded-quantum-storage
model, a classical result about unconditionally secure 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Trans-
fer (1-2 OT) is obtained. It is pointed out that the standard security require-
ment for 1-2 OT of bits, namely that the receiver only learns one of the bits
sent, holds if and only if the receiver has no information on the XOR of the
iii
two bits. This result generalizes to 1-2 OT of strings, in which case the security
can be characterized in terms of binary linear functions. More precisely, it is
shown that the receiver learns only one of the two strings sent, if and only
if he has no information on the result of applying any binary linear function
which non-trivially depends on both inputs to the two strings. This result not
only gives new insight into the nature of 1-2 OT, but it in particular provides
a powerful tool for analyzing 1-2 OT protocols. With this characterization at
hand, the reducibility of 1-2 OT of strings to a wide range of weaker primitives
follows by a very simple argument.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the quest for interesting cryptographic models, bounding the quantum mem-
ory of adversarial players is a great assumption.
1.1 Cryptographic Models and Basic Primitives
It is a fascinating art to come up with protocols1 that achieve a cryptographic
task like encryption, authentication, identification, voting, secure function eval-
uation to name just a famous few. To define a notion of security for such proto-
cols, one needs to specify a cryptographic model, i.e. an environment in which
the protocol is run. The model states for example the number of honest and
dishonest players, the allowed running time and amount of memory available
to honest and dishonest players, how dishonest players are allowed to deviate
from the protocol, the use of external resources like (quantum) communication
channels or other already established cryptographic functionalities etc.
While coming up with more and more protocols for different models, cryp-
tographers realized that some basic primitives (i.e. precisely defined crypto-
graphic tasks) are useful as “benchmarks” of how powerful a particular cryp-
tographic model is. An example is the two-party primitive Oblivious Transfer
(OT). It comes in different flavors, but all of these variants are equivalent in the
sense that anyone of them can be implemented using (possibly several instances
of) an other. The one-out-of-two variant 1-2 OT was originally introduced by
Wiesner around 1970 (but only published much later in [Wie83]) in the very first
paper about quantum cryptography, and later rediscovered by Even, Goldreich,
and Lempel [EGL82]. It lets a sender Alice transmit two bits to a receiver Bob
who can choose which of them to receive. A secure implementation of 1-2 OT
does not allow a dishonest sender to learn which of the two bits was received
and it does not allow a dishonest receiver to learn any information about the
second bit. It was a surprising insight when Kilian showed that this simple
primitive is complete for two-party cryptography [Kil88]. In other words, a
model in which 1-2 OT can be securely implemented allows to implement any
cryptographic functionality between two players2. Another variant we are con-
1A protocol consists of clear-cut instructions for the participating players.
2If the model can be reasonably extended to more players, this usually allows to implement
1
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cerned with in this thesis was introduced by Rabin [Rab81] and is hence called
Rabin Oblivious Transfer (Rabin OT). It is basically a “secure erasure chan-
nel”: the sender Alice sends a bit which with probability one half is absorbed
and with probability one half finds its way to the receiver Bob. The security
requirements are the following: whatever a dishonest Alice does, she cannot
find out whether the bit was received or not; and whatever a dishonest receiver
does, he does not get any information about the bit with probability one half.
Yet another basic two-party primitive of interest is Bit Commitment (BC)
which allows a player to commit himself to a choice of a bit b by communicat-
ing with a verifier. The verifier should not learn b (we say the commitment is
hiding), yet the committer can later choose to reveal b in a convincing way, i.e.
only the value fixed at commitment time will be accepted by the verifier (we
say the commitment is binding). Bit Commitment is a fundamental building
block of virtually every more complicated cryptographic protocol. Implement-
ing secure BC with a secure 1-2 OT at hand is not difficult3. On the other
hand, there are cryptographic models allowing to securely implement BC , but
not 1-2 OT. Moran and Naor gave an example of such a model by assuming the
physical device of a tamper-proof seal [MN05].
It is not hard to see that the two security requirements for BC are in a sense
contradictory, so perfectly secure bit commitment cannot be implemented “from
scratch”, that is if only error-free communication is available and there is no
limitation assumed on the computing power and memory of the players. The
informal reason for this is that the hiding property implies that when 0 is com-
mitted to, exactly the same information exchange could have happened when
committing to 1. Hence, even if 0 was actually committed to, the committer
could always compute a complete view of the protocol consistent with having
committed to 1, and pretend that this view was what he had in mind origi-
nally. By the reduction of BC to 1-2 OT follows that also 1-2 OT and many
other cryptographic functionalities cannot be perfectly secure when built from
scratch.
One might hope that allowing the protocol to make use of quantum com-
munication would make a difference. Here, information is stored in qubits, i.e.,
in the state of two-level quantum mechanical systems, such as the polarization
state of a single photon. Quantum information behaves in a way that is fun-
damentally different from classical information, enabling, for instance, uncon-
ditionally secure key exchange between two honest players (so-called Quantum
Key Distribution). However, in the case of two mutually distrusting parties,
we are not so fortunate: even with quantum communication, unconditionally
secure BC and 1-2 OT remain impossible. This is the infamous impossibility
result by Mayers and by Lo and Chau [May97, LC97].
For this reason, cryptographers have tried hard to exhibit more restricted
models where these impossibility results do not apply. The high art in this pro-
secure multi-party protocols as well.
3To commit to a bit b, the committer sends random bits of parity b via (several instances
of) 1-2 OT and the verifier picks randomly one of the bits. To open, the committer sends all
the random bits he was using, the verifier checks whether these are consistent with what he
received.
1.2. Classical Bounded-Storage Model 3
cess is to find assumptions that are as realistic as possible – thus only minimally
restricting the model, but still strong enough to allow for implementing inter-
esting functionalities. There are at least three kinds of possible assumptions,
namely
• bounding the computing power of players,
• using the noise in the communication channel,
• exploiting some physical limitation of the adversary, e.g., if the size of the
available memory is bounded.
The first scenario is the basis of many well known solutions based on plau-
sible but unproven complexity assumptions, such as hardness of factoring or
discrete logarithms. A term often used for such schemes is “computational se-
curity”, meaning that it is not impossible for an adversary to behave dishonestly,
but it is computationally infeasible for him to do so. Security proofs are usually
done by reduction in the sense that breaking the security of the protocol would
imply solving a hard problem like factoring the product of two large prime num-
bers. The second scenario has been used to construct both BC and OT proto-
cols in various models for the noise by Cre´peau, Kilian, Damg˚ard, Salvail, Fehr,
Morozov, Wolf, and Wullschleger [CK88, DKS99, DFMS04, CMW04, Wul07].
The third scenario is the focus of this thesis. In contrast to the first scenario,
we deal with “unconditional security” where (depending on the task a protocol
aims to achieve) an adversary has no way whatsoever to gain illegal information.
Proofs are not done by reduction, but we can prove in information-theoretic
terms that except with negligible probability, the adversary does not learn any
information that is meant to remain secret.
1.2 Classical Bounded-Storage Model
In the classical bounded-storage model, we assume the players to use classical
error-free communication and to be computationally unbounded, but on the
other hand restrict the size of their memory. In the usual setting, there is
a large random source R (often called the randomizer) which all players can
access, but which is too large (or transmitted too quickly) to store as a whole.
One can think of R as a deep-space radio source or a satellite broadcasting
random bits at a very high rate.
When Maurer introduced the classical bounded-storage model in [Mau90],
the goal was secure message transmission. He showed that two honest parties
Alice and Bob sharing an initial key can expand that key unless the eavesdrop-
per Eve can store more than a large fraction of the randomizer. The basic idea
of the technique allowing Alice and Bob to get an advantage over Eve is that
their initial secret key indexes some positions in the randomizer about which
Eve has some uncertainty if she cannot store the whole randomizer. Therefore,
the bits at these positions can be combined to yield more secure key bits and
so to expand the initial key.
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A line of subsequent work by Maurer, Cachin, Aumann, Ding, Rabin,
Dziembowski, Lu, and Vadhan [Mau92, CM97, ADR02, DM04, Lu04, Vad04]
improved this original protocol in terms of efficiency and security. Aumann,
Ding and Rabin [ADR02] noticed that protocols in this model enjoy the prop-
erty of “everlasting security” in the sense that the newly generated key re-
mains secure even when the initial key is later revealed and Eve is no longer
memory-bounded, under the sole condition that the original randomizer cannot
be accessed any more. Ding [Din05] showed how to do error correction in the
bounded-storage model and therefore how to cope with the situation when the
honest parties do not have exactly the same view on the randomizer.
Cachin, Cre´peau and Marcil illustrated the power of the bounded-storage
model by exhibiting in [CCM98] a protocol for 1-2 OT. Ding improved on this
[Din01a] and later showed a constant-round protocol for oblivious transfer in
joint work with Harnik, Rosen and Shaltiel [DHRS04].
All these protocols are shown secure as long as the adversary’s memory size
is at most quadratic in the memory size of the honest players. Considering
the ease and low cost of storing massive amounts of classical data nowadays,
it is questionable how practical such an assumption on the memory size of the
players is. It would be clearly more satisfactory to have a larger than quadratic
separation between the memory size of honest players and that of the adversary.
However, this was shown to be impossible by Dziembowski and Maurer [DM04].
1.3 Contributions
In this section, we give an overview of the contributions of this thesis. The
results about classical oblivious transfer described in Chapter 3 and summarized
in Section 1.3.2 are joint work with Damg˚ard, Fehr and Salvail [DFSS06]. All
other results are based on two papers co-authored with Damg˚ard, Fehr, Salvail
and Renner: [DFSS05] and [DFR+07]. A journal version of [DFSS05] is to
appear in a special issue of the SIAM Journal of Computing [DFSS08].
1.3.1 Bounded-Quantum-Storage Model
In this thesis, we study for the first time protocols where quantum communi-
cation is used and we place a bound on the adversary’s quantum memory size.
There are two reasons why this may be a good idea: first, if we do not bound the
classical memory size, we avoid the impossibility result of [DM04]. Second, the
adversary’s typical goal is to obtain a certain piece of classical information that
we want to keep hidden from him. However, if he cannot store all the quantum
information that is sent, he must convert some of it to classical information by
measuring. This may irreversibly destroy information, and we may be able to
arrange it in such a way that the adversary cannot afford to lose information
this way, while honest players can.
It turns out that this can be achieved indeed: we present protocols for
both BC and OT in which n qubits are transmitted, where honest players
need no quantum memory, but where the adversary must store at least a large
fraction (typically n/2 or n/4) of the n transmitted qubits to break the protocol.
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We emphasize that no bound is assumed on the adversary’s computing power,
nor on his classical memory. This is clearly much more satisfactory than the
classical case, not only from a theoretical point of view, but also in practice:
while sending qubits and measuring them immediately as they arrive is well
within reach of current technology, storing even a single qubit for more than a
fraction of a second is a formidable technological challenge.
Furthermore, we show that our protocols also work in a non-ideal setting
where we allow the quantum source to be imperfect and the quantum com-
munication to be noisy. We emphasize that what makes OT and BC possible
in our model is not so much the memory bound per se, but rather the loss of
information on the part of the adversary. Indeed, our results also hold if the ad-
versary’s memory device holds an arbitrary number of qubits, but is imperfect
in certain ways.
All these factors make the assumption of bounded quantum memory a very
attractive cryptographic model. On one hand, as for the classical bounded-
storage model, it is simple to work with and yields beautiful theoretical results.
On the other hand, it is much more reasonable to assume the difficulty of storing
quantum information compared to storing classical one and hence, we are very
close to the physical reality and get schemes that can actually be implemented!
1.3.2 Characterization of Security of Classical 1-2 OT
While the task of formally defining unconditional security of classical protocols
for Rabin OT and BC is well understood, capturing the security of 1-2 OT in
information-theoretic terms is considerably more delicate, as was pointed out
by Cre´peau, Savvides, Schaffner and Wullschleger [CSSW06]. For 1-2 OT of
bits, it is clear that the security for a honest sender against a cheating receiver
guarantees that the receiver does not learn any information about the XOR of
the two bits. Somewhat surprisingly, the converse is true as well, not having
any information about the XOR of the two bits sent implies that we can point
at one bit which the dishonest receiver does not know (given the other).
This idea can be generalized to 1-2 OT of strings where the ignorance of the
XOR becomes ignorance of the outcome of all Non-Degenerate Linear binary
Functions (NDLFs) applied to the two strings sent. Such a characterization
of sender-security in terms of NDLF composes well with strongly two-universal
hashing and hereby yields a powerful technique to improve the analyses of the
standard reductions from 1-2 OT to weaker variants of OT.
As a historical side note, the original motivation for this classical charac-
terization was the hope that it translates to the quantum setting and thereby
yields a security proof of the 1-2 OT scheme in the bounded-quantum-storage
model. We will point out why this approach does not work.
1.3.3 Quantum Security Definitions and Protocols
When the players are allowed to use quantum communication, the output of
a dishonest player is a quantum state even when the protocol implements a
classical primitive. Therefore, security definitions for Rabin OT, 1-2 OT and
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BC have to be phrased in quantum terms. As an easy-to-use composability
framework has not yet been established for quantum protocols4, various ad-
hoc security requirements are commonly used. The definitions in this thesis
are the strongest so far proposed, and as they are based on the (classical)
considerations in [CSSW06], we believe that they are best suited to provide
sequential composability.
Most of the presented protocols in the bounded-quantum-storage model can
be cast in a non-interactive form, i.e. only one party sends information when
doing OT, commitment or opening. We show the following.
OT in the Bounded-Quantum-Storage Model: There exist non-interactive
protocols for Rabin OT and 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (1-2 OT) of ℓ-bit mes-
sages, secure in the bounded-quantum-storage model against adversaries with
quantum-memory size at most n/2− ℓ for Rabin OT and n/4− 2ℓ for 1-2 OT.
Here, n is the number of qubits transmitted in the protocol and ℓ can be a con-
stant fraction of n. Honest players need no quantum memory at all.
For the case of bit commitment, the standard definition of the binding
property used in the quantum setting was introduced by Dumais, Mayers and
Salvail [DMS00]. For b ∈ {0, 1}, let pb denote the probability that a dishonest
committer successfully opens the commitment to value b. The binding condition
then requires that the sum of p0 and p1 does essentially not exceed 1. More
formally, p0+p1 ≤ 1+negl(n) where negl(n) stands for a term which is negligible
in n such as 2−cn (for a constant c > 0) which is exponentially small in n. This
is to capture that a quantum committer can always commit to the values 0
and 1 in superposition. We call this notion weakly binding in the following. A
shortcoming of this notion is that committing bit by bit is not guaranteed to
yield a secure string commitment—the argument that one is tempted to use
requires independence of the pb’s between the different executions, which in
general does not hold.
Instead, we propose the following strong binding condition: After the com-
mitment phase, there exists a binary random variable D ∈ {0, 1} such that a
dishonest committer cannot open the commitment to value D except with neg-
ligible probability. The point is that the distribution of D is not under control
of the dishonest committer. We will point out that using this definition, we
can easily derive the security of a string commitment from the security of the
individual bits.
BC in the Bounded-Quantum-Storage Model: There exists a protocol
for bit commitment which is non-interactive. It is perfectly hiding and weakly
binding in the bounded-quantum-storage model against dishonest committers
with quantum-memory size at most n/2. It is strongly binding against memory
sizes of at most n/4. Here, n is the number of qubits transmitted in the protocol.
Honest players need no quantum memory at all.
Furthermore, the commitment protocol has the interesting property that
the only message is sent to the committer, i.e., it is possible to commit while
4Some rather complicated frameworks are known. They have been put forward by Ben-Or
and Mayers [BM04] and Unruh [Unr02].
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only receiving information. Such a scheme clearly does not exist without a
bound on the committer’s memory, even under computational assumptions and
using quantum communication: a corrupt committer could always store (pos-
sibly quantumly) all the information sent, until opening time, and only then
follow the honest committer’s algorithm to figure out what should be sent to
convincingly open a 0 or a 1.
Note that in the classical bounded-storage model, it has been shown by
Moran, Shaltiel and Ta-Shma [MST04] how to do time-stamping that is non-
interactive in our sense: a player can time-stamp a document while only receiv-
ing information. However, no reasonable protocol for BC or for time-stamping
a single bit exists in this model. It is straightforward to see that any such pro-
tocol can be broken by an adversary with classical memory of size twice that
of an honest player, while our protocol requires no quantum memory for the
honest players and remains secure against any adversary unable to store more
than half the size of the quantum transmission.
We also note that it has been shown earlier by Salvail [Sal98] that BC is
possible using quantum communication, assuming a different type of physical
limitation, namely a bound on the size of coherent measurement that can be
implemented. This limitation is incomparable to ours: it does not limit the
total size of the memory, instead it limits the number of bits that can be si-
multaneously operated on to produce a classical result. Our adversary has a
limit on the total quantum memory size, but can measure all of it coherently.
The protocol from [Sal98] is interactive, and requires a bound on the maximal
measurement size that is sub-linear in n.
1.3.4 Quantum Uncertainty Relations
A problem often encountered in quantum cryptography is the following: through
some interaction between the players, a quantum state is generated and then
measured by one of the players (we call her Alice in the following). Assuming
Alice is honest, we want to know how unpredictable her measurement outcome
is to the adversary. Once a lower bound on the adversary’s uncertainty about
Alice’s measurement outcome is established, it is usually easy to prove the de-
sired security property of the protocol. Many existing constructions in quantum
cryptography have been proven secure following this paradigm.
Typically, Alice does not make her measurement in a fixed basis, but chooses
at random from a set of different bases. These bases are usually chosen to be
pairwise mutually unbiased, meaning that if the quantum state is such that the
measurement outcome in one basis is fixed, then this implies that the uncer-
tainty about the outcome of the measurement in the other basis is maximal. In
this way, one hopes to keep the adversary’s uncertainty high, even if the state
is (partially) under the adversary’s control.
An inequality that lower bounds the adversary’s uncertainty in such a sce-
nario is called an uncertainty relation. There exist uncertainty relations for
different measures of uncertainty but cryptographic applications typically re-
quire the adversary’s min-entropy to be bounded from below. Such uncertainty
relations are the key ingredient in the security proofs of our protocols in the
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bounded-quantum-storage model.
In this thesis, we introduce new general and tight high-order entropic un-
certainty relations. Since the relations are expressed in terms of lower bounds
on the min-entropy or upper-bounds on large probabilities respectively, they
are applicable to a large class of natural protocols in quantum cryptography.
The first uncertainty relation is concerned with the situation where a n-qubit
state ρ is measured in one out of two mutually unbiased bases, say either in the
computational basis (the +-basis) or in the diagonal basis (the ×-basis).
First Uncertainty Relation: Let ρ be an arbitrary state of n qubits, and let
Q+(·) and Q×(·) be the respective probability distributions over {0, 1}n of the
outcome when ρ is measured in the +-basis respectively the ×-basis. Then, for
any two sets L+ ⊂ {0, 1}n and L× ⊂ {0, 1}n it holds that
Q+(L+) +Q×(L×) ≤ 1 + 2−n/2
√
|L+||L×|.
Another uncertainty relation is derived for situations where an n-qubit state
ρ has each of its qubits measured in a random and independent basis sampled
uniformly from a fixed set B of bases. B does not necessarily have to be mutu-
ally unbiased, but we assume a lower bound h—the so-called average entropic
uncertainty bound—on the average Shannon entropy of the distribution Pϑ, ob-
tained by measuring an arbitrary one-qubit state in basis ϑ ∈ B, meaning that
1
|B|
∑
ϑH(Pϑ) ≥ h.
Second Uncertainty Relation (informal): Let B be a set of bases with an
average entropic uncertainty bound h as above. Let Pθ denote the probability
distribution defined by measuring an arbitrary n-qubit state ρ in basis θ ∈ Bn.
For a uniform choice Θ ∈R Bn, it holds except with negligible probability (over
Θ and over Pθ) that
H∞(Pθ | Θ = θ) & nh. (1.1)
Observe that (1.1) cannot be improved significantly since the min-entropy
of a distribution is at most equal to the Shannon entropy. Our uncertainty
relation is therefore asymptotically tight when the bound h is tight.
Any lower bound on the Shannon entropy associated to a set of measure-
ments B can be used in (1.1). In the special case where the set of bases is
B = {+,×} (i.e. the two BB84 bases named after Bennett and Brassard who
used them in the first quantum-key-distribution protocol [BB84]), h is known
precisely using Maassen and Uffink’s entropic relation [MU88], see (4.2). We
get h = 12 and (1.1) results in H∞(Pθ | Θ = θ) & n2 . Uncertainty relations for
the BB84 coding scheme are useful, since this coding is widely used in quan-
tum cryptography. Its resilience to imperfect quantum channels, sources, and
detectors is an important advantage in practice.
A major difference between the first and second uncertainty relation is that
while both relations can be used to bound the min-entropy conditioned on an
event, this event happens in the latter case with probability essentially 1 (on
average) whereas the corresponding event from the first relation (defined in
Corollary 4.17) only happens with probability about 1/2.
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1.3.5 QKD against Quantum-Memory-Bounded Eavesdropper
We illustrate the versatility of our second uncertainty relation by applying it to
Quantum-Key-Distribution (QKD) settings. QKD is the art of distributing a
secret key between two distant parties, Alice and Bob, using only a completely
insecure quantum channel and authentic classical communication. QKD pro-
tocols typically provide unconditional security, i.e., even an adversary with un-
limited resources cannot get any information about the key. A major difficulty
when implementing QKD schemes is that they require a low-noise quantum
channel. The tolerated noise level depends on the actual protocol and on the
desired security of the key. Because the quality of the channel typically de-
creases with its length, the maximum tolerated noise level is an important
parameter limiting the maximum distance between Alice and Bob.
We consider a model in which the adversary has a limited amount of quan-
tum memory to store the information she intercepts during the protocol execu-
tion. In this model, we show that the maximum tolerated noise level is larger
than in the standard scenario where the adversary has unlimited resources. For
one-way QKD protocols which are protocols where error-correction is performed
non-interactively (i.e., a single classical message is sent from one party to the
other), we show the following result:
QKD Against Quantum-Memory-Bounded Eavesdroppers: Let B be a
set of orthonormal bases of the two-dimensional Hilbert space H2 with average
entropic uncertainty bound h. Then, a one-way QKD-protocol produces a se-
cure key against eavesdroppers whose quantum-memory size is sublinear in the
length of the raw key at a positive rate, as long as the bit-flip probability p of
the quantum channel fulfills h(p) < h where h(·) denotes the binary Shannon-
entropy function.
Although this result does not allow us to improve (compared to unbounded
adversaries) the maximum error-rate for the BB84 protocol (the 4-state proto-
col), the 6-state (using three mutually unbiased bases) protocol can be shown
secure against adversaries with memory bound sublinear in the secret-key length
as long as the bit-flip error-rate is less than 17%. This improves over the maxi-
mal error-rate of 13% for this protocol against unbounded adversaries. We also
show that the generalization of the 6-state protocol to more bases (not neces-
sarily mutually unbiased) can be shown secure for a maximal error-rate up to
20% provided the number of bases is large enough. Note that the best known
one-way protocol based on qubits is proven secure against general attacks for
an error-rate of only up to roughly 14.1%, and the theoretical maximum is
16.3% [RGK05].
The quantum-memory-bounded eavesdropper model studied here is not
comparable to other restrictions on adversaries considered in the literature
(e.g. individual attacks, where the eavesdropper is assumed to apply indepen-
dent measurements to each qubit sent over the quantum channel as considered
by Fuchs, Gisin, Griffiths, Niu, Peres, and Lu¨tkenhaus [FGG+97, Lu¨t00]). In
fact, these assumptions are generally artificial and their purpose is to simplify
security proofs rather than to relax the conditions on the quality of the com-
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munication channel from which secure key can be generated. We believe that
the quantum-memory-bounded eavesdropper model is more realistic.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis
In Chapter 2, we introduce notation and present some basic concepts from
probability and quantum information theory like quantum states and various
kinds of their entropies. We prepare the stage by reproducing and slightly
extending the results about privacy amplification via two-universal hashing from
Renner’s PhD thesis [Ren05].
Chapter 3 is the only (almost) exclusively classical chapter. It introduces
the different flavors of oblivious transfer and gives a characterization of the
security for the sender of 1-2 OT in terms of non-degenerate linear functions.
It is cast in a stand-alone manner and the rest of the thesis can be understood
without reading this chapter.
In Chapter 4, the basis for the security proofs of the following chapters is
laid by establishing the quantum min-entropic uncertainty relations. The fol-
lowing Chapters 5 and 6 contain the quantum definitions, protocols and secu-
rity proofs for Rabin OT and 1-2 OT, respectively. Chapter 7 treats quantum
bit commitment. Two flavors of the “binding property” are defined and the
techniques from the two previous chapters are used to prove security in the
bounded-quantum-storage model.
Chapter 8 is devoted to another application of the (second) uncertainty
relation, quantum key distribution against a quantum-memory-bounded eaves-
dropper. The last Chapter 9 addresses some practical issues in greater detail
and concludes.
A short summary of the notation, the bibliography and an index can be
found at the end of the thesis.
1.5 Related Work
The classical bounded-storage model is described in Section 1.2. Besides work
pointed out in the overview of the contributions in Section 1.3 above, it is
worth mentioning that several protocols aiming at achieving quantum obliv-
ious transfer have been proposed. After Wiesner’s original conjugate-coding
protocol [Wie83], Bennett, Brassard, Cre´peau, and Skubiszewska proposed an
interactive protocol for 1-2 OT [BBCS91], whose security was subsequently an-
alyzed by Cre´peau [Cre´94], Mayers, Salvail [MS94, May95], and Yao [Yao95].
The protocol from [BBCS91] is interactive and can be easily broken by a dis-
honest receiver with unbounded quantum memory. To ensure that the re-
ceiver actually performs a measurement, it was suggested to use (quantum)
bit-commitment schemes such as [BCJL93] which were believed to be secure
against such adversaries at this point in time. After the impossibility proofs of
quantum bit-commitment by Lo and Chau [LC97], and Mayers [May97], and
of oblivious transfer by Lo [Lo97], it became clear that assumptions are neces-
sary in order to securely realize these primitives. Compared to these previous
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attempts, the protocols in this thesis are simpler, non-interactive, and provably
secure according to stronger security definitions.
Work related to classical OT-reductions is referred to in the introductory
sections to Chapter 3 in Sections 3.1 and 3.4.1. Previous work about quantum
uncertainty relations is described in Section 4.2.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter, we introduce notation and basic concepts used throughout
the rest of the thesis. In addition, most of the following chapters have an
individual preliminary section introducing concepts that are exclusively used in
those specific chapters.
This chapter does not give a thorough introduction to probability theory,
information theory and quantum information processing, but we rather assume
the reader familiar with the basic concepts from the standard literature like
[CT91, NC00]. Instead, we give a specific overview of the concepts which are
required for understanding this thesis.
2.1 Notation and Basic Tools
For a sequence of variables x1, . . . , xn, we use the abbreviation x
i := x1, . . . , xi
for the collection of variables up to index i, and we define x0 := ∅ to be the
empty string.
For a set I = {i1, i2, . . . , iℓ} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and a n-bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n, we
define x|I := xi1xi2 · · · xiℓ . It is sometimes convenient that all substrings of this
form have the same length, irrespective of the actual size ℓ of the index set I.
Therefore, we define the n-bit string x|◦I := xi1xi2 · · · xiℓ0 · · · 0 to be the original
substring padded with n− ℓ zeros.
Most logarithms in this thesis are with respect to base 2 and denoted by
log(·). However, when needed, ln(·) denotes the natural logarithm to base e.
We write Bδn(x) for the ball of all n-bit strings at Hamming distance at
most δn from x. Note that the number of elements in Bδn(x) is the same for all
x, we denote it by Bδn := |Bδn(x)|. It is well known that Bδn ≤ 2nh(δ), where
h(p) := −(p · log p+ (1− p) · log (1− p))
is the binary entropy function.
We denote by negl(n) any function of n smaller than the inverse of any
polynomial provided n is sufficiently large.
If we want to choose two symbols + or × according to the bit b ∈ {0, 1},
12
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we write [+,×]b. The Kronecker delta function is defined as
δi,j =
{
1 if i = j,
0 if i 6= j.
The indicator random variable 1E equals 1, if the event E occurs and 0 else.
Definition 2.1 (convex/concave function) A function f : R → R is con-
vex on the interval [a, b], if for any two points x, y ∈ [a, b] and 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, it
holds that
f(sx+ (1− s)y) ≤ sf(x) + (1− s)f(y).
Analogously, the function is concave on [a, b], if
f(sx+ (1− s)y) ≥ sf(x) + (1− s)f(y).
Lemma 2.2 (Jensen’s inequality) Let f : R → R be a convex function on
R and let x1, . . . , xn ∈ R. Let p1, . . . , pn ∈ [0, 1] be such that
∑
i pi = 1. Then,
f
(
n∑
i=1
pixi
)
≤
n∑
i=1
pif(xi) .
For x1 = x2 = . . . = xn, equality holds.
Lemma 2.3 (Cauchy-Schwarz inquality) For real numbers x1, . . . , xn and
y1, . . . , yn, the following holds(
n∑
i=1
xi · yi
)2
≤
(
n∑
i=1
x2i
)
·
(
n∑
i=1
y2i
)
.
Proof: Note that
∑n
i=1(xi · z + yi)2 is a quadratic polynomial a · z2 + bz + c
without real roots unless all xi/yi are equal. Therefore, its discriminant b
2−4ac
is non-positive:
4
(
n∑
i=1
xi · yi
)2
− 4
(
n∑
i=1
x2i
)
·
(
n∑
i=1
y2i
)
≤ 0 .

2.2 Probability Theory
For a discrete probability space (Ω, P ), we write P [E ] for the probability of
the event E ⊂ Ω, and we write PX for the distribution of the random variable
X : Ω→ X taking values in the finite set X . As is common practice, we do not
refer to the probability space (Ω, P ) but leave it implicitly defined by the joint
probabilities of all considered events and random variables. For two random
variables X and Y with joint distribution PXY over X × Y, the conditional
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probability distribution of X given Y is defined as PX|Y (x|y) := PXY (x,y)PY (y) for all
x ∈ X and y ∈ Y with PY (y) > 0. For a probability distribution Q over X , we
abbreviate the (overall) probability of a set L ⊆ X with Q(L) :=∑x∈LQ(x).
Let P and Q be two probability distributions over the same finite domain
X . The variational distance1 δ(P,Q) between P and Q is defined as
δ
(
P,Q
)
:=
1
2
∑
x∈X
∣∣P (x)−Q(x)∣∣ .
Note that this definition makes sense also for non-normalized distributions, and
indeed we define and use δ
(
P,Q
)
for arbitrary positive-valued functions P and
Q with common domain. In case X is of the form X = U × V, we can expand
δ
(
P,Q
)
to δ
(
P,Q
)
=
∑
u δ
(
P (u, ·), Q(u, ·)) = ∑v δ(P (·, v), Q(·, v)). We write
P ≈ε Q to denote that P and Q are ε-close, i.e., that δ
(
P,Q
) ≤ ε.
By unif we denote a uniformly distributed binary random variable indepen-
dent of anything else, such that Punif(b) =
1
2 for both b ∈ {0, 1}, and unifℓ
stands for ℓ independent copies of unif.
For a random variable R over the reals R, its expected value is denoted by
E[R].
Lemma 2.4 (Markov’s inequality) For a non-negative real random variable
X and ε > 0, we have
Pr
[
X ≥ E[X]
ε
]
≤ ε .
Proof: For the indicator function 1E which equals 1 if the event E occurs and
0 else, we observe that
E[X]
ε
· 1n
X≥ E[X]
ε
o ≤ X .
Taking the expected values on both sides, using linearity of the expectation and
rearranging the terms yields the claim. 
Lemma 2.5 (Chernoff’s inequality) Let X1, . . . ,Xn be identically and in-
dependently distributed random variables with Bernoulli distribution, i.e. Xi =
1 with probability p and Xi = 0 with probability 1− p. Then S :=
∑n
i=1Xi has
binomial distribution with parameters (n, p) and it holds that
P [ |S − pn| > εn ] ≤ 2e−2ε2n .
See [AS00] or [MP95] for a proof.
1also called statistical or Kolmogorov distance
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2.3 Quantum Information Theory
In this section, we give a very brief introduction to the quantum notions we use
in this thesis, we refer to [NC00, Ren05] for further explanations.
For any positive integer d ∈ N, Hd stands for the complex Hilbert space of
dimension d. Sometimes, we omit the dimension and simply write H. The state
of a quantum-mechanical system in H is described by a density operator ρ. A
density operator ρ is normalized with respect to the trace norm (tr(ρ) = 1),
Hermitian (ρ∗ = ρ) and has non-negative eigenvalues. P(H) denotes the set of
all density operators acting on H. 1 denotes the identity matrix (describing the
fully mixed state) renormalized by the appropriate dimension.
A quantum state ρ ∈ P(H) is called pure if it is of the form ρ = |ϕ〉〈ϕ| for
a (normalized) vector |ϕ〉 ∈ H.
A positive operator-valued measurement (POVM) is a familyM = {Ex}x∈X
of non-negative operators such that
∑
x∈X Ex equals the identity matrix. The
probability distribution PX obtained when applying the POVMM to the quan-
tum state ρ is defined as PX(x) := tr(Exρ).
The general evolution (like unitary transforms, measurements, applying
noise etc.) of a quantum system in state ρ can be described by a quantum
operation E(ρ), which is a completely positive and trace-preserving map, i.e.
E is linear and maps non-negative normalized operators ρ ∈ P(H) into non-
negative normalized operators E(ρ) ∈ P(H).
The notion of (variational) distance of two random variables can be natu-
rally extended to the trace distance between two density operators ρ, σ ∈ P(H)
defined by δ
(
ρ, σ
)
: = 12 tr(|ρ − σ|), where we define |A| : =
√
A∗A to be the
positive square-root of A. As in the classical case, we write ρ ≈ε σ to denote
that ρ and σ are ε-close, i.e. δ
(
ρ, σ
) ≤ ε. The trace distance has an operational
meaning in that the value 12 +
1
2δ
(
ρ, σ
)
is the average success probability when
distinguishing ρ from σ via a measurement. In fact, the relation to the classical
variational distance becomes evident in δ
(
ρ, σ
)
= maxM δ
(
M(ρ),M(σ)
)
where
the maximization is over all POVMs M and M(ρ) refers to the probability dis-
tribution obtained when measuring ρ usingM . Ruskai [Rus94] showed that the
trace distance does not increase under (trace-preserving) quantum operations,
formally δ
(
ρ, σ
) ≤ δ(E(ρ), E(σ)) for any quantum operation E .
The pair {|0〉, |1〉} denotes the computational or rectilinear or “+” basis for
the 2-dimensional Hilbert space H2. The diagonal or “×” basis is defined as
{|0〉×, |1〉×} where |0〉× = (|0〉 + |1〉)/
√
2 and |1〉× = (|0〉 − |1〉)/
√
2. The circu-
lar or “	” basis consists of vectors (|0〉+ i|1〉)/√2 and (|0〉 − i|1〉)/√2. Mea-
suring a qubit in the + -basis (resp. ×-basis) means applying the measurement
described by projectors |0〉〈0| and |1〉〈1| (resp. projectors |0〉×〈0|× and |1〉×〈1|×).
When the context requires it, we write |0〉+ and |1〉+ instead of |0〉 respectively
|1〉. For a n-bit string x ∈ {0, 1}n, |x〉+ stands for the state
⊗n
i=1 |xi〉+ ∈ H2n
and analogous for |x〉×.
As mentioned above, the behavior of a quantum state in a register E is fully
described by its density matrix ρE . We often consider cases where a quantum
state may depend on some classical random variableX, in that it is described by
the density matrix ρxE if and only if X = x. For an observer who has only access
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to the register E but not to X, the behavior of the state is determined by the
density matrix
∑
x PX(x)ρ
x
E . The joint state, consisting of the classical X and
the quantum register E and therefore called cq-state, is described by the density
matrix
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE. In order to have more compact expressions, we
use the following notation. We write
ρXE =
∑
x
PX(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE and ρE = trX(ρXE) =
∑
x
PX(x)ρ
x
E .
More general, for any event E , we write
ρXE|E =
∑
x
PX|E(x)|x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE and ρE|E = trX(ρXE|E) =
∑
x
PX|E (x)ρxE .
We also write ρX =
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x| for the quantum representation of the
classical random variable X (and similarly for ρX|E). This notation extends
naturally to quantum states that depend on several classical random variables
(i.e. to ccq-states, cccq-states etc.). Given a cq-state ρXE as above, by saying
that there exists a random variable Y such that ρXY E satisfies some condition,
we mean that ρXE can be understood as ρXE = trY (ρXY E) for a ccq-state
ρXY E that satisfies the required condition.
Obviously, ρXE = ρX⊗ρE holds if and only if the quantum part is indepen-
dent ofX (in that ρxE = ρE for any x), where the latter in particular implies that
no information on X can be learned by observing only ρE . Furthermore, if ρXE
and ρX ⊗ ρE are ε-close in terms of their trace distance δ
(
ρ, σ
)
= 12 tr(|ρ− σ|),
then the real system ρXE “behaves” as the ideal system ρX ⊗ ρE except with
probability ε (as explained by Renner and Ko¨nig in [RK05]) in that for any
evolution of the system no observer can distinguish the real from the ideal one
with advantage greater than ε.
2.4 Entropies
2.4.1 Classical Re´nyi Entropy
Definition 2.6 Let P be a probability distribution over the finite set X and
α ∈ [0,∞]. The α-order sum of the probability distribution P is defined as
πα(P ) :=
∑
x∈X P (x)
α.
In the limits α → ∞ and α → 0, we set π∞(P ) : = maxx∈X P (x) and
π0(P ) := |{x ∈ X : P (x) > 0}.
Definition 2.7 (Re´nyi entropy [Re´n61]) Let P be a probability distribution
over the finite set X and α ∈ [0,∞]. The Re´nyi entropy of order α is defined
as
Hα(P ) :=
1
1− α log (πα(P )) = − log
((∑
x∈X
P (x)α)
1
α−1
)
.
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In the limit α→∞, we obtain themin-entropy H∞(P ) = − log
(
maxx∈X P (x)
)
and for α→ 0, we obtain max-entropy H0(P ) = log |{x ∈ X : P (x) > 0}|. An-
other important special case is the case α = 2, also known as collision probability
π2(P ) =
∑
x∈X P (x)
2 and collision entropy H2(P ) = − log
(∑
x P (x)
2
)
.
For the limit α → 1, we can use Jensen’s inequality (Lemma 2.2) with
px := P (x) to obtain
− 1
α− 1 log
(∑
x
pxP (x)
α−1
)
≤ −
∑
x
px log
(
(P (x)α−1)
1
α−1
)
.
In the limit α → 1, all P (x)α−1 go to 1 and therefore, equality holds and we
obtain the standard definition of Shannon entropy H(P ) := −∑x P (x) log P (x)
as in [Sha48].
For a random variable X with probability distribution PX , we will most
often slightly abuse notation and use the common shortcut Hα(X) instead of
Hα(PX). For a fixed random variable X over the finite set X , α 7→ Hα(X) is a
decreasing function on [0,∞]:
log |X | ≥ H0(X) ≥ H(X) ≥ H2(X) ≥ H∞(X) ,
with equality if and only if X is uniform over a subset of X . Furthermore, we
have that for α > 1, πα(X) =
∑
x PX(x)
α ≥ maxx PX(x)α and therefore,
Hα(X) =
1
1− α log πα(X) ≤
1
1− α log maxx PX(x)
α =
α
1− α log maxx PX(x) ,
which implies the following relation between Re´nyi entropies of order α > 1:
α− 1
α
Hα(X) ≤ H∞(X) . (2.1)
Conditional Re´nyi entropy
The Re´nyi entropy Hα(X|Y =y) of X given the event Y = y is naturally defined
as Hα(X|Y = y) = 11−α log
(∑
x PX|Y=y(x)
α
)
. We can define the conditional
α-order sum of X given Y and conditional Re´nyi entropy by
πα(X|Y ) := max
y
∑
x
PX|Y=y(x)α and Hα(X|Y ) :=
1
1− α log(πα(X|Y )) .
In the limits we have, π∞(X|Y ) = maxx,y PX|Y=y(x), π0(X|Y ) = maxy |{x ∈
X : PX|Y=y(x) > 0}|. For the conditional min-, collision- and max-entropy, we
get
H∞(X|Y ) := min
y
H∞(X|Y = y) = min
x,y
− log PX|Y=y(x),
H2(X|Y ) := min
y
H2(X|Y = y) = min
y
− log
(∑
x
PX|Y=y(x)2
)
,
H0(X|Y ) := max
y
H0(X|Y = y) = max
y
log |{x ∈ X : PX|Y=y(x) > 0}|.
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In the limit α ↓ 1, we get H↓1(X|Y ) = miny H(X|Y = y) and for α ↑ 1, we
get H↑1(X|Y ) = maxy H(X|Y = y) which might be different. However, the
standard definition of conditional Shannon entropy is neither of those, but “in
between”:
H(X|Y ) :=
∑
y
PY (y)H(X|Y = y) =
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y) log PX|Y=y(y) .
We note that in the literature, Hα(X|Y ) is sometimes defined as average
over Y ,
∑
y PY (y) Hα(X|Y =y), like for Shannon entropy. However, we define
the more natural following notion. For 1 < α < ∞, we define the average
conditional Re´nyi entropy H˜α(X|Y ) as
H˜α(X|Y ) := − log
(∑
y
PY (y)
(∑
x
PX|Y (x|y)α)
1
α−1
)
,
and as H˜∞(X|Y ) = − log
(∑
y PY (y)maxx PX|Y (x|y)
)
for α =∞. This notion
is useful in particular because it has the property that if the average conditional
Re´nyi entropy is large, then the conditional Re´nyi entropy is large with high
probability:
Lemma 2.8 Let α > 1 (allowing α = ∞) and t ≥ 0. Then with probability at
least 1− 2−κ (over the choice of y) Hα(X|Y = y) ≥ H˜α(X|Y )− κ.
Proof: By definition of average conditional Re´nyi entropy, we have
2−H˜α(X|Y ) = Ey
[
(πα(X|Y = y))
1
α−1
]
.
By the Markov’s inequality (Lemma 2.4), we get that
Pr
y
[
πα(X|Y = y)
1
α−1 ≥ 2−H˜α(X|Y )+κ
]
≤ 2−κ
and therefore, the probability (over y) that Hα(X|Y = y) ≤ H˜α(X|Y )− κ is at
most 2−κ. 
As long as α > 1, the minimization (or average) over y is the same for all
orders of Re´nyi entropy hence, Equation (2.1) translates to (average) conditional
Re´nyi entropy:
Lemma 2.9 For any 1 < α <∞, we have
H2(X|Y ) ≥ H∞(X|Y ) ≥ α− 1
α
Hα(X|Y )
H˜2(X|Y ) ≥ H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ α− 1
α
H˜α(X|Y ).
2.4. Entropies 19
Concavity
Lemma 2.10 For 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, Re´nyi Entropy is a concave entropic functional,
i.e., for 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 and distributions P,Q, we have
Hα(sP + (1− s)Q) ≥ sHα(P ) + (1− s)Hα(Q) .
For the case of Shannon entropy, note that the function f(p) := −p log p has
derivatives f ′(p) = −1 − log p and f ′′(p) = −1/p and f ′′(p) ≤ 0 for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Therefore, f(p) is concave and we have
H(sP + (1− s)Q) =
∑
x
f(sP (x) + (1− s)Q(x)) ≥
∑
x
sf(P (x)) + (1− s)f(Q(x))
= s
∑
x
f(P (x)) + (1− s)
∑
x
f(Q(x)) = sH(P ) + (1− s)H(Q).
Higher-order Re´nyi entropy is not necessarily concave as the following ex-
ample illustrates. Consider the distributions P (x) = δx,0 and Q(x) = 2
−n
over {0, 1}n with H2(P ) = 0 and H2(Q) = n. For the equal mixture of
these distributions holds H2((P + Q)/2) = − log(1/4) + O(2−n) ≈ 2 < n/2 =
(H2(P ) + H2(Q))/2 for n > 5.
Fano’s Inequality
Lemma 2.11 (Fano’s Inequality) Let X ↔ Y ↔ X ′ be a Markov chain2.
Then, for the error probability pe := P [X 6= X ′], it holds
H(X|Y ) ≤ h(pe) + pe · log(|X | − 1) .
Proof: We denote by E := 1{X 6=X′} the indicator random variable of the event
{X 6= X ′} that the guess was not successful. By the chain rule for Shannon
entropy, we can write
H(XE|Y ) = H(X|Y ) + H(E|XY ) = H(E|Y ) + H(X|EY )
We observe that H(E|Y ) ≤ h(pe), H(E|XY ) ≥ 0 and
H(X|EY ) = (1−pe)H(X|{X = X ′}Y )+peH(X|{X 6= X ′}Y ) = pe log(|X |−1)
and the claim follows by rearranging the terms. 
2.4.2 Smooth Re´nyi Entropy
Smooth min- and max-entropies were introduced by Renner andWolf in [Ren05,
RW05]3. They are families of entropy measures parametrized by non-negative
2Think of X ′ as guess of X based only on Y .
3The notion of smoothing a probability distribution was already used in [ILL89]. Further-
more, a different kind of smooth Re´nyi entropy (not equivalent to the ones used here) was
introduced by Cachin [Cac97].
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real numbers ε, called the smoothness. It is a generalization of the notions of
conditional min- and max-entropy defined in the last section.
Hε∞(X|Y ) := maxE minx,y − log
(
PXY E (x, y)
PY (y)
)
,
Hε0(X|Y ) := minE maxy log |{x ∈ X :
PXY E(x, y)
PY (y)
> 0}|
where the maximum/minimum ranges over all events E with probability Pr[E ] ≥
1 − ε. PXY E(x, y) is the probability that E occurs and X,Y take values x, y.
Hence, the “distribution” PXY E is not normalized.
For a given distribution PXY , it is easy to compute its smooth min-entropy
(max-entropy), simply by cutting a maximum mass of ε off the largest (smallest)
probabilities.
Informally, the statement Hε∞(X) = r can be understood that the standard
min-entropy ofX is close to r, except with probability ε. As ε can be interpreted
as an error probability, we typically require ε to be negligible in the security
parameter.
The reason why we only define the min- and max-versions of smooth Re´nyi
entropy is that it is shown in [RW05] that for example smooth Re´nyi entropy
of order α > 1 obeys
Hε+ε
′
∞ (X|Y ) +
log(1/ε′)
α− 1 ≥ H
ε
α(X|Y ) ≥ Hε∞(X|Y ) .
and hence is equivalent to smooth min-entropy up to an additive term which
depends on α and the smoothness ε′. An analogue statement holds for α < 1
and smooth max-entropy. As pointed out in [RW05], for ε = 0 the relation
above shows for example that H2(X) cannot be larger than H
ε
∞(X) + log(1/ε)
whereas for the non-smooth versions, we only know from Equation (2.1) that
H2(X) ≤ 2H∞(X).
Most importantly, smooth min- and max-entropy have an operational mean-
ing as they provide the answer to two fundamental information-theoretic prob-
lems:
• Hε∞(X|Y ) is the maximum amount4 of randomness that can be extracted
from X and an independent random string R, such that except with prob-
ability ε, the extracted string looks completely uniform to an adversary
who knows Y and learns R. This falls into the setting of privacy amplifi-
cation, see Section 2.5 below.
• Hε0(X|Y ) is the minimal length4 of an encoding computed from X and
some additional independent randomness R, such that except with proba-
bility ε, someone knowing Y and R can reconstruct X from the encoding.
This is a data-compression problem which is often called information rec-
onciliation or error correction in cryptographic settings.
4up to some small additive error term which depends logarithmically on ε
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In [RW05], it is shown that smooth min- and max-entropies enjoy sev-
eral Shannon-like properties such as the chain rule (see Lemma 2.12 below),
sub-additivity Hε∞(XY ) ≤ Hε+ε
′
∞ (X) + H
ε′
0 (Y ) and monotonicity H
ε
∞(X) ≤
Hε∞(XY )).
Lemma 2.12 (Chain Rule [RW05]) For all ε, ε′ > 0, we have
Hε+ε
′
∞ (X|Y ) > Hε∞(XY )−H0(Y )− log
(
1
ε′
)
.
As a consequence of the asymptotic equipartition property (cf. [CT91]),
smooth Re´nyi entropy is asymptotically equal to Shannon entropy in the fol-
lowing sense.
Lemma 2.13 ([RW05, HR06]) Let (X1, Y1), . . . , (Xn, Yn) be n independent
pairs of random variables distributed according to PXY . Then, for any α 6= 1,
lim
ε→0
lim
n→∞
Hεα(X
n|Y n)
n
= H(X|Y ).
Note that such a lemma does not hold at all for non-smooth Re´nyi entropies.
To provide some intuition about smooth min-entropy, the following lemma
shows how to translate smooth min-entropy back to regular conditional min-
entropy.
Lemma 2.14 If Hε∞(X|Y ) = r then there exists an event E ′ such that Pr(E ′) ≥
1− 2ε and H∞(X|E ′, Y =y) ≥ r − 1 for every y with PY E ′(y) > 0.
Proof: By definition of smooth min-entropy, there exists an event E with
Pr(E) ≥ 1− ε and such that H∞(XE|Y =y) ≥ r for all y, and thus PXE|Y (x|y)
≤ 2−r for all x and y. Define E ′ by setting for all x and y
PXE ′|Y (x|y) :=
{
PXE|Y (x|y) if PE|Y (y) ≥ 12
0 else
Then obviously for any y with PY E ′(y) > 0 and thus PE ′|Y (y) = PE|Y (y) ≥ 12 ,
PX|E ′Y (x|y) =
PXE ′|Y (x|y)
PE ′|Y (y)
≤ 2
−r
PE ′|Y (y)
≤ 2−r+1 .
Furthermore,
1− ε ≤ Pr(E)
= Pr(E|PE|Y (Y ) < 12) · Pr(PE|Y (Y ) < 12)
+ Pr(E|PE|Y (Y ) ≥ 12) · Pr(PE|Y (Y ) ≥ 12) (2.2)
≤ 1
2
Pr(PE|Y (Y ) < 12) + Pr(PE|Y (Y ) ≥ 12)
2.4. Entropies 22
from which follows that Pr(PE|Y (Y ) < 12) ≤ 2ε. Thus we can conclude that
Pr(E ′) ≥ Pr(E ′|PE|Y (Y ) ≥ 12 ) · Pr(PE|Y (Y ) ≥ 12)
≥ Pr(E|PE|Y (Y ) ≥ 12) · Pr(PE|Y (Y ) ≥ 12)
≥ 1− ε− 1
2
Pr(PE|Y (Y ) < 12)
≥ 1− 2ε
where the second-last inequality follows from (2.2), and noting (once more) that
Pr(E|PE|Y (Y ) < 12) < 12 . 
2.4.3 Min-Entropy-Splitting Lemma
For proving reductions between variants of oblivious transfer in Section 3.4 and
the security of 1-2 OT in the bounded-quantum storage in Chapter 6, we will
make use of the following min-entropy splitting lemma. Note that if the joint
entropy of two random variables X0 and X1 is large, then one is tempted to
conclude that at least one of X0 and X1 must still have large entropy, e.g. half
of the original entropy. Whereas this is indeed true for Shannon entropy, it
is in general not true for min-entropy. The following lemma, though, which
first appeared in a preliminary version of [Wul07], shows that it is true in a
randomized sense.
Lemma 2.15 (Min-Entropy-Splitting Lemma) Let ε ≥ 0, and let X0,X1
be random variables with Hε∞(X0X1) ≥ α Then, there exists a random variable
C ∈ {0, 1} such that Hε∞(X1−CC) ≥ α/2.
Proof: Below, we give the proof for ε = 0, i.e., for ordinary (non-smooth) min-
entropy. The general claim for smooth min-entropy follows immediately by
observing that the same argument also works for non-normalized distributions
with a total probability smaller than 1.
We extend the probability distribution PX0X1 as follows to PX0X1C . Let
C = 1 if PX1(X1) ≥ 2−α/2 and C = 0 otherwise. We have that for all x1,
PX1C(x1, 0) either vanishes or is equal to PX1(x1). In any case, PX1C(x1, 0) <
2−α/2.
On the other hand, for all x1 with PX1C(x1, 1) > 0, we have that PX1C(x1, 1) =
PX1(x1) ≥ 2−α/2 and therefore, for all x0,
PX0X1C(x0, x1, 1) ≤ 2−α = 2−α/2 · 2−α/2 ≤ 2−α/2PX1(x1).
Summing over all x1 with PX0X1C(x0, x1, 1) > 0, and thus with PX1C(x1, 1) > 0,
results in
PX0C(x0, 1) ≤
∑
x1
2−α/2PX1(x1) ≤ 2−α/2.
This shows that PX1−CC(x, c) ≤ 2−α/2 for all x, c. 
The corollary below follows rather straightforwardly by noting that (for
normalized as well as non-normalized distributions) H∞(X0X1|Z) ≥ α holds
exactly if H∞(X0X1|Z = z) ≥ α for all z, applying the Min-Entropy Splitting
Lemma, and then using the chain rule, Lemma 2.12.
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Corollary 2.16 Let ε ≥ 0 be given, and let X0,X1, Z be random variables with
Hε∞(X0X1|Z) ≥ α. Then, there exists a binary random variable C ∈ {0, 1} such
that for ε′ > 0,
Hε+ε
′
∞ (X1−C |ZC) ≥ α/2− 1− log(1/ε′).
2.4.4 Entropy of Quantum States
As pointed out in [RK05], Re´nyi entropy Hα(ρ) can also be defined for a quan-
tum state ρ ∈ P(H). For α ∈ [0,∞] and ρ ∈ P(H), we have
Hα(ρ) :=
1
1− α log (tr (ρ
α)) .
In the limit cases α → 0 and α → ∞, we obtain H0(ρ) = log(rank(ρ)) and
H∞(ρ) = − log (λmax(ρ)), where λmax(ρ) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of ρ.
For α = 2, we obtain the collision entropy H2(ρ) = − log
(∑
i λ
2
i
)
, where {λi}i
are the eigenvalues of ρ.
For a classical random variable X encoded in ρX =
∑
x PX(x)|x〉〈x|, it holds
that that Hα(ρX) = Hα(X).
For deriving our version of the privacy-amplification theorem in the next
section, we need the slightly more involved version of quantum conditional
min-entropy from [Ren05].
Definition 2.17 ([Ren05]) Let ρAB ∈ P(HA ⊗ HB) and σB ∈ P(HB). The
min-entropy of ρAB relative to σB is
Hmin(ρAB|σB) := − log λ
where λ is the minimum real number such that λ·1A⊗σB−ρAB is non-negative.
The min-entropy of ρAB given HB is
Hmin(ρAB |B) := sup
σB
Hmin(ρAB |σB)
where the supremum ranges over all σB ∈ P(HB).
Similar to the classical case, the smooth version can be defined as follows.
Definition 2.18 ([Ren05]) Let ρAB ∈ P(HA⊗HB), σB ∈ P(HB), and ε ≥ 0.
The ε-smooth min-entropy of ρAB relative to σB is
Hεmin(ρAB |σB) := sup
ρAB
Hmin(ρAB |σB)
where the supremum ranges over the set Bε(ρAB) containing all Hermitian,
non-negative operators ρAB acting on HA ⊗ HB such that δ
(
ρAB , ρAB
) ≤ 2ε
and tr(ρAB) ≤ 1.
The ε-smooth min-entropy given HB is
Hεmin(ρAB |B) := sup
σB
Hεmin(ρAB |σB)
where the supremum ranges over all σB ∈ P(HB).
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To compute Hεmin(ρXB |σB) where ρXB is a cq-state, the supremum can be
restricted to states ρXB ∈ Bε(ρXB) which are classical on HX as well [Ren05,
Remark 3.2.4].
There is a chain rule for smooth min-entropy, proven in [Ren05, Lemma
3.2.9].
Lemma 2.19 ([Ren05]) Let ρXUE ∈ P(HX ⊗HU ⊗HE), σU ∈ P(HU ), and
let σE ∈ P(HE) be the fully mixed state on the image of ρE, and let ε ≥ 0.
Then
Hεmin(ρXUE |σU )−Hmax(ρE) ≤ Hεmin(ρXUE |σU ⊗ σE).
The following two lemmas state that dropping a quantum register cannot
increase the (smooth) min-entropy.
Lemma 2.20 Let ρXUQ ∈ P(HX ⊗HU ⊗HQ) be a ccq-state. Then,
Hmin(ρXUQ|ρU ) ≥ Hmin(ρXU |ρU ).
Proof: For λ := 2−Hmin(ρXU |ρU ), we have by Definition 2.17 that λ · 1X ⊗ ρU −
ρXU ≥ 0. Using that both X and U are classical, we derive that for all x, u, it
holds λ ·pu−pxu ≥ 0, where pu and pxu are shortcuts for the probabilities PU (u)
and PXU (x, u). Let the normalized conditional operator ρ
x,u
Q be the quantum
state conditioned on the event that X = x and U = u, i.e.∑
x,u
pxu ρ
x,u
Q ⊗ |xu〉〈xu| = ρQXU .
Then, ∑
x,u
λ · pu ρx,uQ ⊗ |xu〉〈xu| − pxu ρx,uQ ⊗ |xu〉〈xu| ≥ 0.
Because of ρx,uQ ≤ 1Q, we get∑
x,u
λ · pu 1Q ⊗ |xu〉〈xu| − pxu ρx,uQ ⊗ |xu〉〈xu| ≥ 0.
Therefore, λ · 1QX ⊗ ρU − ρQXU ≥ 0 holds, from which follows by definition
that Hmin(ρXUQ|ρU ) ≥ − log(λ). 
Lemma 2.21 Let ρXUQ ∈ P(HX ⊗ HU ⊗ HQ) be a ccq-state and let ε ≥ 0.
Then
Hεmin(ρXUQ|ρU ) ≥ Hεmin(ρXU |ρU ).
Proof: After the remark after Definition 2.18 above, there exists σXU ∈ Bε(ρXU )
classical on HX ⊗HU such that Hεmin(ρXU |ρU ) = Hmin(σXU |σU ). Because both
X and U are classical, we can write σXU =
∑
x,u pxu|xu〉〈xu| and extend it
to obtain σXUQ : =
∑
x,u pxu|xu〉〈xu| ⊗ ρx,uQ . Lemma 2.20 from above yields
Hmin(σXU |σU ) ≤ Hmin(σXUQ|σU ). We have by construction that δ
(
σXUQ, ρXUQ
)
=
δ
(
σXU , ρXU
) ≤ 2ε. Therefore, σXUQ ∈ Bε(ρXUQ) and Hmin(σXUQ|σU ) ≤
Hεmin(ρXUQ|ρU ). 
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2.5 Two-Universal Hashing and Privacy Amplifica-
tion against Quantum Adversaries
2.5.1 History and Setting of Privacy Amplification
Assume two parties Alice and Bob share some information X which is only
partly secure in the sense that an adversary Eve has some partial knowledge
about it. Privacy Amplification, introduced by Bennett, Brassard, and Robert
[BBR88], is the art of transforming this information X into a highly secure key
K by public discussion. The honest parties want to end up with an almost
uniformly distributed key K about which Eve has only negligible information
given the communication.
A common way to achieve this is to have Alice pick a hash function f at
random from a two-universal class of hashing functions (see next section for
the definition), apply it to X and announce it to Bob, who applies it to X as
well. Due to the randomizing properties of a two-universal function, the output
f(X) is close to uniformly distributed from Eve’s point of view. As shown
in [BBR88] and by Impagliazzo, Levin, Luby [ILL89] and Bennett, Brassard,
Cre´peau, and Maurer [BBCM95], the classical privacy amplification theorem or
left-over hash lemma (see Corollary 2.27 below) states that if Eve has some
classical knowledge W about X, a secure key of length roughly the uncertainty
of Eve about X (measured in terms of min-entropy) can be extracted by two-
universal hashing. It is pointed out in [RW05], that the maximum amount
of extractable randomness is essentially given by the conditional smooth min-
entropy Hε∞(X|W ).
It is interesting to investigate the case when Eve holds quantum infor-
mation about X. This scenario has been considered by Ko¨nig, Maurer, and
Renner [KMR05, RK05, Ren05] and the results reproduced below show that
two-universal hashing works just as well against quantum as against classical
adversaries.
We note that unlike in the classical case, where many other forms of ran-
domness extractors are known, two-universal hashing is essentially the only
way to perform privacy amplification against quantum adversaries.5 This tool
is one of the key ingredients in all protocols presented in this thesis. It has
been widely used in other applications as well, for example in security proofs
of quantum-key-distribution schemes by Christandl, Renner, Ekert, Kraus, and
Gisin [CRE04, KGR05, RGK05, Ren05].
2.5.2 Two-Universal Hashing
An important tool we use is two-universal hashing.
Definition 2.22 A class Fn of hashing functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ is
called two-universal, if for any pair x, y ∈ {0, 1}n with x 6= y, and F uniformly
5In a recent paper, Ko¨nig and Terhal [KT06] exhibit some extractors which work against
quantum adversaries, but the parameters are far from the classical ones.
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chosen from Fn, it holds that
P
[
F (x) = F (y)
] ≤ 1
2ℓ
.
We can also define a slightly stronger notion of two-universality as follows:
Definition 2.23 A class Fn of hashing functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ is
called strongly two-universal, if for any pair x, y ∈ {0, 1}n with x 6= y, and F
uniformly chosen from Fn, the random variables F (x) and F (y) are independent
and uniformly distributed over {0, 1}ℓ.
Several two-universal and strongly two-universal classes of hashing functions
are such that evaluating and picking a function uniformly and at random in Fn
can be done efficiently, as pointed out by Wegman and Carter [CW77, WC79].
2.5.3 Privacy Amplification against Quantum Adversaries
In the following, we consider the situation where a hash function is picked
randomly from Fn and applied to a classical value X ∈ {0, 1}n which is cor-
related with a quantum register HE. Formally, starting with the cq-state
ρXE =
∑
x∈{0,1}n PX(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρxE , we obtain
ρF (X)FE =
∑
f∈Fn
∑
z∈{0,1}ℓ
|z〉〈z| ⊗ |f〉〈f | ⊗
∑
x∈f−1(z)
PX(x) ρ
x
E . (2.3)
The following privacy-amplification theorem in the presence of quantum adver-
saries was first derived in [RK05]. The version below is from [Ren05, Corollary
5.6.1]6.
Theorem 2.24 (Privacy Amplification [Ren05]) Let ρXB ∈ P(HX⊗HB)
be a cq-state, where X takes values in {0, 1}n. Let Fn be a two-universal family
of hash functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ, and let ε ≥ 0. Then, for the ccq-state
ρF (X)FB defined by (2.3), it holds
δ
(
ρF (X)FB ,1⊗ ρFB
) ≤ ε+ 1
2
2−
1
2
(Hεmin(ρXB |B)−ℓ).
For large parts of this thesis, slightly weaker forms of this theorem are used.
These are derived in the following.
Corollary 2.25 Let ρXUE be a ccq-state, where X takes values in {0, 1}n, U in
the finite domain U and register E contains q qubits. Let Fn be a two-universal
family of hash functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ, and let ε ≥ 0. Then, for the
cccq-state ρF (X)FUE defined analogous to (2.3), it holds
δ
(
ρF (X)FUE,1⊗ ρFUE
) ≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
(
Hε∞(X|U)−q−ℓ
)
+ ε. (2.4)
6Note that in [Ren05], the distance from uniform is defined in terms of the trace-norm
distance which is twice the variational distance used in this thesis.
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Recall that by the definition of the trace-distance, we have that if the right-
most term of (2.4) is negligible, i.e. say smaller than 2−λn, then this situation
is 2−λn-close to the ideal situation where F (X) is perfectly uniform and inde-
pendent of F,U and E. In particular, replacing F (X) by an independent and
uniformly distributed bit results in a common state which essentially cannot be
distinguished from the original one.
Proof: In our case, the quantum register B from Theorem 2.24 consists of a
classical part U and a quantum part E. Denoting by σE the fully mixed state
on the image of ρE , we only need to consider the term in the exponent to derive
Theorem 2.25 as follows
Hεmin(ρXUE |UE) ≥ Hεmin(ρXUE |ρU ⊗ σE)
≥ Hεmin(ρXUE |ρU )−Hmax(ρE) (2.5)
≥ Hεmin(ρXU |ρU )−Hmax(ρE) (2.6)
= Hε∞(X|U)− q.
The first inequality follows by Definition 2.18 of Hεmin as supremum over all
σUE. Inequality (2.5) is the chain rule for smooth min-entropy (Lemma 2.19).
Inequality (2.6) uses that the smooth min-entropy cannot decrease when drop-
ping the quantum register which is proven in Lemma 2.21 from the last section.
The last step follows by assumption about the quantum register and observ-
ing that the state ρXU is classical and the quantum Definition 2.18 therefore
reduces to classical smooth min-entropy. 
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Corollary 2.25. In Chap-
ter 7, this lemma will be useful for proving the binding condition of our com-
mitment scheme. Recall that for X ∈ {0, 1}n, Bδn(X) denotes the set of all
n-bit strings at Hamming distance at most δn from X and Bδn := |Bδn(X)| is
the number of such strings.
Corollary 2.26 Let ρXUE be a ccq-state, where X takes values in {0, 1}n, U
in the finite domain U and register E contains q qubits. Let Xˆ be a guess for
X obtained by learning U and measuring E, and let ε ≥ 0. Then, for all δ < 12
it holds that
P
[
Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X)] ≤ 2− 12 (Hε∞(X|U)−q−1)+log(Bδn) + 2ε · Bδn.
In other words, given some classical knowledge U and a quantum memory of
q qubits arbitrarily correlated with a classical random variable X, the prob-
ability to find Xˆ at Hamming distance at most δn from X where nh(δ) <
1
2(H
ε
∞(X|U)) − q) is small.
Proof: Here is a strategy to try to bias F (X) when given Xˆ and F ∈R Fn:
Sample X ′ ∈R Bδn(Xˆ) and output F (X ′). Note that, using psucc as a short
hand for the probability P
[
Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X)] to be bounded,
P
[
F (X ′) = F (X)
]
=
psucc
Bδn
+
(
1− psucc
Bδn
)
1
2
=
1
2
+
psucc
2 · Bδn ,
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where the first equality follows from the fact that if X ′ 6= X then, as Fn is
two-universal, P [F (X) = F (X ′)] = 12 . Note that, given F and U and being
allowed to measure E, the probability of correctly guessing a binary F (X) is
upper bounded by 12 + δ
(
ρF (X)FUE,1⊗ ρFUE
)
[FvdG99]. In combination with
Corollary 2.25 (with ℓ = 1) the above results in
1
2
+
psucc
2 · Bδn ≤
1
2
+
1
2
2−
1
2
(Hε∞(X|U)−q−1) + ε
and the claim follows by rearranging the terms. 
2.5.4 Classical Privacy Amplification
The classical privacy-amplification theorem follows as special case from the
results above. When there is no quantum correlation, we (almost) recover the
well-known classical left-over hash lemma [ILL89, BBCM95, HILL99]:
Corollary 2.27 Let X be a random variable over {0, 1}n, and let F denote the
uniform choice of a hash function in a two-universal family of hash functions
Fn mapping from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ. Then
δ
(
PF (X)F , PunifℓPF
) ≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
(H2(X)−ℓ) .
This corollary (with collision- instead of min-entropy in the exponent on the
right-hand side) cannot immediately be derived from Theorem 2.24 above, but
rather from its proof in [Ren05]. The reason for this is that the easiest way
of proving both Theorem 2.24 and Corollary 2.27 is by directly considering
collision entropy instead of min-entropy. On the other hand, relaxing the notion
of collision entropy to smooth min-entropy gives the natural operative meaning
(see Section 2.4.2) and interestingly, it only looks like we are losing something
by doing that, but in fact this achieves optimality [RW05].
Chapter 3
Classical Oblivious Transfer
Most of the results presented in this chapter are published in [DFSS06].
3.1 Introduction and Outline
As already mentioned in Section 1.1, 1-out-of-2 Oblivious-Transfer, 1-2 OT for
short, is a two-party primitive which allows a sender to send two bits (or, more
generally, strings) B0 and B1 to a receiver, who is allowed to learn one of the two
according his choice C. Informally, it is required that the receiver only learns
BC but not B1−C (what we call security for the honest sender, hence sender-
security), while at the same time the sender does not learn C (receiver-security).
Interestingly, 1-2 OT was introduced by Wiesner around 1970 (but only pub-
lished much later [Wie83]) under the name of “multiplexing” in the context of
quantum cryptography, and, inspired by [Rab81] where a different flavor was
introduced, later re-discovered by Even, Goldreich and Lempel [EGL82].
1-2 OT turned out to be very powerful as Kilian [Kil88] showed it to be
sufficient for secure general two-party computation. For this reason, much
effort has been put into reducing 1-2 OT to seemingly weaker flavors of OT,
like Rabin OT, 1-2 XOT, etc. [Cre´87, BC97, Cac98, Wol00, BCW03, CS06].
In this chapter, we focus on a slightly modified notion of 1-2 OT, which we
call Randomized 1-2 OT, Rand 1-2 OT for short, where the bits (or strings) B0
and B1 are not input by the sender, but generated uniformly at random during
the Rand 1-2 OT and then output to the sender. It is still required that the
receiver only learns the bit (or string) of his choice, BC , whereas the sender
does not learn any information on C. It is obvious that a Rand 1-2 OT can
easily be turned into an ordinary 1-2 OT simply by using the generated B0
and B1 to mask the actual input bits (or strings). Furthermore, all known
constructions of unconditionally secure 1-2 OT protocols make implicitly the
detour via Rand 1-2 OT.
In a first step, we observe that the sender-security condition of a Rand 1-2 OT
of bits is equivalent to requiring the XOR B0⊕B1 to be close to uniformly dis-
tributed from the receiver’s point of view. The proof is very simple, and it is
kind of surprising that—to the best of our knowledge—this has not been real-
ized before. We then ask and answer the question whether there is a natural
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generalization of this result to Rand 1-2 OT of strings. Note that requiring
the bit wise XOR of the two strings to be uniformly distributed is obviously
not sufficient. We show that the sender-security for Rand 1-2 OT of strings
can be characterized in terms of non-degenerate linear functions (bivariate bi-
nary linear functions which non-trivially depend on both arguments, as defined
in Definition 3.3): sender-security holds if and only if the result of applying
any non-degenerate linear function to the two strings is (close to) uniformly
distributed from the receiver’s point of view.
We then show the usefulness of this new understanding of 1-2 OT. We
demonstrate this on the problem of reducing 1-2 OT to weaker primitives. Con-
cretely, we show that the reducibility of an ordinary 1-2 OT to weaker flavors
via a non-interactive reduction follows by a trivial argument from our charac-
terization of sender-security. This is in sharp contrast to the current literature:
The proofs given by Brassard, Cre´peau and Wolf [BC97, Wol00, BCW03] for
reducing 1-2 OT to 1-2 XOT, 1-2 GOT and 1-2 UOT (we refer to Section 3.4
for a description of these flavors of OT) are rather complicated and tailored
to a particular class of privacy-amplifying hash functions; whether the reduc-
tions also work for a less restricted class is left as an open problem [BCW03,
page 222]. And, the proof given by Cachin [Cac98] for reducing 1-2 OT to one
execution of a general UOT is not only complicated, but also incorrect, as we
will point out. Thus, our characterization of the condition for sender-security
allows to simplify existing reducibility proofs and, along the way, to solve the
open problem posed in [BCW03], as well as to improve the reduction parameters
in most cases, but it also allows for new, respectively until now only incorrectly
proven reductions. In recent work by Wullschleger [Wul07], the analysis of these
reductions is further improved.
Furthermore, we extend our result and show how our characterization of
Rand 1-2 OT in terms of non-degenerate linear functions translates to 1-n OT.
As historical side note, we note that the original motivation for character-
izing sender-security with the help of NDLFs was to prove sender-security of
the quantum protocol for 1-2 OT described in Chapter 6. We point out by an
example in Section 3.6 at the end of this chapter why this approach does not
work.
3.2 Defining 1-2 OT
3.2.1 Randomized 1-2 OT of Bits
Formally capturing the intuitive understanding of the security of 1-2 OT is a
non-trivial and subtle task. For instance requiring the sender’s view to be
independent of the receiver’s choice bit C is too strong a requirement, since his
input might already depend on C. The best one can hope for is that his view is
independent of C conditioned on his input B0, B1. Security against a dishonest
receiver is even more subtle. We refer to the security definition by Cre´peau,
Savvides, Schaffner and Wullschleger of [CSSW06], where it is argued that this
definition is the “right” way to define unconditionally secure 1-2 OT. In their
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model, a secure 1-2 OT protocol is as good as an ideal 1-2 OT functionality.
In this thesis, we will mainly focus on a slight modification of 1-2 OT, which
we call Randomized 1-2 OT (although sender-randomized 1-2 OT would be a
more appropriate, but also rather lengthy name). A Randomized 1-2 OT, or
Rand 1-2 OT for short, essentially coincides with an ordinary 1-2 OT, except
that the two bits B0 and B1 are not input by the sender but generated uniformly
at random during the protocol and output to the sender. This is formalized in
Definition 3.1 below.
There are two main justifications for focusing on Rand 1-2 OT. First, an
ordinary 1-2 OT can easily be constructed from a Rand 1-2 OT: the sender
can use the randomly generated B0 and B1 to one-time-pad encrypt his input
bits for the 1-2 OT, and send the masked bits to the receiver (as first realized
by Beaver [Bea95]). For a formal proof of this we refer to the full version
of [CSSW06]. And second, all information-theoretically secure constructions of
1-2 OT protocols we are aware of in fact do implicitly build a Rand 1-2 OT and
use the above reduction to achieve 1-2 OT.
We formalize Rand 1-2 OT in such a way that it minimizes and simplifies
as much as possible the security restraints, while at the same time remaining
sufficient for 1-2 OT.
Definition 3.1 (Rand 1-2 OT) An ε-secure Rand 1-2 OT is a protocol be-
tween sender S and receiver R, with R having input C ∈ {0, 1} (while S has no
input), such that for any distribution of C, the following properties hold:
ε-Correctness: For honest S and R, S has output B0, B1 ∈ {0, 1} and R has
output BC , except with probability ε.
ε-Receiver-security: For honest R and any (dishonest) S˜ with output V ,
δ
(
PCV , PC · PV
) ≤ ε.
ε-Sender-security: For honest S and any (dishonest) R˜ with output W , there
exists a binary random variable D such that
δ
(
PB1−DWBDD, Punif · PWBDD
) ≤ ε.
The condition for receiver-security simply says that S learns no information on
C, and sender-security requires that there exists a choice bit D, supposed to be
C, such that when given the choice D and the corresponding bit BD, then the
other bit, B1−D, is completely random from R’s point of view.
We would like to point out that the definition of Rand 1-2 OT given in
[CSSW06] look syntactically slightly different than our Definition 3.1. However,
it is not hard to see that they are actually equivalent. The main difference is
that the definition in [CSSW06] involves an auxiliary input Z, which is given
to the dishonest player, and receiver- and sender-security as we define them are
required to hold conditioned on Z for any Z. Considering a constant Z imme-
diately proves one direction of the claimed equivalence, and the other follows
from the observation that if receiver- and sender-security as we define them
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hold for any distribution PB0B1C (respectively PC), then they also hold for the
conditional distribution PB0B1C|Z=z (respectively PC|Z=z). The other difference
is that in [CSSW06], in the condition for sender-security of Rand 1-2 OT, B1−D
is required to be random and independent of W , BD, D and C. This of course
implies our sender-security condition (which is without C), but it is also implied
by our definition as C may be part of the output W . We feel that simplifying
the definitions as we do, without changing their meaning, allows for an easier
handling.
3.2.2 Randomized 1-2 OT of Strings
In a 1-2 String OT the sender inputs two strings of the same length, and the
receiver is allowed to learn one and only one of the two. Formally, for any
positive integer ℓ, 1-2 OT ℓ and Rand 1-2 OT ℓ can be defined along the same
lines as 1-2 OT and Rand 1-2 OT of bits: the binary random variables B0 and
B1 as well as unif in Definition 3.1 are simply replaced by random variables S0
and S1 and unif
ℓ with range {0, 1}ℓ.
3.3 Characterizing Sender-Security
3.3.1 The Case of Bit OT
It is well known and it follows from sender-security that in a (Rand) 1-2 OT
the receiver R should in particular learn essentially no information on the XOR
B0 ⊕B1 of the two bits. The following proposition shows that this is not only
necessary for sender-security but also sufficient.
Theorem 3.2 The condition for ε-sender-security for a Rand 1-2 OT is satis-
fied for a particular (possibly dishonest) receiver R˜ with output W if and only
if
δ
(
P(B0⊕B1)W , Punif · PW
) ≤ ε .
Before going into the proof which is surprisingly simple, consider the follow-
ing example. Assume a candidate protocol for Rand 1-2 OT and a dishonest
receiver R˜ which is able to outputW = 0 if B0 = 0 = B1,W = 1 if B0 = 1 = B1
and W = 0 or 1 with probability 1/2 each in case B0 6= B1. Then, it is easy to
see that conditioned on, say, W = 0, (B0, B1) is (0, 0) with probability
1
2 , and
(0, 1) and (1, 0) each with probability 14 , such that the condition on the XOR
from Theorem 3.2 is satisfied. On the other hand, neither B0 nor B1 is uni-
formly distributed conditioned on W = 0, and it appears as if the receiver has
some joint information on B0 and B1 which is forbidden by a (Rand) 1-2 OT.
But that is not so. Indeed, the same view can be obtained when attacking an
ideal Rand 1-2 OT: submit a random bit C to obtain BC and output W = BC .
In the light of Definition 3.1, if W = 0 we can split the event (B0, B1) = (0, 0)
into two disjoint subsets (subevents) E0 and E1 such that each has probability
1
4 , and we define D by setting D = 0 if E0 or (B0, B1) = (0, 1), and D = 1 if
E1 or (B0, B1) = (1, 0). Then, obviously, conditioned on D = d, the bit B1−d is
uniformly distributed, even when given Bd. The corresponding holds if W = 1.
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Proof: The “only if” implication is well-known and straightforward. For the
“if” implication, we first argue the perfect case where P(B0⊕B1)W = Punif · PW .
For any valuew with PW (w) > 0, the non-normalized distribution PB0B1W (·, ·, w)
can be expressed as depicted in the left table of Figure 3.1, where we write
a for PB0B1W (0, 0, w), b for PB0B1W (0, 1, w), c for PB0B1W (1, 0, w) and d for
PB0B1W (1, 1, w). Note that a + b + c + d = PW (w) and, by assumption,
a + d = b + c. Due to symmetry, we may assume that a ≤ b. We can then
define D by extending PB0B1W (·, ·, w) to PB0B1DW (·, ·, ·, w) as depicted in the
right two tables in Figure 3.1: PB0B1DW (0, 0, 0, w) = PB0B1DW (0, 1, 0, w) = a,
PB0B1DW (1, 0, 0, w) = PB0B1DW (1, 1, 0, w) = c etc. Important to realize is that
PB0B1DW (·, ·, ·, w) is indeed a valid extension since by assumption c+(b−a) = d.
a b
c d
PB0B1W (·, ·, w)
a a
c c
PB0B1DW (·, ·, 0, w)
0 b−a
0 b−a
PB0B1DW (·, ·, 1, w)
Figure 3.1: Distributions PB0B1W (·, ·, w) and PB0B1DW (·, ·, ·, w)
It is now obvious that PB0B1DW (·, ·, 0, w) = 12PB0DW (·, 0, w) as well as
PB0B1DW (·, ·, 1, w) = 12PB1DW (·, 1, w). This finishes the perfect case.
Concerning the general case, the idea is the same as above, except that one
has to take some care in handling the error parameter ε ≥ 0. As this does not
give any new insight, and we anyway state and fully prove a more general result
in Theorem 3.6, we skip this part of the proof.1 
3.3.2 The Case of String OT
The obvious question after the previous section is whether there is a natural
generalization of Theorem 3.2 to 1-2 OT ℓ for ℓ ≥ 2. Note that the straightfor-
ward generalization of the XOR-condition in Theorem 3.2, requiring that any
receiver has no information on the bit-wise XOR of the two strings, is clearly
too weak, and does not imply sender-security for Rand 1-2 OT ℓ: for instance
the receiver could know the first half of the first string and the second half of
the second string.
The Characterization
Let ℓ be an arbitrary positive integer.
Definition 3.3 A function β : {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1} is called a non-
degenerate linear function (NDLF) if it is of the form
β : (s0, s1) 7→ 〈a0, s0〉 ⊕ 〈a1, s1〉
1Although the special case ℓ = 1 in Theorem 3.6 is quantitatively slightly weaker than
Theorem 3.2.
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for two non-zero a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, i.e., if it is linear and non-trivially depends
on both input strings.
Even though this is the main notion we are using, the following more relaxed
notion allows to make some of our claims slightly stronger.
Definition 3.4 A binary function β : {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1} is called 2-
balanced if for any s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ the functions β(s0, ·) and β(·, s1) are balanced
in the usual sense, meaning that
∣∣{σ1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ : β(s0, σ1) = 0}∣∣ = 2ℓ/2 and∣∣{σ0 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ : β(σ0, s1)=0}∣∣ = 2ℓ/2.
The following is easy to see and the proof is omitted.
Lemma 3.5 Every non-degenerate linear function is 2-balanced.
In case ℓ = 1, the XOR is a NDLF and thus 2-balanced, and it is the only NDLF
and up to addition of a constant the only 2-balanced function. Based on this
notion of non-degenerate linear functions, sender-security of Rand 1-2 String OT
can be characterized as follows.
Theorem 3.6 The condition of ε-sender-security for a Rand 1-2 OT ℓ is satis-
fied for a particular (possibly dishonest) receiver R˜ with output W if
δ
(
Pβ(S0,S1)W , Punif · PW
) ≤ ε/22ℓ+1
for every NDLF β, and, on the other hand, ε-sender-security may be satisfied
only if δ
(
Pβ(S0,S1)W , Punif · PW
) ≤ ε for every NDLF β.
The number of NDLFs is exponential in ℓ, namely (2ℓ − 1)2. Nevertheless, we
show in Section 3.4 that this characterization turns out to be very useful. There,
we will also argue that an exponential overhead in ℓ in the sufficient condition
is unavoidable. The proof of Theorem 3.6 also shows that the set of NDLFs
forms a minimal set of functions among all sets that imply sender-security. In
this sense, our characterization is tight.
At first glance, Theorem 3.6 appears to be related to the so-called (information-
theoretic) XOR-Lemma, commonly attributed to Vazirani [Vaz86] and nicely
explained by Goldreich [Gol95], which states that a string is close to uniform
if the XOR of the bits of any non-empty substring are. As far as we can see,
neither follows Theorem 3.6 from the XOR-Lemma in an obvious way nor can
it be proven by modifying the proof of the XOR-Lemma, as given in [Gol95].
Furthermore, we would like to point out that Theorem 4 in [BCW03] also
provides a tool to analyze sender-security of 1-2 OT protocols in terms of linear
functions; however, the condition that needs to be satisfied is much stronger
than for our Theorem 3.6: it additionally requires that one of the two strings is a
priori uniformly distributed from the receiver’s point of view.2 This difference is
crucial, because showing that one of the two strings is uniform (conditioned on
2Concretely, it is additionally required that every non-trivial parity of that string is uniform,
but by the XOR-Lemma this is equivalent to the whole string being uniform.
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the receiver’s view) is usually technically involved and sometimes not even pos-
sible, as the example given after Theorem 3.2 shows. This is also demonstrated
by the fact that the analysis in [BCW03] of the considered 1-2 OT protocol
is tailored to one particular class of privacy-amplifying hash functions, and it
is stated as an open problem how to prove their construction secure when a
different class of hash functions is used. The condition for Theorem 3.6, on the
other hand, is naturally satisfied for typical constructions of 1-2 OT protocols,
as we shall see in Section 3.4. As a result, Theorem 3.6 allows for much simpler
and more elegant security proofs for 1-2 OT protocols, and, as a by-product,
allows to solve the open problem from [BCW03]. We explain this in detail in
Section 3.4, and the interested reader may well jump ahead and save the proof
of Theorem 3.6 for later.
Proof of Theorem 3.6 (“only if” part)
We start with the proof for the “only if” part of Theorem 3.6. In fact, a
slightly stronger statement is shown, namely that ε-sender-security implies
δ
(
Pβ(S0,S1)W , Punif · PW
) ≤ ε for any 2-balanced function.
According to Definition 3.1, ε-sender-security for Rand 1-2 OT is satisfied
for a receiver R with output W if there exists a random variable D with range
{0, 1} such that
1
2
∑
w,d,s0,s1
∣∣PS1−DSDDW (s1−d, sd, d, w) − 2−ℓPSDDW (sd, d, w)∣∣ ≤ ε.
In order to upper bound
δ
(
Pβ(S0,S1)W , Punif · PW
)
=
1
2
∑
w,b
∣∣Pβ(S0,S1)W (b, w) − 12PW (w)
∣∣
we expand the terms on the right hand side as follows.
Pβ(S0,S1)W (b, w) =
∑
d
Pβ(S0,S1)DW (b, d, w)
=
∑
d
∑
sd,s1−d
β(s0,s1)=b
PS1−DSDDW (s1−d, sd, d, w)
and
PW (w) =
∑
d
∑
sd
PSDDW (sd, d, w) =
∑
d
2−ℓ+1 ·
∑
sd,s1−d
β(s0,s1)=b
PSDDW (sd, d, w)
where the last equality holds because there are 2ℓ−1 values for s1−d such that
β(s0, s1) = b, as β is a 2-balanced function. Using those two expansions we
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conclude that
δ
(
Pβ(S0,S1)W , Punif · PW
)
≤ 1
2
∑
w,b
∑
d
∑
sd,s1−d
β(s0,s1)=b
∣∣PS1−DSDDW (s1−d, sd, d, w) − 2−ℓPSDDW (sd, d, w)∣∣
=
1
2
∑
w,d,s0,s1
∣∣PS1−DSDDW (s1−d, sd, d, w) − 2−ℓPSDDW (sd, d, w)∣∣ ≤ ε.
where the first inequality follows follows from the above expansions and the
triangle inequality and the last inequality is our initial assumption. 
The “if” part, which is the interesting direction, is proven below.
The Case ℓ = 2
We feel that in order to understand the proof of Theorem 3.6, it is useful to
first consider the case ℓ = 2. Let us focus on trying to develop a condition that
is sufficient for perfect sender-security. Fix an arbitrary output w, and consider
an arbitrary non-normalized probability distribution PS0S1W (·, ·, w) of S0 and
S1 whenW = w. This is depicted in the left table of Figure 3.2, where we write
a for PS0S1W (00, 00, w), b for PS0S1W (00, 01, w), etc. We may assume that
a ≤ b, c, d. We now extend this distribution to PS0S1DW (·, ·, ·, w) similar as in
the proof of Theorem 3.2. This is depicted in the two right tables in Figure 3.2.
We verify what conditions PS0S1W (·, ·, w) must satisfy such that PS0S1DW is
indeed a valid extension, i.e., that PS0S1DW (·, ·, 0, w) + PS0S1DW (·, ·, 1, w) =
PS0S1W (·, ·, w).
a b c d
e f g h
i j k l
m n o p
PS0S1W (·, ·, w)
a a a a
e e e e
i i i i
m m m m
PS0S1DW (·, ·, 0, w)
0 b−a c−a d−a
0 b−a c−a d−a
0 b−a c−a d−a
0 b−a c−a d−a
PS0S1DW (·, ·, 1, w)
Figure 3.2: Distributions PS0S1W (·, ·, w) and PS0S1DW (·, ·, ·, w)
For instance, looking at the second row and second column we get equation
e+ (b− a) = f . Altogether, we get the following system of equations.
b+ e = a+ f b+ i = a+ j b+m = a+ n
c+ e = a+ g c+ i = a+ k c+m = a+ o
d+ e = a+ h d+ i = a+ l d+m = a+ p
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Note that if all these equations do hold for any w, then PS0S1DW (·, ·, ·, ·) is well
defined and satisfies PS0S1DW (·, ·, 0, ·) = 14PS0DW (·, 0, ·) and PS0S1DW (·, ·, 1, ·) =
1
4PS1DW (·, 1, ·), in other words, perfect sender-security holds.
The idea now is to show that the above equation system is equivalent to an-
other equation system, in which every equation expresses that a certain NDLF
applied to S0 and S1 is uniformly distributed when W = w, which holds by
assumption.
For example, by adding all the equations in the original system while taking
every second equation with negative sign, one gets the equation
b+ d+ e+ g + j + l +m+ o = a+ c+ f + h+ i+ k + n+ p .
Define the function β : {0, 1}2 × {0, 1}2 → {0, 1} as follows. Let β(s0, s1) be 0
if the entry which corresponds to (s0, s1) in the left table in Figure 3.2 appears
on the left hand side of the above equation, and else we let β(s0, s1) be 1. Then
the above equation simply says that β(S0, S1) = 0 with the same probability as
β(S0, S1) = 1 (whenW = w). Note that it is crucial that in the above equation
every variable a up to p occurs with multiplicity exactly 1. By comparing
the function tables, it is now easy to verify that β coincides with the function
(s0, s1) 7→ s02 ⊕ s12, where si2 denotes the second coordinate of si ∈ {0, 1}2,
thus is a NDLF.
One can now show (and we are going to do this below for an arbitrary ℓ)
that there are enough such equations, corresponding to NDLFs, such that these
equations imply the original ones. This implies that if β(S0, S1) is distributed
uniformly and independently ofW for every NDLF β, then the original equation
system is satisfied (for any w), and thus PS0S1DW is well-defined.
Proof of Theorem 3.6 (“if” part).
First, we consider the perfect case: if Pβ(S0,S1)W equals Punif · PW for every
NDLF β, then sender-security for Rand 1-2 OT ℓ holds perfectly.
The Perfect Case: Since the case ℓ = 1 is already settled, we assume
that ℓ ≥ 2. We generalize the idea from the case ℓ = 2. The main issue
will be to transform the equations guaranteed by the assumption on the linear
functions into the ones required for PS0S1DW (·, ·, 0, w) + PS0S1DW (·, ·, 1, w) =
PS0S1W (·, ·, w).
Fix an arbitrary output w of the receiver, and consider the non-normalized
probability distribution PS0S1W (·, ·, w). We use the variable ps0,s1 to refer to
PS0S1W (s0, s1, w), and we write o for the all-zero string (0, . . . , 0) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ. We
assume that po,o ≤ po,s1 for any s1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ; we show later that we may do so.
We extend this distribution to PS0S1DW (·, ·, ·, w) by setting
PS0S1DW (s0, s1, 0, w) = ps0,o and PS0S1DW (s0, s1, 1, w) = po,s1 − po,o (3.1)
for any strings s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and we collect the equations resulting from the
condition that PS0S1W (·, ·, w) = PS0S1DW (·, ·, 0, w) + PS0S1DW (·, ·, 1, w) needs
to be satisfied: for any two s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ \ {o}
ps0,o + po,s1 = po,o + ps0,s1 . (3.2)
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If all these equations do hold for any w, then as in the case of ℓ = 1 or ℓ = 2, the
random variable D is well defined and PS1−DSDWD = Punifℓ · PSDWD holds,
since PS0S1DW (s0, s1, 0, w) does not depend on s1 and PS0S1DW (s0, s1, 1, w) not
on s0.
We proceed by showing that the equations provided by the assumed uni-
formity of β(S0, S1) for any β imply the equations given by (3.2). Consider
an arbitrary pair a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ \ {o} and let β be the associated NDLF, i.e.,
such that β(s0, s1) = 〈a0, s0〉 ⊕ 〈a1, s1〉. By assumption, β(S0, S1) is uniformly
distributed, independent of W . Thus, for any fixed w, this can be expressed as∑
σ0,σ1:
〈a0,σ0〉=〈a1,σ1〉
pσ0,σ1 =
∑
σ0,σ1:
〈a0,σ0〉6=〈a1,σ1〉
pσ0,σ1 , (3.3)
where both summations are over all σ0, σ1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ subject to the indicated
respective properties. Recall, that this equality holds for any pair a0, a1 ∈
{0, 1}ℓ \ {o}. Thus, for fixed s0, s1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ \ {o}, if we sum over all such pairs
a0, a1 subject to 〈a0, s0〉 = 〈a1, s1〉 = 1, we get the equation∑
a0,a1:
〈a0,s0〉=〈a1,s1〉=1
∑
σ0,σ1:
〈a0,σ0〉=〈a1,σ1〉
pσ0,σ1 =
∑
a0,a1:
〈a0,s0〉=〈a1,s1〉=1
∑
σ0,σ1:
〈a0,σ0〉6=〈a1,σ1〉
pσ0,σ1 ,
which, after re-arranging the terms of the summations, leads to∑
σ0,σ1
∑
a0,a1:
〈a0,s0〉=〈a1,s1〉=1
〈a0,σ0〉=〈a1,σ1〉
pσ0,σ1 =
∑
σ0,σ1
∑
a0,a1:
〈a0,s0〉=〈a1,s1〉=1
〈a0,σ0〉6=〈a1,σ1〉
pσ0,σ1 . (3.4)
We will now argue that, up to a constant multiplicative factor, equation (3.4)
coincides with equation (3.2).
First, it is straightforward to verify that the variables po,o and ps0,s1 occur
only on the left hand side, both with multiplicity 22(ℓ−1) (the number of pairs
a0, a1 such that 〈a0, s0〉 = 〈a1, s1〉 = 1), whereas ps0,o and po,s1 only occur on
the right hand side, with the same multiplicity 22(ℓ−1).
Now, we argue that any other pσ0,σ1 equally often appears on the right and
on the left hand side, and thus cancel out. Note that the set of pairs a0, a1,
over which the summation runs on the left respectively the right hand side,
can be understood as the set of solutions to a binary non-homogeneous linear
equations system:
 s0 00 s1
σ0 σ1

( a0
a1
)
=

 11
0

 respectively

 11
1

 .
Also note that the two linear equation systems consist of three equations and
involve at least 4 variables, because a0, a1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and ℓ ≥ 2. Therefore,
using basic linear algebra, one is tempted to conclude that they both have
solutions, and, because they have the same homogeneous part, they have the
same number of solutions, equal to the number of homogeneous solutions. How-
ever, this is only guaranteed if the matrix defining the homogeneous part has
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full rank. In our situation, this is precisely the case if and only if (σ0, σ1) 6∈
{(o,o), (s0,o), (o, s1), (s0, s1)}, where those four exceptions have already been
treated above. It follows that the equations (3.3), which are guaranteed by
assumption, imply the equations (3.2).
It remains to justify the assumption that po,o ≤ po,s1 for any s1. In general,
we choose t ∈ {0, 1}ℓ such that po,t ≤ po,s1 for any s1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, and we set
PS0S1DW (s0, s1, 0, w) = ps0,t and PS0S1DW (s0, s1, 1, w) = po,s1 − po,t, resulting
in the equation ps0,t + po,s1 = po,t + ps0,s1 that needs to be satisfied for s0 ∈
{0, 1}ℓ \ {o} and s1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ \ {t}. This equality, though, can be argued as for
equation (3.2), which we did above, simply by replacing pσ0,σ1 on both sides of
(3.3) by pσ0,σ1⊕t (where ⊕ is the bit wise XOR). We may safely do so: doing
a suitable variable substitution and using linearity of the inner product, it is
easy to see that this modified equation still expresses uniformity of β(S0, S1).
This concludes the proof for the perfect case.
The General Case: Now, we consider the general case where there exists
some ε > 0 such that δ
(
Pβ(S0,S1)W , Punif · PW
) ≤ 2−2ℓ−1ε for any NDLF β.
We use the observations from the perfect case but additionally keep track of
the “error term”.
For any w with PW (w) > 0 and any NDLF β, set
εw,β = δ
(
Pβ(S0,S1)W (·, w), Punif · PW (w)
)
.
Note that
∑
w εw,β = δ
(
Pβ(S0,S1)W , Punif · PW
) ≤ 2−2ℓ−1ε, independent of β.
Fix now an arbitrary w with PW (w) > 0. Then, (3.3) only holds up to an
error of 2εw,β, where β is the NDLF associated to a0, a1. As a consequence,
Equation (3.4) only holds up to an error of 2
∑
β εw,β and thus (3.2) holds up
to an error of δs0,s1 =
2
22ℓ−2
∑
β εw,β , where the sum is over the 2
2ℓ−2 functions
associated to the pairs a0, a1 with 〈a0, s0〉 = 〈a1, s1〉 = 1. Note that δs0,s1
depends on w, but the set of β’s, over which the summation runs, does not.
Adding up over all possible w’s gives
∑
w
δs0,s1 =
2
22ℓ−2
∑
w
∑
β
εw,β =
2
22ℓ−2
∑
β
∑
w
εw,β ≤ 2−2ℓε .
Since (3.2) only holds approximately, PS0S1DW as in (3.1) is not necessarily
a valid extension, but close. This can obviously be overcome by instead setting
PS0S1DW (s0, s1, 0, w) = ps0,o ± δ′s0,s1 and
PS0S1DW (s0, s1, 1, w) = po,s1 − po,o ± δ′′s0,s1
with suitably chosen δ′s0,s1, δ
′′
s0,s1 ≥ 0 with δ′s0,s1 + δ′′s0,s1 = δs0,s1, and with
suitably chosen signs “+” or “−”.3 Using that every PS0S1DW (s0, s1, 0, w) dif-
fers from ps0,o by at most δ
′
s0,s1, it follows from a straightforward computation
3Most of the time, it probably suffices to correct one of the two, say, choose δ′s0,s1 =
δs0,s1 and δ
′′
s0,s1
= 0; however, if for instance ps0,o and po,s1 − po,o are both positive but
PS0S1W (s0, s1, w) = 0, then one has to correct both.
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that δ
(
PS1−DSDDW (·, ·, 0, w), PunifPSDDW (·, 0, w)
) ≤ ∑s0,s1 δ′s0,s1 . The corre-
sponding holds for PS0S1DW (·, ·, 1, w). It follows that
δ
(
PS1−DSDWD, PunifPSDWD
) ≤∑
w
∑
s0,s1
(δ′s0,s1 + δ
′′
s0,s1) =
∑
s0,s1
∑
w
δs0,s1 ≤ ε
which concludes the proof. 
3.4 Applications
In this section we will show the usefulness of Theorem 3.6 for the construction
of 1-2 OT ℓ, based on weaker primitives like a noisy channel or other flavors of
OT. In particular, we will show that the reducibility of 1-2 OT to any weaker
flavor of OT follows as a simple argument using Theorem 3.6.
3.4.1 Reducing 1-2 OT ℓ to Independent Repetitions of Weak
1-2 OTs
Background
A great deal of effort has been put into constructing protocols for 1-2 OT ℓ
based on physical assumptions like various models for noisy channels [CK88,
DKS99, DFMS04, CMW04] or a memory bounded adversary [CCM98, Din01b,
DHRS04], as well as into reducing 1-2 OT ℓ to (seemingly) weaker flavors of
OT, like Rabin OT, 1-2 XOT, 1-2 GOT and 1-2 UOT [Cre´87, BC97, Cac98,
Wol00, BCW03, CS06, Wul07]. Note that the latter three flavors of OT are
weaker than 1-2 OT in that the dishonest receiver has more freedom in choos-
ing the sort of information he wants to get about the sender’s input bits B0
and B1: B0, B1 or B0 ⊕ B1 in case of 1-2 XOR-OT (which is abbreviated
by 1-2 XOT), g(B0, B1) for an arbitrary one-bit-output function g in case of
1-2 Generalized-OT (1-2 GOT), and an arbitrary probabilistic Y with mutual
information I(B0B1;Y ) ≤ 1 in case of 1-2 Universal-OT (1-2 UOT).4
All these reductions of 1-2 OT to weaker versions follow a specific con-
struction design, which is also at the core of the 1-2 OT protocols based on
noisy channels or a memory-bounded adversary. By repeated independent ex-
ecutions of the underlying primitive, S transfers a randomly chosen bit string
X = (X0,X1) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n to R such that:
1. depending on his choice bit C, the honest R knows either X0 or X1,
2. any S˜ has no information on which part of X R learned, and
3. any R˜ has some uncertainty in X.
4As a matter of fact, reducibility has been proven for any bound on I(B0B1;Y ) strictly
smaller than 2. Note that there is some confusion in the literature in what a Universal OT,
UOT is: In [BC97, Wol00, BCW03], a UOT takes as input two bits and the receiver is doomed
to have at least one bit or any other non-trivial amount of Shannon entropy on them; we denote
this by 1-2 UOT. Whereas in [Cac98], a UOT takes as input two strings and the receiver is
doomed to have some Re´nyi entropy of order α > 1 on them. We address this latter notion
in more detail in Section 3.4.2.
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Then, this is completed to a Rand 1-2 OT by means of privacy amplification
(cf. Section 2.5): S samples two functions f0 and f1 from a two-universal class F
of hash functions, sends them to R, and outputs S0 = f0(X0) and S1 = f1(X1),
and R outputs SC = fC(XC). Finally, the Rand 1-2 OT is transformed into an
ordinary 1-2 OT in the obvious way.
Correctness and receiver-security of this construction are clear, they follow
immediately from 1. and 2. How easy or hard it is to prove sender-security
depends heavily on the underlying primitive. In case of Rabin OT it is rather
straightforward. In case of 1-2 XOT and the other weaker versions, this is non-
trivial. The problem is that since R might know X0 ⊕X1, it is not possible to
argue that there exists d ∈ {0, 1} such that R’s uncertainty on X1−d is large
when given Xd. This, though, would be necessary in order to finish the proof
by simply applying the privacy amplification theorem (Corollary 2.27). This
difficulty is overcome in [BC97, BCW03] by tailoring the proof to a particu-
lar two-universal class of hash functions, namely the class of all linear hash
functions. Whether the reduction also works for a less restricted class of hash
functions is left in [BC97, BCW03] as an open problem, which we solve here as
a side result. Using a smaller class of hash functions would allow for instance
to reduce the communication complexity of the protocol.
In [CS06], the difficulty is overcome by giving up on the simplicity of the
reduction. The cost of two-way communication allowing for interactive hashing
is traded for better reduction parameters. We would like to emphasize that
these parameters are incomparable to ours, because a different reduction is used,
whereas our approach provides a better analysis of the common non-interactive
reductions.
The New Approach
We argue that, independent of the underlying primitive, sender-security fol-
lows as a simple consequence of Theorem 3.6, in combination with a simple
observation regarding the composition of non-degenerate linear (respectively,
more general, 2-balanced) functions with strongly two-universal hash functions,
stated in Proposition 3.7 below.
Recall Definition 2.23 of strong two-universality. A class F of hash functions
from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ is strongly two-universal, if for any distinct x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}n
the two random variables F (x) and F (x′) are independent and uniformly dis-
tributed over {0, 1}ℓ, where the random variable F represents the random choice
of a function in F .
Proposition 3.7 Let F0 and F1 be two classes of strongly two-universal hash
functions from {0, 1}n0 respectively {0, 1}n1 to {0, 1}ℓ, and let β : {0, 1}ℓ ×
{0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1} be a 2-balanced function. Consider the class F of all functions
f : {0, 1}n0 ×{0, 1}n1 → {0, 1} with f(x0, x1) = β(f0(x0), f1(x1)) where f0 ∈ F0
and f1 ∈ F1. Then, F is strongly two-universal.5
5It is easy to see that the claim does not hold in general for ordinary (as opposed to
strongly) two-universal classes: if n0 = n1 = ℓ and F0 and F1 both only contain the identity
function id : {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}ℓ and thus are two-universal, then F consisting of the function
f(x0, x1) = β(id(x0), id(x1)) = β(x0, x1) is not two-universal.
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Proof: Fix distinct x = (x0, x1) and x
′ = (x′0, x
′
1) in {0, 1}n0 × {0, 1}n1 . As-
sume without loss of generality that x1 6= x′1. Fix f0 ∈ F0, and set s0 = f0(x0)
and s′0 = f0(x
′
0). By assumption on F1, the random variables F1(x1) and
F1(x
′
1) are independent and uniformly distributed over {0, 1}ℓ, where F1 rep-
resents the random choice for f1 ∈ F1. By the assumption on β, this implies
that β(f0(x0), F1(x1)) and β(f0(x
′
0), F1(x
′
1)) are independent and uniformly dis-
tributed over {0, 1}. This holds no matter how f0 is chosen, and thus proves
the claim. 
Now, briefly, sender-security for a construction as sketched above can be
argued as follows: The only restriction is that F needs to be strongly two-
universal. From the independent repetitions of the underlying weak OT (Ra-
bin OT, 1-2 XOT, 1-2 GOT or 1-2 UOT) it follows that R˜ has “high” collision
entropy in X. Hence, for any NDLF β, we can apply the privacy-amplification
Theorem 2.27 with the strongly two-universal hash function β(f0(·), f1(·)) and
argue that β(f0(X0), f1(X1)) is close to uniform for randomly chosen f0 and
f1. Sender-security then follows immediately from Theorem 3.6.
We save the quantitative analysis (Theorem 3.8) for next section, where we
consider a reduction of 1-2 OT to the weakest kind of OT: to one execution of
a UOT. Based on this, we compare in Section 3.4.3 the quality of the analysis
of the above reductions based on Theorem 3.6 with the results in [BCW03]. It
turns out that our analysis is tighter for 1-2 GOT and 1-2 UOT, whereas the
analysis in [BCW03] is tighter for 1-2 XOT; but in all cases, our analysis is
much simpler and, we believe, more elegant.
3.4.2 Reducing 1-2 OT ℓ to One Execution of UOT
In this section, we use the definition and some elementary properties of Re´nyi
entropy introduced in Section 2.4.1.
Universal Oblivious Transfer
Probably the weakest flavor of OT is the Universal OT (UOT) as it was intro-
duced by Cachin in [Cac98], in that it gives the receiver the most freedom in
getting information on the string X. Formally, for a finite set X and parame-
ters α > 1 (allowing α = ∞) and r > 0, an (α, r)-UOT(X ) works as follows:
the sender inputs x ∈ X , and the receiver may choose an arbitrary conditional
probability distribution PY |X with the only restriction that for a uniformly dis-
tributed X it must satisfy Hα(X|Y ) ≥ r. The receiver then gets as output y,
sampled according to the distribution PY |X(·|x), whereas the sender gets no
information on the receiver’s choice for PY |X . Note that a 1-2 UOT is a limit
case of this kind of UOT since “1-2 UOT = (1, 1)-UOT({0, 1}2)”.
The crucial property of such an UOT is that the input is not restricted to
two bits, but may be two bit-strings; this potentially allows to reduce 1-2 OT
to one execution of a UOT, rather than to many independent executions of the
same primitive as for the 1-2 flavors of OT mentioned above. Indeed, following
the design principle discussed in Section 3.4.1, it is straightforward to come
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up with a candidate protocol for 1-2 OT ℓ which uses one execution of a (α, r)-
UOT(X ) with X = {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n. The protocol is given in Figure 3.3, where
F is a strongly two-universal class of hash functions from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ.
OT2UOT (c):
1. S and R run (α, r)-UOT(X ): S inputs a random x = (x0, x1) ∈ X =
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}n, R inputs PY |X with PY |X(x′c|(x′0, x′1)) = 1 for any
(x′0, x
′
1), and as a result R obtains y = xc.
2. S samples independent random f0, f1 ∈ F , sends f0 and f1 to R, and
outputs s0 = f0(x0) and s1 = f1(x1).
3. R computes and outputs sc = fc(y).
Figure 3.3: Protocol OT2UOT for Rand1-2 OT ℓ.
In [Cac98] it is claimed that, for appropriate parameters, protocol OT2UOT
is a secure Rand 1-2 OT ℓ, respectively, the resulting protocol for 1-2 OT is
secure. However, we argue below that the proof given is not correct and it is
not obvious how to fix it. In Theorem 3.8 we then show that its security follows
easily from Theorem 3.6.
A Flaw in the Security Proof
In [Cac98] the security of protocol OT2UOT is argued as follows. Using rather
complicated spoiling-knowledge techniques, it is shown that, conditioned on the
receiver’s output (which we suppress to simplify the notation) at least one out
of H∞(X0) and H∞(X1|X0 = x0) is “large” (for any x0), and, similarly, at
least one out of H∞(X1) and H∞(X0|X1=x1). Since collision entropy is lower
bounded by min-entropy, it then follows from the privacy amplification theorem
that at least one out of H(F0(X0)|F0) and H(F1(X1)|F1,X0=x0) is close to ℓ,
and similarly, one out of H(F1(X1)|F1) and H(F0(X0)|F0,X1= x1). It is then
claimed that this proves OT2UOT secure.
We argue that this very last implication is not correct. Indeed, what is
proven about the entropy of F0(X0) and F1(X1) does not exclude the possibility
that both entropies H(F0(X0)|F0) and H(F1(X1)|F1) are maximal, but that
H(F0(X0)⊕ F1(X1)|F0, F1) = 0. This would allow the receiver to learn the bit
wise XOR S0⊕S1, which is clearly forbidden by the condition of sender-security.
Also note that the proof does not use the fact that the two functions F0
and F1 are chosen independently. However, if they are chosen to be the same,
then the protocol is clearly insecure: if the receiver asks for Y = X0 ⊕X1, and
if F is a class of linear two-universal hash functions, then R˜ obviously learns
S0 ⊕ S1.
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Reducing 1-2 OT ℓ to UOT
The following theorem guarantees the security of OT2UOT for an appropriate
choice of the parameters. The only restriction we have to make is that F needs
to be a strongly two-universal class of hash function.
Theorem 3.8 Let F be a strongly two-universal class of hash functions from
{0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ. Then OT2UOT reduces a 2−κ-secure Rand 1-2 OT ℓ to a per-
fect (2, r)-UOT({0, 1}2n) with n ≥ r ≥ 4ℓ+ 2κ+ 1.
Using the bounds from Lemma 2.9 on the different orders of Re´nyi entropy, the
reducibility of 1-2 OT ℓ to (α, r)-UOT(X ) follows immediately for any α > 1.
Informally, sender-security of the protocol OT2UOT is argued as for the re-
duction of 1-2 OT to Rabin OT, 1-2 XOT etc., discussed in Section 3.4.1, simply
by using Proposition 3.7 in combination with the privacy amplification Theo-
rem 2.27, and applying Theorem 3.6. The formal proof given below additionally
keeps track of the error term.
From this proof it also becomes clear that the exponential (in ℓ) overhead
in Theorem 3.6 is unavoidable. Indeed, a sub-exponential overhead would allow
ℓ in Theorem 3.8 to be super-linear in n, which of course is nonsense.
Proof: By the definition of conditional collision entropy, we have that for all y,
H2(X|Y = y) ≥ r ≥ 4ℓ + 2κ + 1. Fix an arbitrary y and consider any NDLF
β : {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}ℓ → {0, 1}. Let F0 and F1 be the random variables that
represent the random choices of f0 and f1, and set B = β(F0(X0), F1(X1)).
In combination with Proposition 3.7, privacy amplification (Corollary 2.27)
guarantees that
δ
(
PBF0F1|Y=y, PunifPF0F1|Y=y
) ≤ 2− 12 (H2(X|Y=y)+1) ≤ 2− 12 (4ℓ+2κ+2) = 2−2ℓ−κ−1.
It now follows that
δ
(
Pβ(S0,S1)W , Punif · PW
)
= δ
(
PBF0F1Y , PunifPF0F1Y
)
=
∑
y
δ
(
PBF0F1|Y=y, PunifPF0F1|Y=y
)
PY (y) ≤ 2−κ/22ℓ+1 .
Sender-security as claimed now follows from Theorem 3.6. 
The min-entropy splitting Lemma 2.15 and a larger (not necessarily strongly)
two-universal class of hash functions can alternatively be used to show the secu-
rity of the reduction protocol OT2UOT without the use of NDLFs. We do this
here for illustration purposes because the same technique is used in the security
proof of 1-2 OT in the bounded-quantum-storage model in Chapter 6. After
the execution of a perfect (∞, r)-UOT({0, 1}2n), we have H∞(X0X1|Y ) ≥ r
and Lemma 2.15 yields the existence of a random variable D ∈ {0, 1} such that
H∞(X1−DD|Y ) ≥ r/2 and therefore also H∞(X1−DDSD|Y ) ≥ r/2. By the
chain rule (Lemma 2.12) and setting ε := 2−κ−1, we get Hε∞(X1−D|DSDY ) ≥
r/2−1−ℓ−κ−1. Hence to get a 2−κ-secure Rand 1-2 OT ℓ via the privacy am-
plification theorem (Corollary 2.25), we need r/2−ℓ−κ−2 > 2κ+ℓ which gives
slightly worse parameters than in Theorem 3.8, namely n ≥ r ≥ 4ℓ+ 4κ+ 4.
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3.4.3 Quantitative Comparisons To Related Work
Subsequent to [DFSS06], Wullschleger improved the min-entropy splitting tech-
nique described in the last paragraph. In [Wul07], it is shown that the protocol
OT2UOT reduces a 2−κ-secure Rand 1-2 OT ℓ to a perfect (∞, r)-UOT({0, 1}2n)
if n ≥ r ≥ 2ℓ + 6κ + 6 log(3). So, Rand 1-2 OT ℓ of strings of length ℓ roughly
half of the receivers min-entropy r can be obtained, which is asymptotically op-
timal for this reduction-protocol. Technically, the result is essentially obtained
by using the min-entropy splitting approach sketched at the end of last section
and a more careful case distinction. The random variable D ∈ {0, 1} pointing
to the “known” string XD is basically defined as in Lemma 2.15, but for the
case when both X0,X1 have high min-entropy, a new distributed left-over hash
lemma is used to show that both S0 and S1 are close to uniform and therefore
close to independent (and hence, the pointer D can be chosen arbitrarily in this
case).
In the following, we compare the simple reduction of 1-2 OT ℓ to n executions
of 1-2 XOT, 1-2 GOT and 1-2 UOT, respectively, using our analysis based on
Theorem 3.6 together with the quantitative statement given in Theorem 3.8,
with the results achieved in [BCW03].6 The quality of the analysis of a reduction
is given by the reduction parameters clen, csec and cconst such that the 1-2 OT
ℓ
is guaranteed to be 2−κ-secure as long as n ≥ clen · ℓ + csec · κ + cconst. The
smaller these constants are, the better is the analysis of the reduction. The
comparison of these parameters is given in Figure 3.4. We focus on clen and csec
since cconst is not really relevant, unless very large.
1-2 XOT 1-2 GOT 1-2 UOT
clen csec clen csec clen csec
BCW [BCW03] 2 2 4.8 4.8 14.6 14.6
this work [DFSS06] 4 2 4 3 13.2 10.0
subsequent [Wul07] 2 6 2 7 6.7 23.3
Figure 3.4: Comparison of the reduction parameters.
The parameters in the first line can easily be extracted from Theorems 5, 7
and 9 of [BCW03], where in Theorem 9 pe ≈ 0.19. The parameters in the
second line corresponding to the reduction to 1-2 XOT follow immediately from
Theorem 3.8, using the fact that in one execution of a 1-2 XOT, the receiver’s
conditional collision entropy on the sender’s two input bits is at least 1.
Determining the parameters of the reductions to 1-2 GOT and 1-2 UOT
requires a little more work. We first determine the average conditional min-
entropy H˜∞(X|Y ) of one instance of 1-2 GOT and 1-2 UOT. In the case of
1-2 GOT, H˜∞(X|Y ) can easily be seen to be at least 1 (for example by in-
6As mentioned earlier, these results are incomparable to the parameters achieved in [CS06],
where interactive reductions are used.
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spection of Table 2 in [BCW03]). For one execution of 1-2 UOT, the receiver’s
average Shannon entropy is at least 1. Therefore, it follows from Fano’s In-
equality (Lemma 2.11) that his average guessing probability is at most 1 − pe
with pe ≈ 0.19 as above, and thus his average conditional min-entropy is at
least − log(1− pe) ≈ 0.3.
We use Lemma 2.8 to lower bound the (regular) conditional min-entropy
H∞(X|Y = y) except with probability 2−κ−1 and use Theorem 3.8 with security
parameter 2−κ−1 which together yields a 2−κ secure Rand 1-2 OT ℓ. To apply
Theorem 3.8, we require H2(X|Y = y) ≥ H∞(X|Y = y) ≥ 4ℓ + 2κ + 3 and to
obtain this by Lemma 2.8, we need H˜∞(X|Y ) ≥ 4ℓ+ 3κ + 4.
This yields clen = 4, csec = 3 for 1-2 GOT and clen ≈ 4/0.3 and csec ≈ 3/0.3
for 1-2 UOT. The derivation of the parameters for [Wul07] is analogous.
3.5 Extension to 1-n OT ℓ
In this section we extend our characterization of sender-security of Rand 1-2 OT
to Rand 1-n OT. We use the following notation. For a sequence of random
variables S0, S1, . . . , Sn−1 and indices i, j ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}, we denote by Si,j the
sequence of variables {Sk : k ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} \ {i, j}} with all indices except i
and j. Similarly, Si denotes all variables but the ith.
Definition 3.9 (Rand 1-n OT ℓ) An ε-secure Rand 1-n OT is a protocol be-
tween S and R, with R having input C ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−1} (while S has no input),
such that for any distribution of C, the following properties hold:
ε-Correctness: For honest S and R, S has output S0, S1, . . . , Sn−1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ
and R outputs SC , except with probability ε.
ε-Receiver-security: If R is honest then for any (possibly dishonest) S˜ with
output V ,
δ
(
PCV , PC · PV
) ≤ ε.
ε-Sender-security: If S is honest then for any (possibly dishonest) R˜ with
output W , there exists a random variable D with range {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}
such that
δ
(
PSDWSDD, P
n−1
unifℓ
· PWSDD
) ≤ ε.
Analogous to the 1-2 OT-case we want for sender-security that there exists a
choice D, such that when given the corresponding string (or bit) SD all the
other strings (or bits) look completely random from R’s point of view.
Recall that for the characterization of sender-security in the case of 1-2 OT,
it is sufficient that Pβ(S0,S1)W = Punif · PW for every NDLF β. In a first
attempt one might try to characterize the sender-security of 1-n OT using linear
functions β that non-trivially depend on n arguments. In the case of 1-3 OT of
bits, the only linear function of this kind is the XOR of the three bits, but it
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can be easily verified that the requirement that B0 ⊕ B1 ⊕ B2 is uniform does
not imply sender-security in the sense defined above. Instead, as we will see
below, sufficient requirements are that the XOR of every pair of bits is uniform
when given the value of the third.
Theorem 3.10 The condition for ε-sender-security for a Rand 1-n OT ℓ is sat-
isfied for a particular (possibly dishonest) receiver R˜ with output W , if for all
i 6= j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}
δ
(
Pβ(Si,Sj)WSi,j , Punif · PWSi,j
) ≤ ν
for every NDLF β, where ν = ε/(22ℓn(n− 1)).
Proof: We first consider and prove the perfect case.
The Perfect Case: Like in the proof of Theorem 3.6, we fix an out-
put w of the receiver and consider the non-normalized probability distribu-
tion PS0...Sn−1W (·, . . . , ·, w). We use the variable ps0,...,sn−1 to refer to the value
PS0...Sn−1W (s0, . . . , sn−1, w) and o for the all-zero string (0, . . . , 0) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ. We
use bold font to denote a collection of strings s := (s0, s1, . . . , sn−1) ∈ {0, 1}ℓn,
and we write si for (s0, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn−1), the collection s without si. Fi-
nally, for a collection t = (t0, . . . , tk−1) ∈ {0, 1}ℓk of arbitrary size k, we define
sets of indices with one (respectively two) non-zero substrings:
S1(t) := {(o, . . . ,o, ti,o, . . . ,o) : i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}}
S2(t) := {(o, . . . ,o, ti,o, . . . ,o, tj ,o, . . . ,o) : i < j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}}
where the ti (and tj) are at ith (and jth) position. As in the proof of Theo-
rem 3.6, we assume for the clarity of exposition that for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}
and si ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, it holds that po,...,o ≤ po,...,o,si,o,...,o (where si is at position i).
For symmetry reasons, the general case can be handled along the same lines.
We extend the distribution PS0...Sn−1W (·, . . . , ·, w) similarly to (3.1): for
every s ∈ {0, 1}ℓn, we set
PS0...Sn−1DW (s0, . . . , sn−1, 0, w) := ps0,o,...,o,
PS0...Sn−1DW (s0, . . . , sn−1, 1, w) := po,s1,o,...,o − po,...,o,
...
PS0...Sn−1DW (s0, . . . , sn−1, n− 2, w) := po,...,sn−2,o − po,...,o,
PS0...Sn−1DW (s0, . . . , sn−1, n− 1, w) := po,...,o,sn−1 − po,...,o.
In order to show that this is a valid extension, we have to show that for every
s ∈ {0, 1}ℓn
ps =
∑
t∈S1(s)
pt − (n− 1)po,...,o. (3.5)
If this holds, then the random variable D is well defined, and the SD are uni-
formly distributed given D,SD and W .
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We now show that (3.5) follows from the assumed uniformity property that
Pβ(Si,Sj)W |Si,j=si,j = Punif ·PW |Si,j=si,j for every non-degenerate linear function
β and any i 6= j. This is done by induction on n. The case n = 2 is covered by
the proof of Theorem 3.6, and by induction assumption we may assume that
it also holds for n − 1. Let us fix some s ∈ {0, 1}ℓn and i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. It
is easy to see that the assumed uniformity property on S0, . . . , Sn−1,W implies
the corresponding uniformity property on Si,W when conditioning on Si = si,
and therefore, by induction assumption and “multiplying out the conditioning”,
ps =
∑
t
pt − (n− 2)po,...,o,si,o,...,o . (3.6)
where the sum is over all t ∈ {0, 1}ℓn with ti = si and ti ∈ S1(si). Summing all
the equations over i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} yields
n · ps = 2
∑
t∈S2(s)
pt − (n− 2)
∑
t∈S1(s)
pt . (3.7)
By a similar reasoning we can also derive from the case n = 2 that equations
of type (3.2) hold conditioned on the event that all but two of the Si’s are zero.
More formally, we have that for all i < j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1},
po,...,o,si,o,...,o,sj ,o,...,o = po,...,o,si,o,...,o + po,...,o,sj ,o,...,o − po,...,o. (3.8)
Summing these equations over all i < j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} yields
∑
t∈S2(s)
pt = (n− 1)
∑
t∈S1(s)
pt −
(
n
2
)
po,...,o (3.9)
We conclude by substituting (3.9) into (3.7) as follows
n · ps = 2
∑
t∈S2(s)
pt − (n− 2)
∑
t∈S1(s)
pt
= 2

(n− 1) ∑
t∈S1(s)
pt −
(
n
2
)
po,...,o

− (n− 2) ∑
t∈S1(s)
pt
= n
∑
t∈S1(s)
pt − n(n− 1)po,...,o,
which is equation (3.5) after dividing by n, and thus finishes the induction step
and the claim for ε = 0.
The General Case: For the non-zero error case, we follow the above argu-
ment, but keep track of the error. For technical reasons, we assume that the Si’s
are independent and uniformly distributed, and we assume that the assumed
uniformity property with respect to NDLFs holds conditioned on Si,j = sij for
any sij , not just on average, i.e., δ
(
Pβ(Si,Sj)W |Si,j=sij , Punif · PW |Si,j=sij
) ≤ ν
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for any sij ∈ {0, 1}ℓ(n−2). We show at the end of the proof how to argue in
general. Write
δs =
∣∣ ∑
t∈S1(s)
pt − (n− 1)po,...,o − ps
∣∣
such that (3.5) holds up to the error δs. Note that δs depends on w; we also
write δs(w) to make this dependency explicit. We will argue, following the
induction proof, that ∑
w,s
δs(w) ≤ n(n− 1) · 22ℓ · ν = ε .
The proof can then be completed analogue to the proof of Theorem 3.6 by
“correcting” the values for PS0...Sn−1DW ’s appropriately.
By the proof of Theorem 3.6, the claimed inequality holds in case n = 2.
For the induction step, note that by induction assumption, (3.6) holds up to
δsi(w)PSi(si) where ∑
w,si
δsi(w) ≤ (n− 1)(n − 2) · 22ℓ · ν .
Furthermore, from the case n = 2 it follows that Equation (3.8) holds up to
δsi,sj(w)PSij (o · · · o), where∑
w,si,sj
δsi,sj(w) ≤ 22ℓ+1 · ν
and, by the additional assumption posed on the Si’s, PSij (o · · · o) = 2−(n−2)ℓ.
It follows that (3.5) holds up to
δs =
1
n
(∑
i
δsiPSi(si) + 2
∑
i<j
δsi,sjPSij (o · · · o)
)
such that∑
w,s
δs(w) =
1
n
(∑
i
∑
w,si
δsi(w)
∑
si
PSi(si) + 2
∑
i<j
∑
sij
∑
w,si,sj
δsi,sj(w)PSij (o · · · o)
)
≤ (n− 1)(n − 2) · 22ℓ · ν + (n− 1) · 2(n−2)ℓ · 22ℓ+1 · 2−(n−2)ℓ · ν
=
(
(n− 1)(n − 2) · 22ℓ + 2 · (n − 1) · 22ℓ) · ν
≤ n(n− 1) · 22ℓ · ν = ε .
It remains to argue the case where the Si’s are not independent uniformly
distributed and/or the assumed uniformity property holds only on average over
the sij ’s. We first argue that we may indeed assume without loss of generality
that the Si’s are random: We consider S˜0, . . . , S˜n−1, W˜ defined as S˜i = Si⊕Ri
and W˜ = [W,R0, . . . , Rn−1] for independent and uniformly distributed Ri’s in
{0, 1}ℓ. It is easy to see that the assumed uniformity condition with respect to
NDLFs on S0, . . . , Sn−1,W implies the corresponding uniformity condition on
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S˜0, . . . , S˜n−1, W˜ with the same “error” ν, and it is obvious that the S˜i’s are inde-
pendent and uniformly distributed. Furthermore, it is easy to see that ε-sender-
security for S˜0, . . . , S˜n−1, W˜ implies ε-sender-security for S0, . . . , Sn−1,W with
the same ε. Thus it suffices to prove the claim for the case of random Si’s.
Finally, in order to reason that we may assume that the uniformity property
holds conditioned on every sij , where we now may already assume that the Si’s
are random due to the above observation, we again consider S˜0, . . . , S˜n−1, W˜
defined as above. It is not hard to verify that due to this randomization and
since the Si’s are random, the average near-uniformity of β(Si, Sj) translates
to a “worst-case” near-uniformity of β(S˜i, S˜j) with the same ν. 
3.6 1-2 OT in a Quantum Setting
As briefly mentioned in the introductory Section 3.1, the results of this chapter
were originally motivated by the idea of using them to prove sender-security
in the bounded-quantum-storage model of the 1-2 OT-protocol presented later
in Chapter 6. For this protocol, we can use a quantum uncertainty relation to
show a lower bound on the min-entropy of the n-bit string X transmitted by
the sender using a quantum encoding.
If we had a quantum version of Theorem 3.6 at hand, we could use privacy
amplification against quantum adversaries (Theorem 2.25) to prove sender-
security against quantum-memory-bounded receivers. Unfortunately, the ex-
ample below shows that such a quantum version of Theorem 3.6 cannot exist.
In the case of a dishonest quantum receiver R˜, the final state of a quantum
protocol for Rand 1-2 OT is given by the ccq-state ρS0S1R˜. The condition for
ε-sender-security given in Definition 6.1 requires the existence of a random
variable D ∈ {0, 1} such that
δ
(
ρS1−DSDDR˜,1⊗ ρSDDR˜
) ≤ ε .
This coincides with the classical Definition 3.1, except that the dishonest re-
ceiver’s output is a quantum state, and closeness is measured in terms of the
trace-norm distance.
A quantum analogue of Theorem 3.6 would state that this condition is
fulfilled if for every NDLF β,
δ
(
ρβ(S0,S1)R˜,1⊗ ρR˜
) ≤ ε′
where ε′ is comparable to the classical parameter ε/22ℓ+1.
Consider now the following example for 1-2 OT of bits B0, B1. We define
the ccq-state ρB0B1R˜ as follows: Let
ρB0B1R˜ :=
1
4
(|00〉〈00| ⊗ |0〉〈0| + |11〉〈11| ⊗ |1〉〈1|
+|01〉〈01| ⊗ |+〉〈+| + |10〉〈10| ⊗ |−〉〈−|),
where |+〉〈+| and |−〉〈−| are the projectors onto the states |+〉 := |0〉× = |0〉+|1〉√2
and |−〉 := |1〉× = |0〉−|1〉√2 .
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For this state, it is clear that the XOR B0⊕B1 is perfectly hidden from the
dishonest receiver holding ρ
R˜
, i.e.
δ
(
ρ(B0⊕B1)R˜,1⊗ ρR˜
)
= 0 .
On the other hand, R˜ can determine the bit of his choice by measuring in the
Breitbart basis {cos(π/8)|0〉 + sin(π/8)|1〉, sin(π/8)|0〉 − cos(π/8)|1〉} if he is
interested in the first bit, or by measuring in the Breitbart basis rotated by
45 degrees if he wants to obtain the second bit. It is easy to see that such a
measurement succeeds in yielding the correct bit with probability cos(π/8)2 ≈
0.85. This precludes the existence of a pointer variable D ∈ {0, 1} such that
perfect sender-security in the sense of Definition 6.1 holds.
It is unclear how that difficulty can be overcome, but it is clear from the
simple example above, that a statement like in Theorem 3.6 with comparable
parameters cannot hold. Therefore, the alternative approach via the entropy-
splitting Lemma 2.15 (outlined at the end of Section 3.4.2) will be taken in
Chapter 6 to show sender-security.
Chapter 4
Quantum Uncertainty
Relations
Quantum uncertainty relations are the fundamental tool for the security anal-
ysis of protocols in the bonded-quantum-storage model presented later in this
thesis. We start off with some preliminary tools in Section 4.1 and proceed to
the history of uncertainty relations in Section 4.2. Then, we derive new high-
order entropic uncertainty relations for two (Section 4.3) and more (Section 4.4)
mutually unbiased bases. In the last Section 4.5, we investigate the situation
where for each qubit, a basis is picked independently at random from a set of
bases.
The results in this chapter are based on joint work with Damg˚ard, Fehr,
Salvail and Renner which appeared in [DFSS08, DFR+07].
4.1 Preliminaries
4.1.1 Operators and Norms
For a linear operator A on the complex Hilbert space H, we define the operator
norm
‖A‖ := sup
〈x|x〉=1
‖Ax‖
for the Euclidian norm ‖x‖ : = √〈x|x〉 of the vector |x〉 ∈ H. When A is
Hermitian, i.e. the complex conjugate transpose H∗ and H coincide, we have
‖A‖ = λmax(A) := max{|λj | : λj an eigenvalue of A}.
From an equivalent definition of the norm ‖A‖ = sup
〈y|y〉=〈x|x〉=1
|〈y|A|x〉|, it is easy
to see that ‖A∗‖ = ‖A‖. For two Hermitian matrices A and B, we have that
‖AB‖ = ‖(AB)∗‖ = ‖B∗A∗‖ = ‖BA‖. The operator norm is unitarily invari-
ant, i.e. for all unitary U, V , ‖A‖ = ‖UAV ‖ holds. It is easy to show that∥∥∥∥
(
A 0
0 B
)∥∥∥∥ = max {‖A‖, ‖B‖} .
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Lemma 4.1 Let X, Y be any two n × n matrices such that the products XY
and Y X are Hermitian. Then, we have
‖XY ‖ = ‖Y X‖
Proof: For any two n × n matrices X and Y , XY and Y X have the same
eigenvalues, see e.g. [Bha97, Exercise I.3.7]. Therefore, ‖XY ‖ = λmax(XY ) =
λmax(Y X) = ‖Y X‖. 
A linear operator P such that P 2 = P and P ∗ = P is called an orthogonal
projector.
Proposition 4.2 Let A and B be two orthogonal projectors. Then it holds that
‖A+B‖ ≤ 1 + ‖AB‖.
Proof: We adapt a technique by Kittaneh [Kit97] to our case. Define two
2× 2-block matrices X and Y as follows
X :=
(
A B
0 0
)
and Y :=
(
A 0
B 0
)
.
Using A2 = A and B2 = B, we compute
XY :=
(
A+B 0
0 0
)
and Y X :=
(
A AB
BA B
)
=
(
A 0
0 B
)
+
(
0 AB
BA 0
)
.
As A and B are Hermitian, so are A+ B, AB, BA, XY and Y X as well. We
use Lemma 4.1 and the triangle inequality to obtain∥∥∥∥
(
A+B 0
0 0
)∥∥∥∥ =
∥∥∥∥
(
A AB
BA B
)∥∥∥∥ ≤
∥∥∥∥
(
A 0
0 B
)∥∥∥∥+
∥∥∥∥
(
0 AB
BA 0
)∥∥∥∥ .
Using the unitary invariance of the operator norm to permute the columns in the
rightmost matrix and the facts that ‖A‖ = ‖B‖ = 1 as well as ‖AB‖ = ‖BA‖,
we conclude that
‖A+B‖ ≤ 1 + ‖AB‖.

A nice feature of this block-matrix technique is that it generalizes easily to
more projectors.
Proposition 4.3 For orthogonal projectors A0, A1, A2, . . . , AM , it holds that∥∥∥∥∥
M∑
i=0
Ai
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤ 1 +M · max0≤i<j≤M ‖AiAj‖. (4.1)
Proof: Defining
X :=


A0 A1 · · · AM
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
0 0 · · · 0

 and Y :=


A0 0 · · · 0
A1 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
AM 0 · · · 0


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yields
XY =


A0 +A1 + . . . +AM 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
0 0 · · · 0

 and
Y X =


A0 A0A1 · · · A0AM
A1A0 A1 · · · A1AM
...
...
. . .
...
AMA0 AMA1 · · · AM


The matrix Y X can be additively decomposed into M + 1 matrices according
to the following pattern
Y X =


∗
∗
. . .
∗
∗

+


0 ∗
0
. . .
. . .
0 ∗
∗ 0

+ . . . +


0 ∗
∗ 0
. . .
. . .
0
∗ 0


where the asterisk stand for entries of Y X and for i = 0, . . . ,M the ith asterisk-
pattern after the diagonal pattern is obtained by i cyclic shifts of the columns
of the diagonal pattern. Entries without asterisk are zero.
As in the proof of Proposition 4.2, XY and Y X are Hermitian and we use
Lemma 4.1, the triangle inequality, the unitary invariance of the operator norm
and the facts that for all i 6= j : ‖Ai‖ = 1, ‖AiAj‖ = ‖AjAi‖ to obtain the
desired statement (4.1). 
4.1.2 Azuma’s Inequality
As we will exclusively use the concentration result at the end of this section, we
only give an informal definition of martingales. We refer to [AS00] or [MP95]
for a more detailed treatment.
Definition 4.4 A sequence of real random variables X0,X1, . . . is a martingale
sequence, if for all i = 1, 2, . . ., it holds E[Xi|X0, . . . ,Xi−1] = Xi−1.
Theorem 4.5 (Azuma’s inequality [Azu67]) Let X0,X1, . . . be a martin-
gale sequence such that for each k, |Xk −Xk−1| ≤ ck, where ck may depend on
k. Then, for all t ≥ 0 and any τ > 0,
Pr[Xt −X0 ≥ τ ] ≤ exp
(
− τ
2
2
∑t
k=1 c
2
k
)
.
The theorem is often stated as two-sided bound with absolute values:
Pr
[|Xt −X0| ≥ τ] ≤ 2 exp
(
− τ
2
2
∑t
k=1 c
2
k
)
,
but the one-sided version fits our purposes better.
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Definition 4.6 A sequence of real-valued random variables R1, . . . , Rn is called
a martingale difference sequence if for every i and every r1, . . . , ri−1 ∈ R:
E[Ri|R1=r1, . . . , Ri−1=ri−1] = 0.
Note that for an arbitrary sequence of real random variables S0, S1, . . . ∈ R,
definingRn :=
∑n
i=1 Si−E[Si|Si−1] (with R0 := 0) yields a martingale difference
sequence R0, R1, . . ..
The following lemma follows directly from Azuma’s Theorem 4.5.
Corollary 4.7 Let R1, . . . , Rn be a martingale difference sequence such that
|Ri| ≤ c for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, for any λ > 0,
Pr
[∑
i
Ri ≥ λn
]
≤ exp (−λ2n
2c2
)
.
Proof: Set τ := λn, X0 := 0, and for n ≥ 1, Xn :=
∑n
i=1Ri in Theorem 4.5. 
4.1.3 Mathematical Tools
The following two purely analytical lemmas will be used to bound some error
terms.
Lemma 4.8 For any 0 < x < 1/e such that y := x log(1/x) < 1/4, it holds
that x > y4 log(1/y) .
Proof: Define the function x 7→ f(x) = x log(1/x). It holds that f ′(x) =
d
dxf(x) = log(1/x)−log e, which shows that f is bijective in the interval (0, 1/e),
and thus the inverse function f−1(y) is well defined for y ∈ (0, log(e)/e), which
contains the interval (0, 1/4). We are going to show that f−1(y) > g(y) for
all y ∈ (0, 1/4), where g(y) = y4 log(1/y) . Since both f−1(y) and g(y) converge
to 0 for y → 0, it suffices to show that ddyf−1(y) > ddyg(y); respectively, we
will compare their reciprocals. For any x ∈ (0, 1/e) such that y = f(x) =
x log(1/x) < 1/4
1
d
dyf
−1(y)
= f ′(f−1(y)) = log(1/x) − log(e)
and
d
dy
g(y) =
1
4
(
1
log(1/y)
+
1
ln(2) log(1/y)2
)
such that
1
d
dy g(y)
= 4
ln(2) log(1/y)2
ln(2) log(1/y) + 1
= 4
log(1/y)
1 + 1ln(2) log(1/y)
> 2 log
(1
y
)
= 2 log
( 1
x log(1/x)
)
= 2
(
log(1/x)− log log(1/x))
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where for the inequality we are using that y < 1/4 so that ln(2) log(1/y) >
2 ln(2) = ln(4) > 1. Defining the function
h(z) := z − 2 log(z) + log(e)
and showing that h(z) > 0 for all z > 0 finishes the proof, as then
0 < h
(
log(1/x)
) ≤ 1
d
dyg(y)
− 1
d
dyf
−1(y)
which was to be shown. For this last claim, note that h(z) → ∞ for z → 0
and for z →∞, and thus the global minimum is at z0 with h′(z0) = 0. h′(z) =
1−2/(ln(2)z) and thus z0 = 2/ ln(2) = 2 log(e), and hence the minimum of h(z)
equals h(z0) = 3 log(e)− 2 log
(
2 log(e)
)
, which turns out to be positive. 
Lemma 4.9 For any 0 < x < 1/4, it holds that exp(− x232(2−log(x))2 ) < 2−x
4/32 .
Proof: Note that exp(− x2
32(2−log(x))2 ) = 2
− log(e)
32
x2
(2−log(x))2 . Therefore, it suffices
to show that x4 ≤ x2
(2−log(x))2 or equivalently that the function x 7→ f(x) :=
x2(2 − log(x))2 is smaller than 1 for 0 < x < 1/4. It holds that f(0) = 0 and
f(1/4) = 1 and it is easy to see that f is a continuous increasing function, e.g.
by verifying that for the first derivative
d
dx
f(x) = 2x (2− log(x))
(
2− log(x)− 1
ln(2)
)
> 0
holds for 0 < x < 1/4. 
4.2 History and Previous Work
4.2.1 Mutually Unbiased Bases
Definition 4.10 (Mutually Unbiased Bases (MUBs)) Two orthonormal
bases B0 : = {|ai〉}Ni=1 and B1 : = {|bj〉}Nj=1 of the complex Hilbert space HN
of dimension N := 2n are called mutually unbiased if
∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} : |〈ai|bj〉| = 1√
N
= 2−n/2.
More B0,B1, . . . ,BM bases of this space HN are called mutually unbiased, if
every pair of them is mutually unbiased.
Wiesner showed in 1970 in one of the first articles about quantum cryptog-
raphy [Wie83] that there are at least m mutually unbiased bases in a Hilbert
space of dimension 2(m−1)!/2. Later, optimal constructions of N + 1 mutually
unbiased bases in a Hilbert space of dimension N were shown by Ivanovic´ when
N is prime [Ivo81] and by Wootters and Fields for N a prime power [WF89]
(in particular, for N = 2n in the case of n qubits). A nice construction based
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on the stabilizer formalism can be found in the article by Lawrence, Brukner,
and Zeilinger [LBZ02]. It turned out to be an intriguing question to determine
the maximal number of mutually unbiased bases in other dimensions, already
the case N = 6 is still open [Eng03].
For a density matrix ρ describing the state of n qubits, letQ0ρ(·), Q1ρ(·), . . . , QMρ (·)
be the probability distributions over n-bit strings when measuring ρ in bases
B0,B1, . . . ,BM , respectively. For instance, for basis B0 = {|ai〉}Ni=1 and basis
B1{|bj〉}Nj=1, we have Q0ρ(i) = 〈ai|ρ|ai〉 and Q1ρ(j) = 〈bj |ρ|bj〉. We leave out the
state ρ in the subscript when it is clear from the context.
4.2.2 Uncertainty Relations Using Shannon Entropy
The history of uncertainty relations starts with Heisenberg who showed that the
outcomes of two non-commuting observables applied to a quantum state are not
easy to predict simultaneously [Hei27]. However, Heisenberg only speaks about
the variance of the measurement results, and his result was shown to have
several shortcomings by Deutsch [Deu83] and Hilgevood and Uffink [HU88].
More general forms of uncertainty relations were proposed by Bialynicki-Birula
and Mycielski in [BBM75] and by Deutsch [Deu83] to resolve these problems.
The new relations were called entropic uncertainty relations, because they are
expressed using Shannon entropy instead of the statistical variance.
For mutually unbiased bases, Deutsch’s relation reads
H(Q0) + H(Q1) ≥ −2 log 1
2
(1 +
1√
N
).
A much stronger bound was first conjectured by Kraus [Kra87] and later proved
by Maassen and Uffink [MU88]
H(Q0) + H(Q1) ≥ logN = n. (4.2)
Intuitively, these bounds assure that if you know the outcome of measuring ρ
in basis B0 pretty well, you have large uncertainty when measuring in the other
basis B1.
Note that for entropic bounds using Shannon entropy, it is sufficient to
state them for pure states. They then automatically hold for mixed state by
concavity.
Lemma 4.11 If H(Q0|ϕ〉) +H(Q
1
|ϕ〉) ≥ k holds for all pure states |ϕ〉 ∈ H, then
H(Q0ρ) + H(Q
1
ρ) ≥ k holds for all (possibly mixed) states ρ ∈ P(H).
Proof: Let ρ =
∑
x λx|ϕx〉〈ϕx| the spectral composition of a mixed state. We
then have for i = 0, 1 that Qiρ =
∑
x λxQ
i
|ϕx〉 and therefore by concavity of the
Shannon entropy (Lemma 2.10)
H(Q0ρ) + H(Q
1
ρ) ≥
∑
x
λx
(
H(Q0|ϕx〉) + H(Q
1
|ϕx〉)
)
≥ k.

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Although a bound on Shannon entropy can be helpful in some cases, it is
usually not good enough in cryptographic applications. The main tool to reduce
the adversary’s information—privacy amplification by two-universal hashing—
requires a bound on the adversary’s min-entropy (in fact collision entropy), see
Section 2.5. As H(Q) ≥ Hα(Q) for α > 1, higher-order entropic bounds are
generally weaker, but imply bounds for Shannon entropy as well.
4.2.3 Higher-Order Entropic Uncertainty Relations
Different results are known for complete sets of N +1 mutually unbiased bases
of HN . All of them are based on the following surprising geometrical result by
Larsen.
Theorem 4.12 ([Lar90]) Let Q0ρ, . . . , Q
N
ρ be the N +1 distributions obtained
by measuring state ρ in mutually unbiased bases B0, . . . ,BN of the Hilbert space
HN . Then,
N∑
i=0
π2(Q
i
ρ) = 1 + tr(ρ
2), (4.3)
where π2(Q) =
∑
xQ(x)
2 denotes the collision probability of a distribution Q
(cf. Definition 2.6).
For a pure state ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, tr(ρ2) = 1 holds and the right hand side of (4.3)
equals 2. In this case, using that x 7→ − log(x) is a convex function, Sa´nchez-
Ruiz [Sa´n95] applies Jensen’s inequality (Lemma 2.2) to derive the following
lower-bound on the sum of the collision entropies
N∑
i=0
H2(Q
i) =
N∑
i=0
− log(π2(Qi))
≥ −(N + 1) log
(∑N
i=0 π2(Q
i)
N + 1
)
= (N + 1) log
(
N + 1
2
)
.
Because of the lack of convexity of higher-order Re´nyi entropy, we cannot im-
mediately extend an uncertainty relation for pure states to mixed states. On
the other hand, the following lemma shows that uncertainty relations based on
upper bounds of high-order probability sums for pure states also hold for mixed
states and therefore translate to entropy lower bounds for mixed states.
Lemma 4.13 Let α ∈ (1,∞]. If ∑Mi=0 πα(Qi|ϕ〉) ≤ c for all pure states |ϕ〉,
then for all mixed states ρ,
M∑
i=0
Hα(Q
i
ρ) ≥ (M + 1) log
(
M + 1
c
)
.
Equality holds for a state ρ for which πα(Q
i
ρ) =
c
M+1 for all i.
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Proof: As x 7→ xα is convex for α > 1, πα(·) is a convex functional. Therefore,
for a mixed state ρ =
∑
x λx|ϕx〉〈ϕx|, we have Qiρ =
∑
x λxQ
i
|ϕx〉 and
M∑
i=0
πα(Q
i
ρ) ≤
M∑
i=0
∑
x
λxπα(Q
i
|ϕx〉) ≤
∑
x
λx
M∑
i=0
πα(Q
i
|ϕx〉) ≤ c.
Just as above follows by Jensen’s inequality (Lemma 2.2) that
M∑
i=0
Hα(Q
i
ρ) =
M∑
i=0
− log(πα(Qiρ))
≥ −(M + 1) log
(∑M
i=0 πα(Q
i
ρ)
M + 1
)
≥ (M + 1) log
(
M + 1
c
)
.
Jensen’s inequality is tight if the values πα(Q
i
ρ) are all equal. 
For incomplete sets of bases B0, . . . ,BM with 1 ≤ M ≤ N , the current
state-of-the-art bound was independently obtained by Damg˚ard, Salvail and
Pedersen [DPS04] and Azarchs [Aza04] by subtracting the minimal amount of
collision probability (1/N) in the bases not included in the sum:
M∑
i=0
π2(Q
i
|ϕ〉) ≤ 2−
(N + 1− (M + 1))
N
=
N +M
N
. (4.4)
By Lemma 4.13, this yields
M∑
i=0
H2(Q
i
ρ) ≥ (M + 1) log
(
N(M + 1)
N +M
)
. (4.5)
As mentioned above, all lower bounds on the collision entropy from this
section imply bounds on the Shannon entropy because H(Q) ≥ H2(Q), but do
not tell us anything about the min-entropy H∞(Q). In the rest of this chapter,
we derive entropic uncertainty relations involving min-entropy.
Uncertainty relations in terms of Re´nyi entropy have also been studied in a
different context by Bialynicki-Birula [BB06].
4.3 Two Mutually Unbiased Bases
In this section, we consider the situation where a n-qubit state is measured in
one out of two mutually unbiased bases of H2n . Without loss of generality, we
assume these two bases to be the n-fold tensor product of the computational
basis +⊗n and of the diagonal basis ×⊗n, in this section simply called +- and
×-basis.
We show that two distributions obtained by measuring in two mutually un-
biased bases cannot both be “very far from uniform”. One way to characterize
non-uniformity of a distribution is to identify a subset of outcomes that has
much higher probability than for a uniform choice. Intuitively, the theorem be-
low says that such sets cannot be found simultaneously for both measurements.
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Theorem 4.14 Let ρ be an arbitrary state of n qubits, and let Q+(·) and Q×(·)
be the respective distributions of the outcome when ρ is measured in the +-basis
respectively the ×-basis. Then, for any two sets L+ ⊂ {0, 1}n and L× ⊂ {0, 1}n
it holds that
Q+(L+) +Q×(L×) ≤ 1 + 2−n/2
√
|L+||L×|.
Proof: We define the two orthogonal projectors
A :=
∑
x∈L+
|x〉〈x| and B :=
∑
y∈L×
H⊗n|y〉〈y|H⊗n.
Using the spectral decomposition of ρ =
∑
w λw|ϕw〉〈ϕw|, we have
Q+(L+) +Q×(L×) = tr (Aρ) + tr (Bρ)
=
∑
w
λw (tr (A|ϕw〉〈ϕw|) + tr (B|ϕw〉〈ϕw|))
=
∑
w
λw (〈ϕw|A|ϕw〉+ 〈ϕw|B|ϕw〉)
=
∑
w
λw〈ϕw|(A+B)|ϕw〉
≤ ‖A+B‖ ≤ 1 + ‖AB‖,
where the last line is Proposition 4.2. To conclude, we show that ‖AB‖ ≤
2−n/2
√|L+||L×|. Note that an arbitrary state |ψ〉 = ∑z λzH⊗n|z〉 can be
expressed with coordinates λz in the diagonal basis. Then, with the sums over
x and y understood as over x ∈ L+ and y ∈ L×, respectively,∥∥AB|ψ〉∥∥ = ∥∥∥∥∑
x,y
|x〉〈x|H⊗n|y〉〈y|H⊗n|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥ = 2−n/2
∥∥∥∥∑
x,y
|x〉〈y|H⊗n|ψ〉
∥∥∥∥
= 2−n/2
∥∥∥∥∑
x
|x〉
∥∥∥∥ ·
∣∣∣∣∑
y
λy
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2−n/2√|L+|∑
y
|λy| ≤ 2−n/2
√
|L+||L×|,
The second equality holds since 〈x|H⊗n|y〉 = 2−n/2 are mutually unbiased,
the first inequality follows from Pythagoras and the triangle inequality, and
the last inequality follows from Cauchy-Schwarz (Lemma 2.3). This implies
‖AB‖ ≤ 2−n/2√|L+||L×| and finishes the proof. 
This theorem yields a meaningful bound as long as |L+| · |L×| < 2n, for
instance if L+ and L× both contain less than 2n/2 elements. The relation is
tight in the sense that for the Hadamard-invariant state
|ϕ〉 = (|0〉⊗n + (H|0〉)⊗n) /√2(1 + 2−n/2)
and L+ = L× = {0n}, it is straightforward to verify that Q+(L+) = Q×(L×) =
(1 + 2−n/2)/2 and therefore Q+(L+) + Q×(L×) = 1 + 2−n/2. Another state
that achieves equality (for n even) is |ϕ〉 = |0〉⊗n/2 ⊗ (H|0〉)⊗n/2 with L+ =
{0n/2x|x ∈ {0, 1}n/2} and L× = {x0n/2|x ∈ {0, 1}n/2}. We get that Q+(L+) =
Q×(L×) = 1 and thus Q+(L+) +Q×(L×) = 2 = 1 + 2−n/2
√
2n.
If for r ∈ {+,×}, Lr contains only the n-bit string with the maximal prob-
ability of Qr, we obtain a known tight relation (see (9) in [MU88]).
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Corollary 4.15 Let q+∞ and q×∞ be the maximal probabilities of the distributions
Q+ and Q× from above. It then holds that q+∞ + q×∞ ≤ 1 + c and therefore also
q+∞ · q×∞ ≤ 14 (1 + c)2 where c = 2−n/2.
Equality is achieved for the same state |ϕ〉 = (|0〉⊗n + (H|0〉)⊗n) /√2(1 + 2−n/2)
as above.
Using Lemma 4.13, the following corollary is obtained.
Corollary 4.16 For all quantum states ρ of n qubits, it holds that
H∞(Q+ρ ) + H∞(Q
×
ρ ) ≥ 2(1 − log(1 + 2−n/2)).
There exists a quantum state achieving equality.
The following corollary plays the crucial role in the security proofs of proto-
cols in the bounded-quantum-storage model presented in the following chapters
of this thesis.
Corollary 4.17 Let R be a random variable over {+,×}, and let X be the
outcome when ρ is measured in basis R, such that PX|R(x|r) = Qr(x). Then,
for any λ < 12 there exists κ > 0 and an event E such that
P [E|R=+] + P [E|R=×] ≥ 1− 2−κn
and thus P [E ] ≥ 12 − 2−κn in case R is uniform, and such that
H∞(X|R=r, E) ≥ λn
for r ∈ {+,×} with PR|E(r) > 0.
Proof: Choose κ > 0 such that λ+ 2κ < 12 , and define
S+ :=
{
x ∈ {0, 1}n : Q+(x) ≤ 2−(λ+κ)n} and
S× :=
{
z ∈ {0, 1}n : Q×(z) ≤ 2−(λ+κ)n}
to be the sets of strings with small probabilities and denote by L+ : = S
+
and L× := S× their complements1. Note that for all x ∈ L+, we have that
Q+(x) > 2−(λ+κ)n and therefore |L+| < 2(λ+κ)n. Analogously, we have |L×| <
2(λ+κ)n. For ease of notation, we abbreviate the probabilities that strings with
small probabilities occur with q+ := Q+(S+) and q× := Q×(S×). It follows
immediately from the choice of κ and Theorem 4.14 that
q+ + q× ≥ 1− 2−n/2 · 2(λ+κ)n ≥ 1− 2−κn .
We define E to be the event X ∈ SR. Then P [E|R=+] = P [X ∈ S+|R=
+] = q+ and similarly P [E|R = ×] = q×, and thus the first claim follows
immediately. Furthermore, if R is uniformly distributed, then
P [E ] = P [E|R=+]PR(+) + P [E|R=×]PR(×)
=
1
2
(q+ + q×) ≥ 1
2
− 2−κn/2 ≥ 1
2
− 2−κn.
1Here’s the mnemonic: S for the strings with Small probabilities, L for Large.
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Regarding the second claim, in case R = +, we have
H∞(X|R=+, E) = − log
(
max
x∈S+
Q+(x)
q+
)
≥ − log
(
2−(λ+κ)n
q+
)
= λn+ κn+ log(q+).
Thus, if q+ ≥ 2−κn then indeed H∞(X|R=+,X ∈ S+) ≥ λn. The correspond-
ing holds for the case R = ×.
Finally, if q+ < 2−κn (or similarly q× < 2−κn) then instead of the above,
we define E as the empty event if R = + and as the event X ∈ S× if R = ×.
It follows that P [E|R =+] = 0 and P [E|R=×] = q× ≥ 1 − 2−κn, as well as
H∞(X|R=×, E) = H∞(X|R=×,X ∈ S×) ≥ λn + κn + log(q×) ≥ λn (for n
large enough), both by the bound on q+ + q× and on q+, whereas PR|E (+) =
0. 
4.4 More Mutually Unbiased Bases
In this section, we generalize the uncertainty relation derived in Section 4.3 to
more than two mutually unbiased bases. Such uncertainty relations over more
than two, but not all mutually unbiased bases in terms of min-entropy may be
of independent interest, see the discussion at the end of Section 4.2.
Theorem 4.18 Let the density matrix ρ describe the state of n qubits and let
B0,B1, . . . ,BM be mutually unbiased bases of H2n . Let Q0(·), Q1(·), . . . , QM (·)
be the distributions of the outcome when ρ is measured in bases B0,B1, . . . ,BM ,
respectively. Then, for any sets L0, L1, . . . , LM ⊂ {0, 1}n, it holds that
M∑
i=0
Qi(Li) ≤ 1 +M · 2−n/2 max
0≤i<j≤M
√
|Li||Lj |.
Proof: Except of using Proposition 4.3 instead of Proposition 4.2, the proof is
analogous to the one of Theorem 4.14. 
As in Corollary 4.16, we derive an uncertainty relation about the sum of the
min-entropies of up to 2n/2 distributions.
Corollary 4.19 For an ε > 0, let 0 < M < 2
n
2
−εn. For i = 0, . . . ,M , let
H∞(Qi) be the min-entropies of the distributions Qi from the theorem above.
Then,
M∑
i=0
H∞(Qi) ≥ (M + 1)
(
log(M + 1)− negl(n)).
Proof: For i = 0, . . . ,M , we denote by qi∞ the maximal probability of Qi
and let Li be the set containing only the n-bit string x with this maximal
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probability qi∞. Theorem 4.18 together with the assumption about M assures∑M
i=0 q
i∞ ≤ 1 + negl(n). By Lemma 4.13 follows
M∑
i=0
H∞(Qi) ≥ (M + 1)
(
log(M + 1)− negl(n)).

4.5 Independent Bases for Each Subsystem
So far, we have focused on the case of an n-qubit state ρ ∈ P(H2n) measured
in two or more mutually unbiased bases of H2n . In this section, we investi-
gate the case when each of the n qubits is measured in an individual basis,
picked independently and uniformly from {+,×}, i.e. ρ is measured in basis
Θ ∈R {+,×}n.
More generally, our result holds for a state ρ ∈ H⊗nd of n quantum systems—
each d-dimensional—which are measured in an individual basis, picked indepen-
dently and uniformly from a set B of basis of Hd, see Theorem 4.22.
4.5.1 A Classical Tool
We start our derivation with a classical information-theoretic tool which itself
might be of independent interest.
Theorem 4.20 Let Z1, . . . , Zn be n random variables (not necessarily inde-
pendent) over alphabet Z. If there exists a real number h > 0 such that for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n and z1, . . . , zi−1 ∈ Z:
H(Zi|Z1 = z1, . . . , Zi−1 = zi−1) ≥ h,
then for any 0 < λ < 12
Hε∞(Z1, . . . , Zn) ≥ (h− 2λ)n,
where ε = exp
(− λ2n32 log(|Z|/λ)2 ).
If the Zi’s are independent and have Shannon entropy at least h, it is known (see
Lemma 2.13) that the smooth min-entropy of Z1, . . . , Zn is at least nh for large
enough n. Informally, Theorem 4.20 guarantees that when the independence-
condition is relaxed to a lower bound on the Shannon entropy of Zi given any
previous history, then we still have (almost) nh bits of min-entropy except with
negligible probability ε.
The proof idea is to use Azuma’s inequality in the form of Corollary 4.7 for
cleverly chosen Ri’s. The main trick is that for a random variable Z over Z,
we can define another random variable S := logPZ(Z) over R with expected
value E[S] =
∑
z∈Z PZ(z) · log PZ(z) = H(Z) equal to the Shannon entropy
of Z, which allows us to make the connection with the assumption about the
Shannon entropy.
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Proof: Recall that the superscript means Zi := (Z1, . . . , Zi) for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
and similarly for other sequences. We want to show that
Pr
[
PZn(Z
n) ≥ 2−(h−2λ)n] ≤ ε
for ε as claimed in Theorem 4.20. This means that PZn(z
n) is smaller than
2−(h−2λ)n except with probability at most ε (over the choice of zn), and therefore
implies the claim Hε∞(Zn) ≥ (h− 2λ)n by the definition of smooth min-entropy
from Section 2.4.2. Note that PZn(Z
n) ≥ 2−(h−2λ)n is equivalent to
n∑
i=1
(
log
(
PZi|Zi−1(Zi|Zi−1)
)
+ h
)
≥ 2λn (4.6)
which is of suitable form to apply Azuma’s inequality (Corollary 4.7).
Consider first an arbitrary sequence S1, . . . , Sn of real-valued random vari-
ables. We assume the Si’s to be either all positive or all negative. Define a new
sequence R1, . . . , Rn of random variables by putting Ri := Si − E[Si|Si−1]. It
is straightforward to verify that E[Ri|Ri−1] = 0, i.e., R1, . . . , Rn forms a mar-
tingale difference sequence. Thus if for any i, |Si| ≤ c for some c, and thus
|Ri| ≤ c, Azuma’s inequality guarantees that
Pr
[
n∑
i=1
(
Si − E
[
Si|Si−1
]) ≥ λn
]
≤ exp
(
−λ
2n
2c2
)
. (4.7)
We now put Si := logPZi|Zi−1(Zi|Zi−1) for i = 1, . . . , n. Note that S1, . . . , Sn ≤
0. It is easy to see that the bound on the conditional entropy of Zi from
Theorem 4.20 implies that E[Si|Si−1] ≤ −h. Indeed, for any zi−1 ∈ Zi−1, we
have E
[
log PZi|Zi−1(Zi|Zi−1)|Zi−1 = zi−1
]
= −H(Zi|Zi−1 = zi−1) ≤ −h, and
thus for any subset E of Zi−1, and in particular for the set of zi−1’s which map
to a given si−1, it holds that
E
[
Si|Zi−1∈E
]
=
∑
zi−1∈E
PZi−1|Zi−1∈E (z
i−1) · E[ log PZi|Zi−1(Zi|Zi−1)|Zi−1=zi−1]
≤ −h . (4.8)
As a consequence, the bound on the probability of (4.7) in particular bounds
the probability of the event (4.6), even with λn instead of 2λn. A problem
though is that we have no upper bound c on the |Si|’s. Because of that, we now
consider a modified sequence S˜1, . . . , S˜n defined by S˜i := logPZi|Zi−1(Zi|Zi−1)
if PZi|Zi−1(Zi|Zi−1) ≥ δ and S˜i := 0 otherwise, where δ > 0 will be determined
later. This gives us a bound like (4.7) but with an explicit c, namely c =
log(1/δ). Below, we will argue that E
[
S˜i|S˜i−1
] − E[Si|S˜i−1] ≤ λ by the right
choice of δ; the claim then follows from observing that
S˜i − E
[
S˜i|S˜i−1
] ≥ Si − E[S˜i|S˜i−1]
≥ Si − E
[
Si|S˜i−1
]− λ
≥ Si + h− λ,
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where the last inequality follows from (4.8). Regarding the claim E
[
S˜i|S˜i−1
]−
E
[
Si|S˜i−1
] ≤ λ, using a similar argument as for (4.8), it suffices to show that
E
[
S˜i|Z˜i−1=zi−1
]− E[Si|Z˜i−1=zi−1] ≤ λ for any zi−1:
E
[
S˜i|Z˜i−1=zi−1
]− E[Si|Z˜i−1=zi−1]
= −
∑
zi
PZi|Zi−1(zi|zi−1) log(PZi|Zi−1(zi|zi−1))
≤ |Z|δ log(1/δ)
where the summation is over all zi ∈ Z with PZi|Zi−1(zi|zi−1) < δ, and where the
inequality holds as long as δ ≤ 1/e, as can easily be verified. Thus, we let 0 <
δ < 1/e be such that |Z|δ log(1/δ) = λ. Using the mathematical Lemma 4.8,
we have that δ > λ/|Z|4 log (|Z|/λ) and derive that c
2 = log(1/δ)2 = λ2/(δ|Z|)2 <
16 log(|Z|/λ)2, which gives us the claimed bound ε on the probability. 
4.5.2 Quantum Uncertainty Relations
We now state and prove the new entropic uncertainty relation in its most general
form. A special case will then be introduced (Corollary 4.23) and used in the
security analysis of the 1-2 OT-protocols we consider in Chapter 6.
Definition 4.21 Let S be a finite set of orthonormal bases in the d-dimensional
Hilbert space Hd. We call h ≥ 0 an average entropic uncertainty bound for S
if every state in Hd satisfies 1|S|
∑
ϑ∈S H(Pϑ) ≥ h, where Pϑ is the distribution
obtained by measuring the state in basis ϑ.
Note that by the convexity of the Shannon entropy H, a lower bound for all
pure states in Hd suffices to imply the bound for all (possibly mixed) states.
Theorem 4.22 Let S be a set of orthonormal bases in Hd with an average
entropic uncertainty bound h, and let ρ ∈ P(H⊗nd ) be an arbitrary quantum
state. Let Θ = (Θ1, . . . ,Θn) be uniformly distributed over Sn and let X =
(X1, . . . ,Xn) be the outcome when measuring ρ in basis Θ, distributed over
{0, . . . , d− 1}n. Then for any 0 < λ < 12
Hε∞(X|Θ) ≥ (h− 2λ)n
with ε = exp
(
− λ2n
32(log(|S|·d/λ))2
)
.
Proof: Define Zi : = (Xi,Θi) and Z
i : = (Z1, . . . , Zi). Let z
i−1 ∈ Si−1 be
arbitrary. Then
H(Zi|Zi−1=zi−1) = H(Xi|Θi, Zi−1=zi−1) + H(Θi|Zi−1=zi−1) ≥ h+ log |S|,
where the inequality follows from the fact that Θi is chosen uniformly at random
and from the definition of h. Note that h lower bounds the average entropy for
any system in Hd, and thus in particular for the ith subsystem of ρ, with all
previous d-dimensional subsystems measured. Theorem 4.20 thus implies that
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Hε∞(XΘ) ≥ (h + log |B| − 2λ)n for any 0 < λ < 12 and for ε as claimed. We
conclude that
Hε∞(X | Θ) ≥ Hε∞(XΘ)− n log |B| ≥ (h− 2λ)n ,
where the first inequality follows from the equality
PXE|Θ(x|θ) = PXΘE (x, θ)/PΘ(θ) = |B|n · PXΘE(x, θ)
for all x and θ and any event E , and from the definition of (conditional) smooth
entropy. 
For the special case where S = {+,×} is the set of BB84 bases, we can
use the uncertainty relation of Maassen and Uffink [MU88] (see Equation (4.2))
which, using our terminology, states that S has average entropic uncertainty
bound h = 12 . Theorem 4.22 together with Lemma 4.9 then immediately gives
the following corollary.
Corollary 4.23 Let ρ ∈ P(H⊗n2 ) be an arbitrary n-qubit quantum state. Let
Θ = (Θ1, . . . ,Θn) be uniformly distributed over {+,×}n and X = (X1, . . . ,Xn)
be the outcome when measuring ρ in basis Θ. Then for any 0 < λ < 14
Hε∞(X|Θ) ≥
(
1
2 − 2λ
)
n
where ε = 2−
λ4
32
n.
Maassen and Uffink’s relation being optimal means there exists a quantum
state ρ—namely the product state of eigenstates of the subsystems, e.g. ρ =
|0〉〈0|⊗n—for which H(X|Θ) = n2 . On the other hand, we have shown that
(12−λ)n ≤ Hε∞(X|Θ) for λ > 0 arbitrarily close to 0. For the product state ρ, the
X are independent and we know from Lemma 2.13 that Hε∞(X|Θ) approaches
H(X|Θ) = n2 . It follows that the relation cannot be significantly improved even
when considering Re´nyi entropy of order 1 < α <∞.
Another tight corollary is obtained if we consider the set of measurements
S = {+,×,	} (see Section 2.3 for the definition of the circular basis 	). In
[Sa´n93], Sa´nchez-Ruiz shows that for this S, the average entropic uncertainty
bound
h =
2
3
(4.9)
is optimal. It implies that Hε∞(X|Θ) & H(X|Θ) = 2n3 for negligible ε.
4.5.3 The Overall Average Entropic Uncertainty Bound
In the this section, we compute the average uncertainty bound for the set of all
bases of a d-dimensional Hilbert space. Let U(d) be the set of unitaries on Hd.
Moreover, let dU be the normalized Haar measure on U(d), i.e.,∫
U(d)
f(V U)dU =
∫
U(d)
f(UV )dU =
∫
U(d)
f(U)dU ,
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for any V ∈ U(d) and any integrable function f , and ∫U(d) dU = 1. (Note that
the normalized Haar measure dU exists and is unique.)
Let {ω1, . . . , ωd} be a fixed orthonormal basis ofHd, and let Sall = {ϑU}U∈U(d)
be the family of bases ϑU = {Uω1, . . . , Uωd} with U ∈ U(d). The set Sall con-
sist of all orthonormal basis of Hd. We generalize Definition 4.21, the average
entropic uncertainty bound for a finite set of bases, to the infinite set Sall.
Definition 4.24 We call hd an overall average entropic uncertainty bound in
Hd if every state in Hd satisfies∫
U(d)
H(PϑU )dU ≥ hd ,
where PϑU is the distribution obtained by measuring the state in basis ϑU ∈ Sall.
Proposition 4.25 For any positive integer d,
hd =
(
d∑
i=2
1
i
)
/ ln(2)
is the overall average entropic uncertainty bound in Hd. It is attained for any
pure state in Hd.
The proposition follows immediately from Formula (14) in [JRW94] for a pure
state, i.e. (λ1, . . . , λn) = (1, 0, . . . , 0). The result was originally shown by
Sy´kora [Sy´k74] and by Jones [Jon91], another proof can be found in the ap-
pendix of an article by Jozsa, Robb, and Wootters [JRW94]. An elementary
proof suggested by Harremoe¨s based on recent results by Harremoe¨s and Vig-
nat [HV06] is given below.
Proof: Let |ϕ〉 be a pure state in Hd. For the probability distribution PϑU =
(p1, . . . , pd) holds pi = |〈ϕ|U |ωi〉|2. We want to compute the integral
∫
U(d)
−
d∑
i=1
pi log(pi) dU = −
d∑
i=1
∫
U(d)
|〈ϕ|U |ωi〉|2 log(|〈ϕ|U |ωi〉|2) dU.
Note that by the invariance of the Haar measure, all summands on the right-
hand side are equal and it suffices to compute
− d
∫
U(d)
|〈ϕ|U |e1〉|2 log(|〈ϕ|U |e1〉|2) dU, (4.10)
where |e1〉 is the first vector in the computational basis, i.e. |〈ϕ|U |e1〉|2 is the
length of the projection onto the first coordinate of U∗|ϕ〉.
The Haar measure over U(d) is the uniform distribution over the d-dimensional
complex sphere which can be seen as the uniform distribution over the 2d-
dimensional real sphere S2d = {(X,Y ) ∈ R2d|
∑2d
i=1X
2
i + Y
2
i = 1} where the
complex coordinates are given by (X1+iY1, . . . ,Xd+iYd). Setting Zi = X
2
i +Y
2
i
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and Z = (Z1, . . . , Zd) and using a result from [HV06] about the projection of
the uniform distribution over S2d to the first coordinate, we obtain that the
density of Z1 is f(z) = (d − 1)(1 − z)d−2dz for z ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, (4.10)
equals
−d
∫ 1
0
z log(z) · (d− 1)(1 − z)d−2dz =
(
d∑
i=2
1
i
)
/ ln(2),
where the evaluation of this integral follows from standard calculus. By con-
vexity of the Shannon entropy, the bound also holds for mixed states and the
claim follows. 
The following table gives some numerical values of hd for small values of d.
d 2 4 8 16
hd 0.72 1.56 2.48 3.43
hd
log(d) 0.72 0.78 0.83 0.86
It is well-known that the harmonic series in Proposition 4.25 diverges in the
same way as log(d) and therefore, hdlog(d) goes to 1 for large dimensions d.
Chapter 5
Rabin OT in the
Bounded-Quantum-Storage
Model
In this chapter, we present an efficient protocol for Rabin Oblivious Transfer
which is secure in the bounded-quantum-storage model. It first appeared in
[DFSS05], a journal version of this paper is in preparation [DFSS08].
5.1 The Definition
A protocol for Rabin Oblivious Transfer (Rabin OT) between sender Alice and
receiver Bob allows for Alice to send a bit b through an erasure channel to Bob.
Each transmission delivers b or an erasure with probability 12 . Intuitively, a
protocol for Rabin OT is secure if
• the sender Alice gets no information on whether b was received or not, no
matter what she does, and
• the receiver Bob gets no information about b with probability at least 12 ,
no matter what he does.
In this chapter, we are considering quantum protocols for Rabin OT. This
means that while the inputs and outputs of the honest senders are classical,
described by random variables, the protocol may contain quantum computation
and quantum communication, and the view of a dishonest player is quantum,
and is thus described by a quantum state.
Any such (two-party) protocol is specified by a family {(Sn,Rn)}n>0 of pairs
of interactive quantum circuits (i.e. interacting through a quantum channel).
Each pair is indexed by a security parameter n > 0, where Sn and Rn denote
the circuits for sender Alice and receiver Bob, respectively. In order to simplify
the notation, we often omit the index n, leaving the dependency on it implicit.
For the formal definition of the security requirements of a Rabin OT proto-
col, let us fix the following notation. Let B denote the binary random variable
describing S’s input bit b, and let A and Y denote the binary random variables
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describing R’s two output bits, where the meaning is that A indicates whether
the bit was received or not. Furthermore, for a dishonest sender S˜, the final
state of a fixed candidate protocol for Rand 1-2 OT can be described by the
ccq-state ρAY S˜ where (by slight abuse of notation) we also denote by S˜ the
quantum register that the sender outputs. Its state may depend on A and Y .
Similarly, for a dishonest receiver R˜, we have the cq-state ρBR˜.
Definition 5.1 A two-party (quantum) protocol (S,R) is a ε-secure Rabin OT
if the following holds:
ε-Correctness: For honest S and R,
P [B = Y |A = 1] ≥ 1− ε .
ε-Receiver-security: For honest R and any dishonest S˜ there exists1 a binary
random variable B′ such that
P [B′ = Y |A = 1] ≥ 1− ε, and δ(ρAB′S˜,1⊗ ρB′S˜) ≤ ε .
ε-Sender-security: For any R˜ there exists an event E with P [E ] ≥ 12 − ε such
that
δ
(
ρBR˜|E , ρB ⊗ ρR˜|E
) ≤ ε .
If any of the above holds for ε = 0, then the corresponding property is said to
hold perfectly. If one of the properties only holds with respect to a restricted
class S of S˜’s respectively R of R˜’s, then this property is said to hold (and the
protocol is said to be secure) against S respectively R.
Receiver-security requires that the joint quantum state is essentially the
same as when the dishonest sender chooses a bit B′ according to some dis-
tribution and a (possibly dependent) quantum state, and gives B′ to an ideal
functionality which passes it on to the receiver with probability 12 . Sender-
security requires that the joint quantum state is essentially the same as when
the dishonest receiver gets the sender’s bit B with probability 12 and prepares
some state that may depend on B in case he receives it, and prepares some state
that does not depend on B otherwise. In other words, security requires that
the dishonest party cannot do more than when attacking an ideal functionality.
From such a strong security guarantee we expect nice composition behavior, for
instance like in [CSSW06].
Note that the original definition given in [DFSS05] does not guarantee that
the distribution of the input bit is determined at the end the execution of
Rabin OT. This is a strictly weaker definition and does not fully capture what is
expected from a Rabin OT: it is easy to see that if the dishonest sender can still
influence his input bit after the execution of the protocol, then known schemes
based on Rabin OT, like bit commitments, are not secure anymore. The security
definition given here is in the spirit of the security definition from [DFR+07]
for 1-2 OT, described in the next Chapter 6.
1Recall from Section 2.3: Given a cq-state ρXE, by saying that there exists a random
variable Y such that ρXYE satisfies some condition, we mean that ρXE can be understood as
ρXE = trY (ρXYE) for a ccq-state ρXYE that satisfies the required condition.
5.2. The Protocol 71
5.2 The Protocol
We present a quantum protocol for Rabin OT that will be shown perfectly cor-
rect and perfectly receiver-secure (against any sender) and statistically sender-
secure against any quantum-memory-bounded receiver. Our protocol exhibits
some similarity with quantum conjugate coding introduced by Wiesner [Wie83].
qot(b):
1. S picks x ∈R {0, 1}n, and r ∈R {+,×} and sends |ψ〉 := |x〉r to R
(i.e. the string x encoded in basis r).
2. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all qubits of |ψ〉 in basis r′. Let
x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
3. S announces r, f ∈R Fn, and e := b⊕ f(x).
4. R outputs a := 1 and y := e ⊕ f(x′) if r′ = r and else a := 0 and
y := 0.
Figure 5.1: Quantum Protocol for Rabin OT
The protocol given in Figure 5.1 is very simple: S picks x ∈R {0, 1}n and
sends to R n qubits in state either |x〉+ or |x〉× each chosen with probability 12 .
R then measures all received qubits either in the rectilinear or in the diagonal
basis. With probability 12 , R picked the right basis and gets x, while any R˜ that
is forced to measure part of the state (due to a memory bound) can only have
full information on x in case the +-basis was used or in case the ×-basis was
used (but not in both cases). Privacy amplification based on any two-universal
class of hashing functions Fn is then used to eliminate partial information (as
explained in Section 2.5). For simplicity, we focus on the case where the output
size of the family Fn is just one bit, i.e. ℓ = 1, but all results of this chapter
can easily be extended to Rabin OT ℓ of ℓ-bit strings, by using an output size
ℓ > 1 and adjusting the memory bounds accordingly, see Section 5.7.
In order to avoid aborting, we specify that if a dishonest S˜ refuses to partic-
ipate, or sends data in incorrect format, then R samples its output bits a and
y both at random in {0, 1}.
We first consider receiver-security.
Proposition 5.2 qot is perfectly receiver-secure.
It is obvious that no information about whether R has received the bit is leaked
to any sender S˜, since R does not send anything. However, one needs to show
the existence of a random variable B′ as required by receiver-security.
Proof: Recall, the quantum state ρAY S˜ is defined by the experiment where the
dishonest sender S˜ interacts with the honest memory-bounded R. Consider a
modification of the experiment where we allow R to be unbounded in memory
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and where R waits to receive r and then measures all qubits in basis r. Let
X ′ be the resulting string. Nevertheless, R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} at random
and outputs (A,Y ) = (0, 0) if r′ 6= r and (A,Y ) = (1, e ⊕ f(X ′)) if r′ = r.
Since the only difference between the two experiments is when R measures the
qubits and in what basis R measures them when r 6= r′, in which case his final
output is independent of the measurement outcome, the two experiments result
in the same ρAY S˜. However, in the modified experiment we can choose B
′ to
be e ⊕ f(X ′), such that by construction B′ = Y if A = 1 and A is uniformly
distributed, independent of anything, and thus ρAB′S˜ = 1⊗ ρB′S˜. 
As we shall see in Section 5.4, the security of the qot protocol against
receivers with bounded-size quantummemory holds as long as the bound applies
before Step 3 is reached. An equivalent protocol is obtained by purifying the
sender’s actions. Although qot is easy to implement, the purified or EPR-
based version depicted in Figure 5.2 is easier to prove secure. This technique
was pioneered by Ekert [Eke91] in the scenario of quantum key distribution. A
similar approach was taken in the Shor-Preskill proof of security for the BB84
quantum-key-distribution scheme [SP00].
epr-qot(b):
1. S prepares n EPR pairs each in state |Ω〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) and sends
one half of each pair to R and keeps the other halves.
2. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all received qubits in basis r′.
Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
3. S picks r ∈R {+,×}, and measures all kept qubits in basis r. Let x ∈
{0, 1}n be the outcome. S announces r, f ∈R Fn, and e := b⊕ f(x).
4. R outputs a := 1 and y := e ⊕ f(x′) if r′ = r and else a := 0 and
y := 0.
Figure 5.2: Protocol for EPR-based Rabin OT
Notice that while qot requires no quantum memory for honest players,
quantum memory for S seems to be required in epr-qot. The following Lemma
shows the strict security equivalence between qot and epr-qot.
Lemma 5.3 qot is ε-sender-secure if and only if epr-qot is.
Proof: The proof follows easily after observing that S’s choices of r and f ,
together with the measurements all commute with R˜’s actions. Therefore, they
can be performed right after Step 1 with no change for R˜’s view. Modifying
epr-qot that way results in qot. 
Note that for a dishonest receiver it is not only irrelevant whether he tries to
attack qot or epr-qot, but in fact there is no difference in the two protocols
from his point of view.
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5.3 Modeling Dishonest Receivers
We model dishonest receivers in qot, respectively epr-qot, under the assump-
tion that the maximum size of their quantum storage is bounded. These ad-
versaries are only required to have bounded quantum storage when they reach
Step 3 in (epr-)qot. Before (and after) that, the adversary can store and
carry out quantum computations involving any number of qubits. Apart from
the restriction on the size of the quantum memory available to the adversary,
no other assumption is made. In particular, the adversary is not assumed to be
computationally bounded and the size of its classical memory is not restricted.
Definition 5.4 The set Rγ denotes all possible quantum dishonest receivers
{R˜n}n>0 in qot or epr-qot where for each n > 0, R˜n has quantum memory
of size at most γn when Step 3 is reached.
In general, the adversary R˜ is allowed to perform any quantum computation
compressing the n qubits received from S into a quantum register M of size
at most γn when Step 3 is reached. More precisely, the compression function
is implemented by some unitary transform T acting upon the quantum state
received and an ancilla register of arbitrary size (initially in the state |0〉). The
compression is performed by a measurement that we assume in the computa-
tional basis without loss of generality. Before starting Step 3, the adversary
first applies a unitary transform T :
2−n/2
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉 ⊗ T |x〉|0〉 7→ 2−n/2
∑
x∈{0,1}n
|x〉 ⊗
∑
y
αx,y|ϕx,y〉M |y〉Y ,
where for all x,
∑
y |αx,y|2 = 1. Then, a measurement in the computational
basis is applied to register Y providing classical outcome y. The result is a
quantum state in register M of size γn qubits. Ignoring the value of y to ease
the notation, the re-normalized state of the system in its most general form
when Step 3 in epr-qot is reached is thus of the form
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
αx|x〉 ⊗ |ϕx〉M ,
where
∑
x |αx|2 = 1. We will prove security for any such state |ψ〉 and thus
conditioned on any value y that may be observed. It is therefore safe to leave
the dependency on y implicit.
5.4 Security Against Dishonest Receivers
In this section, we use the uncertainty relation derived in Section 4.3 to show
that epr-qot is secure against any dishonest receiver having access to a quan-
tum storage device of size strictly smaller than half the number of qubits re-
ceived at Step 1.
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Theorem 5.5 For all γ < 12 , qot is ε-secure for a negligible (in n) ε against
Rγ .
Proof: After Lemmas 5.3 and 5.2, it remains to show that epr-qot is ε-sender-
secure against Rγ . Since γ <
1
2 , we can find κ > 0 with γ + κ <
1
2 . Consider
a dishonest receiver R˜ in epr-qot with quantum memory of size γn. Let R
and X denote the random variables describing the basis r and the outcome x of
S’s measurement (in basis r) in Step 3 of epr-qot, respectively. We implicitly
understand the distribution of X given R to be conditioned on the classical
outcome y of the measurement R˜ performed when the memory bound applies,
as described in Section 5.3; the following analysis works no matter what y is.
Corollary 4.17 with λ = γ + κ implies the existence of ε negligible in n and an
event E such that P [E ] ≥ 12 − ε and such that H∞(X|R= r, E) ≥ γn + κn for
any relevant r. Note that by construction, the random variables X and R, and
thus also the event E , are independent of the sender’s input bit B, and hence
ρB|E = ρB . It remains to show that δ
(
ρBR˜|E , ρB|E⊗ρR˜|E
) ≤ ε. As the bit B
is masked by the output of the two-universal hash function F (X) in Step 4 of
epr-qot (where the random variable F represents the random choice for f),
it suffices to show that F (X) is close to uniform and essentially independent
from R˜’s view, conditioned on E . But this is guaranteed by the above bound on
H∞(X|R=r, E) and by the privacy-amplification theorem (Corollary 2.25 with
ε := 0, ℓ := 1, q := γn and U constant). 
5.5 On the Necessity of Privacy Amplification
In this section, we show that randomized privacy amplification is needed for
protocol qot to be secure. For instance, it is tempting to believe that the
sender could use the XOR
⊕
i xi in order to mask the bit b, rather than f(x) for
a randomly sampled f ∈ Fn. This would reduce the communication complexity
as well as the number of random coins needed. However, we argue in this section
that this is not secure (against an adversary as we model it). Indeed, somewhat
surprisingly, this variant can be broken by a dishonest receiver that has no
quantum memory at all (but that can do coherent measurements on pairs of
qubits) in the case n is even. For odd n, the dishonest receiver needs to store
a single qubit.
Clearly, a dishonest receiver can break the modified scheme qot and learn
the bit b with probability 1 if he can compute
⊕
i xi with probability 1. Note
that, using the equivalence between qot and epr-qot, xi can be understood
as the outcome of the measurement in either the +- or the ×-basis, performed
by the sender on one part of an EPR pair while the other is handed over to the
receiver. The following proposition shows that indeed the receiver can learn⊕
i xi by a suitable measurement of his parts of the EPR pairs. Concretely,
he measures the qubits he receives pair-wise by a suitable measurement which
allows him to learn the XOR of the two corresponding xi’s, no matter what the
basis is (and he needs to store one single qubit in case n is odd). This obviously
allows him to learn the XOR of all xi’s in all cases.
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Proposition 5.6 Consider two EPR pairs, i.e., |ψ〉 = 12
∑
x |x〉S |x〉R where x
ranges over {0, 1}2. Let r ∈ {+,×}, and let x1 and x2 be the result when mea-
suring the two qubits in register S in basis r. There exists a fixed measurement
for register R so that the outcome together with r uniquely determines x1 ⊕ x2.
Proof: The measurement that does the job is the Bell measurement, i.e., the
measurement in the Bell basis {|Φ+〉, |Ψ+〉, |Φ−〉, |Ψ−〉}. Recall,
∣∣Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ + |11〉+) = 1√
2
(|00〉× + |11〉×)∣∣Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ + |10〉+) = 1√2
(|00〉× − |11〉×)∣∣Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ − |11〉+) = 1√2
(|01〉× + |10〉×)∣∣Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ − |10〉+) = 1√2
(|10〉× − |01〉×) .
Due to the special form of the Bell basis, when register R is measured and, as
a consequence, one of the four Bell states is observed, the state in register S
collapses to that same Bell state. Indeed, when doing the basis transformation,
all cross-products cancel each other out. It now follows by inspection that
knowledge of the Bell state and the basis r allows to predict the XOR of the
two bits observed when measuring the Bell state in basis r. For instance, for
the Bell state |Ψ+〉, the XOR is 1 if r = + and it is 0 if r = ×. 
Note that from the proof above, one can see that the receiver’s attack,
respectively his measurement on each pair of qubits, can be understood as
teleporting one of the two entangled qubits from the receiver to the sender
using the other as EPR pair. However, the receiver does not send the outcome
of his measurement to the sender, but keeps it in order to predict the XOR.
Clearly, the same strategy also works against any fixed linear function.
Therefore, the only hope for doing deterministic privacy amplification is by
using a non-linear function. However, it has been shown recently by Ballester,
Wehner, and Winter [BWW06], that also this approach is doomed to fail in our
scenario, because the outcome of any fixed Boolean function can be perfectly
predicted by a dishonest receiver who can store a single qubit and later learns
the correct basis r ∈ {+,×}.
5.6 Weakening the Assumptions
Observe that qot requires error-free quantum communication, in that a trans-
mitted bit b, that is encoded by the sender and measured by the receiver using
the same basis, is always received as b. In addition, it also requires a perfect
quantum source which on request produces one and only one qubit in the right
state, e.g. one photon with the right polarization. Indeed, in case of noisy
quantum communication, an honest receiver in qot is likely to receive an in-
correct bit, and the sender-security of qot is vulnerable to imperfect sources
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that once in a while transmit more than one qubit in the same state: a mali-
cious receiver R˜ can easily determine the basis r ∈ {+,×} and measure all the
following qubits in the right basis. However, current technology only allows to
approximate the behavior of single-photon sources and of noise-free quantum
communication. It would be preferable to find a variant of qot that allows to
weaken the technological requirements put upon the honest parties.
In this section, we present such a protocol based on BB84 states [BB84],
bb84-qot (see Figure 5.3). The security proof follows essentially by adapting
the security analysis of qot in a rather straightforward way, as will be discussed
later.
5.6.1 Weak Quantum Model
Let us consider a quantum channel with an error probability φ < 12 , i.e., φ
denotes the probability that a transmitted bit b, that is encoded by the sender
and measured by the receiver using the same basis, is received as 1−b. In order
not to have the security rely on any level of noise, we assume the error proba-
bility to be zero when considering a dishonest receiver. Also, let us consider a
quantum source which produces two or more qubits (in the same state), rather
than just one, with probability η < 1−φ. We call this the (φ, η)-weak quantum
model. By adjusting the parameters, this model can also cope with dark counts
and empty pulses, see Section 9.1.1.
In order to deal with noisy quantum communication, we need to do error-
correction without giving the adversary too much information. Techniques
to solve this problem are known as information reconciliation (as introduced
for instance by Brassard and Salvail [BS93]) or as secure sketches introduced
by Dodis, Reyzin, Smith [DRS04]. Let x ∈ {0, 1}ℓ be an arbitrary string,
and let x′ ∈ {0, 1}ℓ be the result of flipping every bit in x (independently)
with probability φ. It is well known that learning the syndrome S(x) of x,
with respect to a suitable efficiently-decodable linear error-correcting code C
of length ℓ, allows to recover x from x′, except with negligible probability in ℓ
(see,e.g., [Mau91, Cre´97, DRS04]). Furthermore, it is known from coding theory
that, for large enough ℓ, such a code can be chosen with rate R arbitrarily close
to but smaller than 1− h(φ), i.e., such that the syndrome length s is bounded
by s < (h(φ) + ε)ℓ where ε > 0 (see e.g. [Cre´97] or the full version of [DRS04]
and the references therein).
Regarding the loss of information, we can use the privacy-amplification
statement in form of Corollary 2.25 with ε : = 0 and constant U in a simi-
lar way as before, just by appending the classical syndrome S(x) (of length s)
to the quantum register E, which results in
δ
(
ρF (X)FS(X)E ,1⊗ ρFS(X)E
) ≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
(H∞(X)−q−s−1). (5.1)
Consider the protocol bb84-qot shown in Figure 5.3 in the (φ, η)-weak
quantum model. The protocol uses an efficiently decodable linear code Cℓ,
parametrized in ℓ ∈ N, with codeword length ℓ, rate R = 1 − h(φ) − ε for
some small ε > 0, and being able to correct errors occurring with probability
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φ (except with negligible probability). Let Sℓ be the corresponding syndrome
function. Like before, the memory bound in bb84-qot applies before Step 3.
bb84-qot(b):
1. S picks x ∈R {0, 1}n and θ ∈R {+,×}n and sends xi in the corre-
sponding bases |x1〉θ1 , . . . , |xn〉θn to R.
2. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all qubits in basis r′. Let x′ ∈
{0, 1}n be the result.
3. S picks r ∈R {+,×}, sets I := {i : θi= {+,×}[r]} and ℓ := |I|, and
announces r, I, syn := Sℓ(x|I), f ∈R Fℓ, and e := b⊕ f(x|I).
4. R recovers x|I from x′|I and syn, and outputs a : = 1 and b′ : =
e⊕ f(x|I) if r′ = r and else a := 0 and b′ := 0.
Figure 5.3: Protocol for the BB84 version of Rabin OT
By the above mentioned properties of the code Cℓ, it is obvious that R
receives the correct bit b if r′ = r, except with negligible probability. (The
error probability is negligible in ℓ, but by Chernoff’s inequality (Lemma 2.5),
ℓ is linear in n except with negligible probability.) Also, since there is no
communication from R to S, a dishonest sender S˜ cannot learn whether R re-
ceived the bit. In fact, bb84-qot can be shown perfectly receiver-secure in the
same way as in Proposition 5.2. Similar as for protocol qot, in order to argue
about sender-security we compare bb84-qot with a purified version shown in
Figure 5.4. bb84-epr-qot runs in the (φ, 0)-weak quantum model, and the
imperfectness of the quantum source assumed in bb84-qot is simulated by S
in bb84-epr-qot so that there is no difference from R’s point of view.
The security equivalence between bb84-qot (in the (φ, η)-weak quantum
model) and bb84-epr-qot (in the (φ, 0)-weak quantum model) follows along
the same lines as in Section 5.2.
Theorem 5.7 In the (φ, η)-weak quantum model, bb84-qot is ε-secure with ε
negligible in n against Rγ for any γ <
1−η
4 − h(φ)2 and n large enough.
Proof Sketch: It remains to show that bb84-epr-qot is sender-secure against
Rγ (in the (φ, 0)-weak quantum model). The reasoning goes analogous to the
proof of Theorem 5.5, except that we restrict our attention to those i’s which
are in J . By Chernoff’s inequality (Lemma 2.5), ℓ lies within (1 ± ε)n/2 and
|J | within (1 − η ± ε)n/2 except with negligible probability. In order to make
the proof easier to read, we assume that ℓ = n/2 and |J | = (1− η)n/2, and we
also treat the ε occurring in the rate of the code Cℓ as zero. For the full proof,
we simply need to carry the ε’s along, and then choose them small enough at
the end of the proof.
Write n′ = |J | = (1 − η)n/2, and let γ′ be such that γn = γ′n′, i.e.,
γ′ = 2γ/(1 − η). Assume κ > 0 such that γ′ + κ < 12 , where we make sure
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bb84-epr-qot(b):
1. S prepares n EPR pairs each in state |Ω〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉). Addi-
tionally, S initializes I ′+ := ∅ and I ′× := ∅. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
S does the following. With probability 1− η, S sends one half of the
i-th pair to R and keeps the other half. While with probability η, S
picks θi ∈R {+,×}, replaces I ′θi by I ′θi ∪ {i} and sends two or more
qubits in the same state |xi〉θi to R where xi ∈R {0, 1}.
2. R picks r′ ∈R {+,×} and measures all received qubits in basis r′.
Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
3. S picks a random index set J ⊂R {1, . . . , n} \ (I ′+ ∪ I ′×). Then,
it picks r ∈R {+,×}, sets I : = J ∪ I ′r and ℓ : = |I|, and for each
i ∈ J it measures the corresponding qubit in basis r. Let xi be the
corresponding outcome, and let x|I be the collection of all xi’s with
i ∈ I. S announces r, I, syn = Sℓ(x|I), f ∈R Fℓ, and e = b⊕ f(x|I).
4. R recovers x|I from x′|I and syn, and outputs a : = 1 and b′ : =
e⊕ f(x|I), if r′ = r and else a := 0 and b′ := 0.
Figure 5.4: Protocol for EPR-based Rabin OT, BB84 version
later that such κ exists. It then follows from Corollary 4.17 that there exists
an event E such that P [E ] ≥ 12 − negl(n′) = 12 − negl(n) and
H∞
(
X|J
∣∣R=r, E) ≥ (γ′ + κ)n′ = γn+ κ(1− η)n/2 .
By Inequality (5.1), it remains to argue that this is larger than q + s = γn +
h(φ)n/2, i.e.,
κ(1− η) > h(φ) ,
where κ has to satisfy
κ <
1
2
− γ′ = 1
2
− 2γ/(1 − η) .
This can obviously be achieved (by choosing κ appropriately) if and only if the
claimed bound on γ holds. 
5.7 Rabin OT of Strings
In this chapter, we only considered Rabin OT of one bit per invocation. Our
technique can easily be extended to deal with Rabin OT ℓ of ℓ-bit strings, es-
sentially by using a class of two-universal functions with range {0, 1}ℓn rather
than {0, 1}, for some ℓ with γ+ℓ < 12 (respectively < 1−η4 − h(φ)2 for bb84-qot).
Chapter 6
1-2 OT in the
Bounded-Quantum-Storage
Model
In the last chapter, we have shown how to construct Rabin OT securely in
the bounded-quantum-storage model. Although other flavors of OT can be
constructed from Rabin OT using standard reductions, a more direct approach
gives a better ratio between storage-bound and communication-complexity.
In this chapter, we present an efficient protocol for 1-2 Oblivious Transfer
secure in the bounded-quantum-storage model. The protocol is very close to
Wiesner original ”conjugate-coding” protocol [Wie83] from the early 70’s. The
uncertainty relation from Section 4.5 will be extensively used for proving the
security.
The results of this section appeared in [DFR+07].
6.1 The Definition
In 1-2 OT ℓ, the sender Alice sends two ℓ-bit strings S0, S1 to the receiver Bob
in such a way that Bob can choose which string he wants to receive, but does
not learn anything about the other. Alice does not get to know which string
Bob has chosen. As explained in Chapter 3, the common way to build 1-2 OT ℓ
is by constructing a protocol for (Sender-)Randomized 1-2 OT ℓ, which then
can easily be converted into an ordinary 1-2 OT ℓ. Rand 1-2 OT ℓ essentially
coincides with ordinary 1-2 OT ℓ, except that the two strings S0 and S1 are not
input by the sender but generated uniformly at random during the protocol
and output to the sender.
For the formal definition of the security requirements for a quantum protocol
for Rand 1-2 OT ℓ, we translate the classical Definition 3.1 to the quantum set-
ting using a similar notation as for the definition of Rabin OT in Section 5.1:
Let C denote the binary random variable describing receiver R’s choice bit,
let S0, S1 denote the ℓ-bit long random variables describing sender S’s output
strings, and let Y denote the ℓ-bit long random variable describing R’s out-
put string (supposed to be SC). Furthermore, for a fixed candidate protocol
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for Rand 1-2 OT ℓ, and for a fixed input distribution for C, the overall quantum
state in case of a dishonest sender S˜ is given by the ccq-state ρCY S˜. Analogously,
in the case of a dishonest receiver R˜, we have the ccq-state ρS0S1R˜.
Definition 6.1 (Rand 1-2 OT ℓ) An ε-secure Rand 1-2 OT ℓ is a quantum pro-
tocol between S and R, with R having input C ∈ {0, 1} while S has no input,
such that for any distribution of C, the following holds:
ε-Correctness: If S and R follow the protocol, then S gets output strings
S0, S1 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and R gets Y = SC except with probability ε.
ε-Receiver-security: If R is honest, then for any S˜, there exist1 random vari-
ables S′0 and S
′
1 such that Pr
[
Y = S′C
] ≥ 1− ε and
δ
(
ρCS′0S′1S˜
, ρC ⊗ ρS′0S′1S˜
) ≤ ε .
ε-Sender-security: If S is honest, then for any R˜, there exists a random vari-
able D ∈ {0, 1} such that
δ
(
ρS1−DSDDR˜,1⊗ ρSDDR˜
) ≤ ε .
If any of the above holds for ε = 0, then the corresponding property is said to
hold perfectly. If one of the properties only holds with respect to a restricted
class S of S˜’s respectively R of R˜’s, then this property is said to hold and the
protocol is said to be secure against S respectively R.
Receiver-security, as defined here, implies that whatever a dishonest sender
does is as good as the following: generate the ccq-state ρS′0S′1S˜
independently of
C, let R know S′C , and output ρS˜. On the other hand, sender-security implies
that whatever a dishonest receiver does is as good as the following: generate
the ccq-state ρSDDR˜ arbitrarily, let S know SD and an independent uniformly
distributed S1−D, and output ρR˜. In other words, a protocol satisfying Defini-
tion 6.1 is a secure implementation of the natural Rand 1-2 OT ℓ ideal function-
ality, except that it allows a dishonest sender to influence the distribution of
S0 and S1, and the dishonest receiver to influence the distribution of the string
of his choice. This is in particular good enough for constructing a standard
1-2 OT ℓ in the straightforward way.
We would like to point out the importance of requiring the existence of S′0
and S′1 in the formulation of receiver-security in a quantum setting: requiring
only that the sender learns no information on C, as is sufficient in the classical
setting (see e.g. [CSSW06]), does not prevent a dishonest sender from obtaining
S0, S1 by a suitable measurement after the execution of the protocol in such a
way that he can choose S0 ⊕ S1 at will, and SC is the string the receiver has
obtained in the protocol. This would for instance make the straightforward
construction of a bit commitment 2 based on 1-2 OT insecure.
1Recall from Section 2.3: Given a cq-state ρXE, by saying that there exists a random
variable Y such that ρXYE satisfies some condition, we mean that ρXE can be understood as
ρXE = trY (ρXYE) for a ccq-state ρXYE that satisfies the required condition.
2The committer sends two random bits of parity equal to the bit he wants to commit to,
the verifier chooses to receive at random one of those bits.
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6.2 The Protocol
We present a quantum protocol for Rand 1-2 OT ℓ that will be shown perfectly
receiver-secure against any sender and statistically sender-secure against any
quantum-memory-bounded receiver. The first two steps of the protocol are
identical to Wiesner’s “conjugate coding” protocol [Wie83] from circa 1970 for
“transmitting two messages either but not both of which may be received”.
The simple protocol is described in Figure 6.1. The sender S sends random
BB84 states to the receiver R, who measures all received qubits according to his
choice bit C. S then picks randomly two functions from a fixed two-universal
class of hash functions Fn from {0, 1}n to {0, 1}ℓ, where ℓ is to be determined
later, and applies them to the bits encoded in the +-basis respectively the bits
encoded in ×-basis to obtain the output strings S0 and S1. Note that we may
apply a function f ∈ Fn to a n′-bit string with n′ < n by padding it with
zeros3 (which does not decrease its entropy). S announces the encoding bases
and the hash functions to the receiver who then can compute SC . Intuitively,
a dishonest receiver who cannot store all the qubits until the right bases are
announced will measure some qubits in the wrong basis and thus cannot learn
both strings simultaneously.
Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ: Let c be R’s choice bit.
1. S picks x ∈R {0, 1}n and θ ∈R {+,×}n and sends
|x1〉θ1 , |x2〉θ2 , . . . , |xn〉θn to R.
2. R measures all qubits in basis [+,×]c. Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
3. S picks two hash functions f0, f1 ∈R Fn, announces θ and f0, f1 to
R, and outputs s0 := f0(x|◦I0) and s1 := f1(x|◦I1) where Ib := {i : θi=
[+,×]b}.
4. R outputs sc = fc(x
′|◦Ic).
Figure 6.1: Quantum Protocol for Rand 1-2 OT ℓ.
We would like to stress that although protocol description and analysis are
designed for an ideal setting with perfect noiseless quantum communication and
with perfect sources and detectors, all our results can easily be extended to a
more realistic noisy setting along the same lines as in the previous Chapter 5.
It is clear by the non-interactivity of Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ that a dishonest sender
cannot learn anything about the receiver’s choice bit. Below, we show Rand 1
-2 QOT ℓ perfectly receiver-secure according to Definition 6.1.
Proposition 6.2 Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ is perfectly receiver-secure.
Proof: Recall that the ccq-state ρCY S˜ is defined by the experiment where S˜
interacts with the honest memory-bounded R. We now define (in a new Hilbert
3Recall the notation for padding x|◦I introduced in Section 2.1.
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space) the ccccq-state ρˆCˆYˆ Sˆ′0Sˆ′1S˜
by a slightly different experiment: We let S˜
interact with a receiver with unbounded quantum memory, which waits to re-
ceive θ and then measures the i-th qubit in basis θi for i = 1, . . . , n. Let X
be the resulting string, and define Sˆ′0 = f0(X|◦I0) and Sˆ′1 = f1(X|◦I1). Finally,
sample Cˆ according to PC and set Yˆ = Sˆ
′
C . It follows by construction that
Pr
[
Yˆ 6= Sˆ′
Cˆ
]
= 0 and ρˆCˆ is independent of ρˆSˆ′0Sˆ′1S˜
. It remains to argue that
ρˆCˆYˆ S˜ = ρCY S˜, so that corresponding S
′
0 and S
′
1 also exist in the original ex-
periment. But this is obviously satisfied since the only difference between the
two experiments is when and in what basis the qubits at position i ∈ I1−C are
measured, which, once C is fixed, cannot influence ρY S˜ respectively ρˆYˆ S˜. 
6.3 Security Against Dishonest Receivers
As in Section 5.3, we model dishonest receivers in Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ under the
assumption that the maximum size of their quantum storage is bounded. Such
adversaries are only required to have bounded quantum storage when Step 3
in Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ is reached. Before and after that, the adversary can store
and carry out arbitrary quantum computations involving any number of qubits.
Apart from the restriction on the size of the quantum memory available to the
adversary, no other assumption is made. In particular, the adversary is not
assumed to be computationally bounded and the size of its classical memory is
not restricted.
Definition 6.3 The set Rγ denotes all possible quantum dishonest receivers
R˜ in Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ which have quantum memory of size at most γn when
Step 3 is reached.
First, we consider a purified version of Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ, EPR Rand 1-
2 QOT ℓ in Figure 6.2, where S prepares an EPR pair |Φ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉)
instead of |xi〉θi and sends one part to the receiver while keeping the other.
Only when Step 3 is reached and R˜’s quantum memory is bound to γn qubits,
S measures her qubits in basis θ ∈R {+,×}n. It is easy to see that for any
R˜, EPR Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ is equivalent to the original Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ, and
it suffices to prove sender-security for the former. Indeed, S’s choices of θ and
f0, f1, together with the measurements all commute with R’s actions. Therefore,
they can be performed right after Step 1 with no change for R’s view. Modifying
EPR Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ that way results in Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ.
Theorem 6.4 Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ is ε-secure against Rγ for a negligible (in n) ε
if there exists δ > 0 such that γn ≤ n/4− 2ℓ− δn.
The proof has the same structure as the security-proof for the reduction OT2UOT
described at the end of Section 3.4.2. The uncertainty relation from Section 4.5
lower bounds the dishonest receiver’s (smooth) min-entropy about the sender’s
X. Hence, we have an (imperfect) (∞, n2 )-UOT({0, 1}n) from which we get
an ordinary Rand 1-2 OT ℓ via the min-entropy splitting lemma and privacy
amplification against quantum adversaries.
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EPR Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ:
1. S prepares n EPR pairs each in state |Ω〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) and sends
one half of each pair to R and keeps the other halves.
2. R measures all qubits in basis [+,×]c. Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
3. S picks random θ ∈R {+,×}n, and she measures the ith qubit in
basis θi. Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be the outcome. S picks two hash functions
f0, f1 ∈R Fn, announces θ and f0, f1 to R and outputs s0 := f0(x|◦I0)
and s1 := f1(x|◦I1) where Ib := {i : θi=[+,×]b}.
4. R outputs sc = fc(x
′|◦Ic).
Figure 6.2: Protocol for EPR-based Rand 1-2 OT ℓ.
Proof: Consider the ccq-state ρXΘR˜ in EPR Rand 1-2 QOT
ℓ after R˜ has mea-
sured all but γn of his qubits, where X describes the outcome of the sender
measuring her part of the state in random basis Θ. Also, let F0 and F1 be
the random variables that describe the random and independent choices of
f0, f1 ∈ Fn. Finally, let Xb be Xb = X|◦{i: Θi=[+,×]b} (padded with zeros so it
makes sense to apply Fb).
Choose λ, κ all positive, but small enough such that (for large enough n)
γn ≤ (1/4 − λ− λ′ − κ)n− 1− 2ℓ.
From the uncertainty relation (Corollary 4.23), we know that Hε∞(X0X1|Θ) ≥
(1/2 − 2λ)n for ε exponentially small in n. Therefore, by the Min-Entropy
Splitting Lemma 2.15, there exists a binary random variable D such that
Hε∞(X1−DD|Θ) ≥ (1/4− λ)n.
We denote by the random variables F0, F1 Alice’s choices of hash functions.
It is clear that we can condition (for free) on the independent FD. We write
SD = FD(XD), set ε
′ = 2−λ′n, and use the chain rule (Lemma 2.12) to condition
on D,SD as well.
Hε+ε
′
∞ (X1−D|ΘFDDSD)
≥ Hε∞(X1−DDSD|ΘFD)−H0(DSD|ΘFD)− λ′n
≥ (1/4 − λ− λ′)n − 1− ℓ
≥ γn+ ℓ+ κn,
by the choice of λ, λ′, κ.
We can now apply privacy amplification in form of Corollary 2.25 to
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obtain
δ
(
ρS1−DF1−DΘFDDSDR˜,1⊗ ρF1−DΘFDDSDR˜
)
≤ 1
2
2
− 1
2
“
Hε+ε
′
∞ (X1−D |ΘSDFDD)−γn−ℓ
”
+ (ε+ ε′)
≤ 1
2
2−
1
2
κn + ε+ ε′,
which is negligible. This shows ε-sender-security according to Definition 6.1. 
6.4 Extensions
6.4.1 1-2 OT ℓ with Longer Strings
It is possible to extend recent techniques by Wullschleger [Wul07] described in
Section 3.4.3 to the quantum case and hence, the security of Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ
can be proven against Rγ if there exists δ > 0 such that γn ≤ n/4− ℓ− δn.
6.4.2 Weakening the Assumptions
As described in Section 5.6 for Rabin OT, we can extend protocol Rand 1-2
QOT to work in the (φ, η)-weak quantum model. To enable the receiver to
recover from errors in the transmission, the sender S additionally sends error-
correcting information in Step 3. The players agree beforehand on an efficiently
decodable error-correcting code of length n/2 with syndrome length s roughly
h(φ)n/2 as in Section 5.6. Then, S sends along the two syndromes of S(x|I0)
and S(x|I1) (where the x|Ib are padded with 0s or truncated to length n/2).
It can be argued as for Rabin OT that this will reduce the min-entropy by
the length s of the syndrome and hence, we can show sender-security of this
protocol against the class of receivers Rγ with γ such that there exists δ > 0
with
γn ≤
(
1− η
4
− h(φ)
2
)
n− 2ℓ− δn .
6.4.3 Reversing the Quantum Communication
In order to illustrate the versatility of our security analysis, we show that the
proofs carry easily over to a protocol where the direction of the quantum com-
munication is reversed. In the protocol described in Figure 6.3, the receiver
R of the Rand 1-2 OT sends n qubits, encoded in the basis determined by his
choice bit. The sender of the Rand 1-2 OT S measures them in a random basis.
The players then proceed as in Rand 1-2 QOT .
It is clear by construction that the protocol is perfectly correct. ε-Sender-
security against dishonest receivers in Rγ can be argued as in Theorem 6.4
above by observing that the uncertainty relation applies to any n-qubit state
of the honest sender which is measured in a random basis and about which the
dishonest receiver holds at most γn qubits of information.
For the security of an honest receiver against a dishonest sender, we can
show the existence of the two input strings as in Proposition 6.2 above by
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Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ: Let c be R’s choice bit.
1. R picks x′ ∈ {0, 1}n at random and sends |x′〉θ′ to R where θ′ =
[+,×]c.
2. S picks θ ∈R {+,×}n and measures the received qubits in basis θ.
Let x ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
3. S picks two hash functions f0, f1 ∈R Fn, announces θ and f0, f1 to
R, and outputs s0 := f0(x|◦I0) and s1 := f1(x|◦I1) where Ib := {i : θi=
[+,×]b}.
4. R outputs sc = fc(x
′|◦Ic).
Figure 6.3: Rand 1-2 QOT ℓ with Reversed Quantum Communication.
letting the sender interact with an unbounded receiver. In an error-free model,
it further holds that the sender cannot infer the basis in which the qubits are
encoded and therefore does not learn any information about the receiver’s choice
bit. However, in a more realistic setting with multi-pulse emissions, this coding
scheme with reversed communication is highly insecure, as a malicious sender
can determine the encoding basis from a multi-pulse qubit. The same problem
occurred for the Rabin OT-protocol qot from the last chapter.
Chapter 7
Quantum Bit Commitment
This chapter is about quantum Bit Commitment (BC) schemes. In BC , a
committer C commits himself to a choice of a bit b ∈ {0, 1} by exchanging
information with a verifier V. We want that V does not learn b (we say the
commitment is hiding), yet C can later choose to reveal b in a convincing way,
i.e., only the value fixed at commitment time will be accepted by V (we say the
commitment is binding).
In the next section, we present a BC scheme from a committer C with
bounded quantum memory to an unbounded receiver V. The scheme is peculiar
since in order to commit to a bit, the committer does not send anything. During
the committing stage, information only goes from V to C. Therefore, there is no
way for the verifier to get information about the committed bit, i.e. the scheme
is perfectly hiding.
In Section 7.3, we define two notions of the binding property and show our
scheme secure against quantum-memory-bounded committer in both of these
senses. Similar techniques as in the two previous chapters for the analysis of
the oblivious-transfer protocols are used.
The results in this chapter appeared in [DFSS05, DFR+07].
7.1 The Protocol
The protocol is given in Figure 7.1. Intuitively, a commitment to a bit b is
made by measuring random BB84-states in basis {+,×}[b].
As for the oblivious-transfer protocols in the two previous chapters, we
present an equivalent EPR-version of the protocol that is easier to analyze (see
Figure 7.2).
Lemma 7.1 comm is secure against dishonest committers C˜ if and only if
epr-comm is.
Proof: The proof uses similar reasoning as the one for Lemma 5.3. First, it
clearly makes no difference, if we change Step 4 to the following:
4’. V chooses the subset I, measures all qubits with index in I in basis
{+,×}[b] and all qubits not in I in basis {+,×}[1−b]. V verifies that
xi = x
′
i for all i ∈ I and accepts if and only if this is the case.
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comm(b):
1. V picks x ∈R {0, 1}n and θ ∈R {+,×}n and sends xi in the corre-
sponding bases |x1〉θ1 , |x2〉θ2 , . . . , |xn〉θn to C.
2. C commits to the bit b by measuring all qubits in basis {+,×}[b]. Let
x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
3. To open the commitment, C sends b and x′ to V.
4. V verifies that xi = x
′
i for those i where θi = {+,×}[b]. V accepts if
and only if this is the case.
Figure 7.1: Protocol for quantum bit commitment
epr-comm(b):
1. V prepares n EPR pairs each in state |Ω〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉). V sends
one half of each pair to C and keeps the other halves.
2. C commits to the bit b by measuring all received qubits in basis
{+,×}[b]. Let x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
3. To open the commitment, C sends b and x′ to V.
4. V measures all his qubits in basis {+,×}[b] and obtains x ∈ {0, 1}n.
He chooses a random subset I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. V verifies that xi = x′i
for all i ∈ I and accepts if and only if this is the case.
Figure 7.2: Protocol for EPR-based quantum bit commitment
Finally, we can observe that the view of C˜ does not change if V would have done
his choice of I and his measurement already in Step 1. Doing the measurements
at this point means that the qubits to be sent to C˜ collapse to a state that is
distributed identically to the state prepared in the original scheme. The EPR-
version is therefore equivalent to the original commitment scheme from C˜’s point
of view. 
It is clear that epr-comm is hiding, i.e., that the commit phase reveals no
information on the committed bit, since no information is transmitted to V at
all. Hence we have
Lemma 7.2 epr-comm is perfectly hiding.
7.2 Modeling Dishonest Committers
A dishonest committer C˜ with bounded memory of at most γn qubits in epr-
comm can be modeled very similarly to the dishonest oblivious-transfer re-
ceivers R˜ from Section 5.3 and 6.3: C˜ consists first of a circuit acting on all n
7.3. Defining the Binding Property 88
qubits received, then of a measurement of all but at most γn qubits, and finally
of a circuit that takes the following input: a bit b that C˜ will attempt to open,
the γn qubits in memory, and some ancilla in a fixed state. The output is a
string x′ ∈ {0, 1}n to be sent to V at the opening stage.
Definition 7.3 We define Cγ to be the class of all committers {C˜n}n>0 in
comm or epr-comm that, at the start of the opening phase (i.e. at Step 3),
have a quantum memory of size at most γn qubits.
7.3 Defining the Binding Property
7.3.1 The “Standard” Binding Condition
In the context of unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment, it is widely
accepted that “the right way” of defining the binding property is to require that
the probability of opening a commitment successfully to 0 plus the probability
of opening it successfully to 1 is essentially upper bounded by one, put forward
by Dumais, Mayers, and Salvail [DMS00]. We call this notion weakly binding,
as opposed to the new notion of strongly binding defined in the next section
below.
Definition 7.4 A (quantum) bit-commitment scheme is weakly binding against
C if for all {C˜n}n>0 ∈ C, the probability pb(n) that C˜n opens b ∈ {0, 1} with suc-
cess satisfies
p0(n) + p1(n) ≤ 1 + negl(n).
In the next Section 7.4, we show that epr-comm is weakly binding against Cγ
for any γ < 12 .
Note that the binding condition given here in Definition 7.4 is weaker than
the classical one, where one would require that a bit b exists such that pb(n) is
negligible. For a general quantum adversary though who can always commit to
0 and 1 in superposition, this is a too strong requirement; thus, it is typically
argued that Definition 7.4 is the best one can hope for.
However, we argue now that this weaker notion is not really satisfactory, and
we show that there exists a stronger notion, which still allows the committer to
commit to a superposition and thus is not necessarily impossible to achieve in
a quantum setting, but which is closer to the classical standard way of defining
the binding property.
7.3.2 A Stronger Binding Condition
A shortcoming of Definition 7.4 is that committing bit by bit is not guaranteed
to yield a secure string commitment—the argument that one is tempted to use
requires independence of the pb’s between the different executions, which in
general does not hold.
We now argue that this notion is unnecessarily weak, at least in some cases,
and in particular in the case of commitments in the bounded-quantum-storage
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model where the dishonest committer is forced to do some partial measure-
ment and where we assume honest parties to produce only classical output (by
measuring their entire quantum state). Technically, this means that for any
dishonest committer C˜, the joint state of the honest verifier and of C˜ after the
commit phase is a ccq-state ρV ZC˜ =
∑
v,z PV Z(v, z)|v〉〈v| ⊗ |z〉〈z| ⊗ ρv,zC˜ , where
the first register contains the verifier’s (classical) output and the remaining
two registers contain C˜’s (partially classical) output. We propose the following
definition.
Definition 7.5 A commitment scheme in the bounded-quantum-storage model
is called ε-binding, if for every (dishonest) committer C˜, inducing a joint state
ρV ZC˜ after the commit phase, there exists a classical binary random variable
D, given by its conditional distribution PD|V Z , such that for b = 0 and b =
1 the state ρb
V ZC˜
=
∑
v PV Z|D(v, z|b)|v〉〈v| ⊗ |z〉〈z| ⊗ ρv,zC˜ satisfies the following
condition. When executing the opening phase on the state ρb
V C˜
, for any strategy
of C˜, the honest verifier accepts an opening to 1− b with probability at most ε.
It is easy to see that the binding property as defined here implies the above
discussed weak version, namely pb ≤ PD(b)+PD(1−b)ε and thus p0+p1 ≤ 1+ε.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that this stronger notion allows for a
formal proof of the obvious reduction of a string to a bit commitment by com-
mitting bit-wise: the i-th execution of the bit commitment scheme guarantees
a random variable Di, defined by PDi|ViZ , such that the committer cannot open
the i-th bit commitment to 1−Di, and thus there exists a random variable S,
namely S = (D1, . . . ,Dm) defined by PD1···Dm|V1···VmZ =
∏
i PDi|ViZ , such that
for any opening strategy, the committer cannot open the list of commitments
to any other string than S.
In Section 7.5, we show that the bit commitment comm from Figure 7.1
as a matter of fact satisfies this stronger and more useful notion of security.
This turns out to be a rather straightforward consequence of the security of the
1-2 OT scheme from Chapter 6.
7.4 Weak Binding of the Commitment Scheme
In this section, we use the techniques from the analysis of the Rabin OT pro-
tocol from Chapter 5 to prove our commitment scheme comm (or rather its
purified version epr-comm) weakly binding against quantum-memory-bounded
adversarial committers.
Note that the first two steps of epr-qot (from Figure 5.2) and epr-comm
(i.e. before the memory bound applies) are exactly the same! This allows us to
reuse Corollary 4.17 and the analysis of Section 5.4 to prove the weakly binding
property of epr-comm.
Theorem 7.6 For any γ < 12 , comm is perfectly hiding and weakly binding
against Cγ.
The proof is given below. It boils down to showing that essentially p0(n) ≤
1−q+ and p1(n) ≤ 1−q×. The weak binding property then follows immediately
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from Corollary 4.17. The intuition behind p0(n) ≤ 1− q+ = 1−Q+(S+) is that
a committer has only a fair chance in opening to 0 if x measured in the +-basis
has large probability, i.e., x 6∈ S+. The following proof makes this intuition
precise by choosing the ε and δ’s correctly.
Proof: It remains to show that epr-comm is binding against Cγ . Let ε, δ > 0
be such that γ+2h(δ)+2ε < 1/2, where h is the binary entropy function. Recall
that the number Bδn of n-bit strings of Hamming-distance at most δn from a
fixed string is at most 2h(δ)n. Let R be the basis, determined by the bit that C˜
claims in Step 3, and in which V measures the quantum state in Step 4, and let
X be the outcome. Corollary 4.17 implies the existence of an event E such that
P [E|R=+]+P [E|R=×] ≥ 1−negl(n) and H∞(X|R=r, E) ≥ (γ+2h(δ)+2ε)n.
Applying Corollary 2.26 (with constant U and ε = 0), it follows that any guess
Xˆ for X satisfies
P
[
Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X) |R=r, E] ≤ 2− 12 (H∞(X|X∈S+)−γn−1)+log(Bδn) ≤ 2−εn+ 12 .
However, if Xˆ 6∈ Bδn(X) then sampling a random subset of the positions will
detect an error except with probability at most 2−δn. Hence, writing q+ :=
P [E|R=+] and q× := P [E|R=×],
p0(n) ≤ (1− q+) + q+ · (2−εn+
1
2 + 2−δn) ≤ 1− q+ + negl(n)
and analogously p1(n) ≤ 1− q× + negl(n). We conclude that
p0(n) + p1(n) ≤ 2− q+ − q× + negl(n) ≤ 1 + negl(n) .

7.5 Strong Binding of the Commitment Scheme
In this section, we reuse the analysis of the 1-2 OT-protocol from Chapter 6 to
prove the strong binding condition.
Theorem 7.7 The quantum bit-commitment scheme comm is ε-binding ac-
cording to Definition 7.5 against Cγ for a negligible (in n) ε if γ <
1
4 .
Intuitively, one can argue that X has (smooth) min-entropy about n/2 given
Θ. The Min-Entropy Splitting Lemma implies that there exists D such that
X1−D has smooth min-entropy about n/4 given Θ andD. Privacy amplification
implies that F (X1−D) is close to random given Θ,D, F and C˜’s quantum register
of size γn, where F is a two-universal one-bit-output hash function, which in
particular implies that C˜ cannot guess X1−D. The formal proof is given below.
Proof: It remains to show that epr-comm is strongly binding against Cγ . Let
Θ ∈ {+,×}n be the random basis that would correspond to the choice of basis
in the first step of comm, i.e. θi = {+,×}[b] for i ∈ I and θi = {+,×}[1−b] for
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i 6∈ I. Let X be the measurement outcome when V measures his halves of the
EPR-pairs in basis Θ.
Recall that h(·) denotes the binary Shannon entropy. Choose λ, λ′, κ and
δ all positive, but small enough such that γ ≤ 1/4 − λ − λ′ − 2h(δ) − 2κ,
h(δ) ≤ λ′ − κ, and h(δ) ≤ λ432 − κ. Before Step 3, the overall state is given
by the ccq-state ρXΘC˜ after C˜ has measured all but γn of his qubits, where
X describes the outcome of the verifier V measuring his part of the state in
random basis Θ. From the uncertainty relation (Corollary 4.23), we know that
Hε∞(X | Θ) ≥ (1/2 − 2λ)n for ε = 2−
λ4
32
n exponentially small in n. Therefore,
by Corollary 2.16, there exists a binary random variable D ∈ {0, 1} such that
for ε′ = 2−λ
′n, it holds that
Hε+ε
′
∞ (X1−D | ΘD) ≥ (1/4 − λ− λ′)n− 1
≥ (1/4 − λ− λ′)n− 1
≥ γn+ 2h(δ)n + 2κn − 1 .
Recall that Bδn ≤ 2h(δ)n. Applying Corollary 2.26, it follows that any guess
Xˆ for X1−D satisfies
P
[
Xˆ ∈ Bδn(X1−D)
] ≤ 2− 12 (Hε+ε′∞ (X1−D |ΘD)−γn−1)+log(Bδn) + (2ε + 2ε′)Bδn
≤ 2− 12 (2κn−2) + 2 · 2−λ
4
32
n+h(δ)n + 2 · 2−λ′n+h(δ)n
≤ 1
2
2−κn + 2 · 2−κn + 2 · 2−κn ,
which is negligible by the choice of the parameters. 
7.6 Weakening the Assumptions
As argued earlier, assuming that a party can produce single qubits (with prob-
ability 1) is not reasonable given current technology. Also the assumption that
there is no noise on the quantum channel is impractical. It can be shown that a
straightforward modification of comm remains secure in the (φ, η)-weak quan-
tum model as introduced in Section 5.6 (see also Section 9.1.1), with φ < 12 and
η < 1− φ.
The protocol comm’ in Figure 7.3 is the same as comm from Figure 7.1
except that in the last Step 4, V accepts if and only if xi = x
′
i for all but
about a φ-fraction of the i where ri = {+,×}[b]. More precisely, for all but a
(φ+ ε)-fraction, where ε > 0 is sufficiently small.
Theorem 7.8 In the (φ, η)-weak quantum model, comm’ is perfectly hiding
and it is weakly binding against Cγ for any γ satisfying γ <
1
2(1− η)− 2h(φ).
Proof Sketch: Using Chernoff’s inequality (Lemma 2.5), one can argue that
for honest C and V, the opening of a commitment is accepted except with
negligible probability. The hiding property holds using the same reasoning
as in Lemma 7.2. And the binding property can be argued essentially along
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comm’(b, φ):
1. V picks x ∈R {0, 1}n and θ ∈R {+,×}n and sends xi in the corre-
sponding bases |x1〉θ1 , |x2〉θ2 , . . . , |xn〉θn to C.
2. C commits to the bit b by measuring all qubits in basis {+,×}[b]. Let
x′ ∈ {0, 1}n be the result.
3. To open the commitment, C sends b and x′ to V.
4. V verifies that xi = x
′
i for i where θi = {+,×}[b]. V accepts if and
only if this is the case for all but a φ-fraction of these positions.
Figure 7.3: Protocol for noise-tolerant quantum bit commitment
the lines of Theorem 7.6, with the following modifications. Let J denote the
set of indices i where V succeeds in sending a single qubit. We restrict the
analysis to those i’s which are in J . By Chernoff’s inequality (Lemma 2.5),
the cardinality of J is about (1 − η)n (meaning within (1 − η ± ε)n), except
with negligible probability. Thus, restricting to these i’s has the same effect as
replacing γ by γ/(1 − η) (neglecting the ±ε to simplify notation). Assuming
that C˜ knows every xi for i 6∈ J , for all xi’s with i ∈ J , he has to be able to
guess all but about a φ/(1 − η)-fraction correctly, in order to be successful in
the opening. Using Corollary 2.26, we can show that for a correctly chosen
δ > 0, the probability of guessing Xˆ within Hamming distance δn to the real
X is negligible. Therefore, C˜ succeeds with only negligible probability if the
fraction of allowed errors φ/(1− η) is smaller than δ, i.e.
φ/(1− η) < δ ,
Additionally, in order for the machinery from Theorem 7.6 to work, δ must be
such that
γ
1− η + 2h(δ) <
1
2
.
δ can be chosen that way if
γ
1− η + 2h
(
φ
1− η
)
<
1
2
.
Using the fact that h(νp) ≤ νh(p) for any ν ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 12 such that
νp ≤ 1, this is clearly satisfied if γ + 2h(φ) < 12(1− η). 
Theorem 7.9 In the (φ, η)-weak quantum model, comm’ is perfectly hiding
and it is strongly binding against Cγ for any γ satisfying γ <
1
4(1−η)−3h(φ)−
4
√
32h(φ).
Proof Sketch: The proof goes like the proof of Theorem 7.8, but uses the
techniques from Section 7.5. In order for those to work, we need to choose
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λ, λ′, and δ all positive and such that
φ
1− η < δ,
γ
1− η + 2h(δ) + λ
′ + λ < 1/4 ,
h(δ) < λ′ ,
h(δ) <
λ4
32
.
(7.1)
We verify that the assumption γ < 14(1 − η) − 3h(φ) − 4
√
32h(φ) on γ allows
for that. Rearranging the terms and using that x < 4
√
x for 0 < x < 1 yields
γ
1− η + 3
h(φ)
1− η +
4
√
32
h(φ)
1− η < 1/4 .
Using as in the previous proof the fact that h(νp) ≤ νh(p) for any ν ≥ 1 and
0 ≤ p ≤ 12 such that νp ≤ 1, we get that
γ
1− η + 3h
(
φ
1− η
)
+ 4
√
32h
(
φ
1− η
)
< 1/4.
That allows to choose δ > φ1−η such that
γ
1− η + 2h(δ) + h(δ) +
4
√
32h(δ) < 1/4,
and therefore, also λ and λ′ can be chosen such that the conditions (7.1) are
fulfilled. 
Chapter 8
QKD Secure Against
Quantum-Memory-Bounded
Eavesdroppers
In this chapter, we present another application for the uncertainty relation
derived in Section 4.5. This illustrates that these relations are useful in scenarios
beyond the simple two-party setting.
In Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), two honest players Alice and Bob
want to agree on a secure key, using only completely insecure quantum and au-
thentic classical communication. The computationally unbounded eavesdropper
Eve should not get any information about the key. A major difficulty when im-
plementing QKD schemes is that they require a low-noise quantum channel.
The tolerated noise level depends on the actual protocol and on the desired se-
curity of the key. Because the quality of the channel typically decreases with its
length, the maximum tolerated noise level is an important parameter limiting
the maximum distance between Alice and Bob.
We consider a model in which the adversary has a limited amount of quan-
tum memory to store the information she intercepts during the protocol execu-
tion. In this model, we show that the maximum tolerated noise level is larger
than in the standard scenario where the adversary has unlimited resources.
For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to one-way QKD protocols which are
protocols where error-correction is performed non-interactively, i.e., a single
classical message is sent from one party to the other.
The results in this chapter appeared in [DFR+07].
8.1 Derivation of the Maximum Tolerated Noise Level
Let S be a set of orthonormal bases of a d-dimensional Hilbert space Hd. For
each basis ϑ ∈ S, we assume that the d basis vectors are parametrized by the
elements of the fixed set X of size |X | = d. We then consider QKD protocols
consisting of the steps described in Figure 8.1.
Note that the quantum channel is only used in the preparation step. Af-
terwards, the communication between Alice and Bob is only classical (over an
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One-Way QKD: let N ∈ N be arbitrary
1. Preparation: For i = 1 . . . N , Alice chooses at random a basis ϑi ∈ S
and a random element Xi ∈ X . She encodes Xi into the state of
a quantum system according to the basis ϑi and sends this system
to Bob. Bob measures each of the states he receives according to
a randomly chosen basis ϑ′i and stores the outcome Yi ∈ X of this
measurement.
2. Sifting: Alice and Bob publicly announce their choices of bases and
keep their data at position i only if ϑi = ϑ
′
i. In the following, we
denote by X and Y the concatenation of the remaining data Xi and
Yi, respectively. X and Y are sometimes called the sifted raw key.
3. Error correction: Alice computes some error correction information
C depending on X and sends C to Bob. Bob computes a guess Xˆ
for Alice’s string X, using C and Y .
4. Privacy amplification: Alice chooses at random a function f from a
two-universal family of hash functions and announces f to Bob. Alice
and Bob then compute the final key by applying f to their strings X
and Xˆ, respectively.
Figure 8.1: General form for one-way QKD protocols.
authentic channel).
As shown in [Ren05, Lemma 6.4.1], the length ℓ of the secret key that can
be generated by the protocol described above is given by1
ℓ ≈ Hεmin(ρXE | E)−H0(C) ,
where the cq-state ρXE is the state of the quantum system with the property
that E contains all the information Eve has gained during the preparation step
of the protocol and where H0(C) is the number of error correction bits sent from
Alice to Bob. Note that this formula can be seen as a generalization of the well-
known expression by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner for classical key agreement [CK78].
Let us now assume that Eve’s system E can be decomposed into a classical
part U and a purely quantum part E′. Then, by the same derivation as in the
proof of Corollary 2.25, we find
ℓ ≈ Hεmin(ρXUE′ | UE′)−H0(C) ≥ Hε∞(X | U)−Hmax(ρE′)−H0(C) .
As, during the preparation step, Eve does not know the encoding bases which
are chosen at random from the set S, we can apply our uncertainty relation
(Theorem 4.22) to get a lower bound for the min-entropy of X conditioned on
1The approximation in this and the following equations holds up to some small additive
value which depends logarithmically on the desired security ε of the final key.
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Eve’s classical information Θ, i.e.,
Hε∞(X | Θ) ≥Mh,
whereM denotes the length of the sifted raw key X and h is the average entropic
uncertainty bound for S. [write much more!] Let q be the bound on the size of
Eve’s quantum memory Hmax(ρE′) ≤ q. Moreover, let e be the average amount
of error correction information that Alice has to send to Bob per symbol of the
sifted raw key X. Then
ℓ 'M(h− e)− q .
Hence, if the memory bound only grows sublinearly in the length M of the
sifted raw key, then the key rate, i.e., the number of key bits generated per bit
of the sifted raw key, is lower bounded by
rate ≥ h− e .
8.2 The Binary-Channel Setting
For a binary channel (with a two-dimensional Hilbert space H2), the aver-
age amount of error correction information e is given by the binary Shannon
entropy2 h(p), where p is the bit-flip probability (for classical bits encoded ac-
cording to some orthonormal basis as described above). The achievable key
rate of a QKD protocol using a binary quantum channel is thus given by
ratebinary ≥ h− h(p) .
Summing up, we have derived the following theorem.
Theorem 8.1 Let S be a set of orthonormal bases of H2 with average entropic
uncertainty bound h. Then, a one-way QKD protocol as in Figure 8.1 produces
a secure key against eavesdroppers whose quantum-memory size is sublinear in
the length of the raw key (i.e., sublinear in the number of qubits sent from Alice
to Bob) at a positive rate as long as the bit-flip probability p fulfills
h(p) < h . (8.1)
For the BB84 protocol [BB84], we have h = 12 (cf. Inequality (4.2)). In-
equality (8.1) is thus satisfied as long as p ≤ 11%. This bound coincides with
the known bound for one-way QKD in the standard model (with an unbounded
eavesdropper). So, using our analysis here, the memory-bound does not give
an advantage.
The situation is different for the six-state protocol where h = 23 . Ac-
cording to (8.1), security against memory-bounded adversaries is guaranteed
(i.e. h(p) < 23) as long as p ≤ 17%. If one requires security against an
unbounded adversary, the threshold for the same protocol lies below 13% as
2This value of e is only achieved if an optimal error-correction scheme is used. In practical
implementations, the value of e might be slightly larger.
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shown by Lo [Lo01], and even the best known QKD protocol on binary chan-
nels with one-way classical post-processing can only tolerate noise up to roughly
14.1% [RGK05]. It has also been shown that, in the unbounded model, no such
protocol can tolerate an error rate of more than 16.3%.
The performance ofQKD protocols against quantum-memory bounded eaves-
droppers can be improved further by making the choice of the encoding bases
more random. For example, they might be chosen from the set of all pos-
sible orthonormal bases on a two-dimensional Hilbert space. As shown in
Section 4.5.3, the overall average entropic uncertainty bound is then given by
h ≈ 0.72 and (8.1) is satisfied if p / 20%. For an unbounded adversary, the
thresholds are the same as for the six-state protocol (i.e., 14.1% for the best
known one-way protocol).
8.3 Possible Extensions
It is an interesting open problem to consider protocols using higher-dimensional
quantum systems. The results described in Section 4.5.3 show that for high-
dimensional systems, the average entropic uncertainty bound converges to its
theoretical maximum. The maximal tolerated channel noise might thus be
higher for such protocols (depending on the noise model for higher-dimensional
quantum channels).
Another interesting problem is to derive completely one-way quantum-key-
distribution schemes, i.e. to eliminate the interactive sifting phase from the
protocol in Figure 8.1. The idea is to let the honest parties use a pre-shared
secret key to determine the bases of the encoding. If a key of size linear in the
number of qubits is used, the scheme has to guarantee that a big portion of the
key can be reused several times in order to yield a reasonable amount of fresh
key. Quantifying the amount of information an eavesdropper can learn about
the pre-shared key by interfering in the preparation step and eavesdropping on
the following classical communication is an open problem.
Another approach consists of expanding a pre-shared key of size only log-
arithmic in the number of qubits into a pseudo-random linear-size key to de-
termine the bases of the encoding. It is an open question how to extend our
uncertainty relation from Section 4.5 to the case of only pseudo-random bases.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
9.1 Towards Practice
In the following two sections, we elaborate on the question how close to practice
our systems are. First, we argue that imperfections occurring in practice like
dark counts and empty pulses are covered by our (φ, η)-weak quantum model
used in Sections 5.6, 6.4.2, and 7.6. Second, we sketch how our techniques can
be extended to the more realistic setting of noisy quantum memory.
9.1.1 More Imperfections
A natural approach for implementing two-party protocols like bb84-qot, Rand
1-2 QOT ℓ, and comm is to use the polarization of photons governed by the laws
of quantum optics. Such systems are nowadays at the stage where they can be
built in a optical physics lab. Besides the already modeled bit errors and multi-
pulse emissions, more imperfections of the physical apparatus such as empty
pulses and dark counts need to be taken into account.
The players have synchronized clocks and in every predefined time slot, the
sender is supposed to send out a single qubit. In practice, weak coherent pulses
are used to approximate single-photon sources by producing in average only a
small fraction of one qubit per pulse. This means that most of the pulses are
empty, but on the other hand, there is also a small probability for a multi-qubit
pulse. The receiver reports to the sender in which time slots he received pulses.
Empty pulses also occur when the quantum channel lets a transmitted qubit
escape or when it is absorbed. It is realistic that a good estimate on the rate
at which empty pulses are produced (when no adversary is present) is known,
e.g., from the hardware specifications and by measuring and calibrating the
experimental setup. In this case, the adversary can only take advantage of
empty pulses caused by absorption in the fiber. The best the adversary can
do is to substitute the fiber for one that preserves all qubits sent and to report
empty pulses when a single pulse has been received. The effect is to increase the
rate at which multi-qubit pulses occur. This attack is known as Photon-Number-
Splitting attack as first noted by Huttner, Imoto, Gisin, and Mor [HIGM95] and
for instance explained in [BLMS00a, BLMS00b] in the setting of quantum key
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distribution. It follows that empty pulses can also be included in the (φ, η)-weak
quantum model by an appropriate adjustment of parameter η.
Furthermore, thermal fluctuation in the detector hardware might result in
detection even though no qubit was received. This is called a dark count. In this
time slot, the receiver will report the reception of a qubit and as the outcome
is random, it agrees with the actual bit sent with probability 12 .
Formally, assume that a practical implementation of bb84-qot, Rand 1-2
QOT ℓ, or comm takes place in a setting where φx is the probability for a bit
error caused by the channel, φdc is the probability for a dark count in a specific
time slot, ηmq is the probability for a multi-qubit transmission in a non-empty
pulse, and ηab is the probability for an empty pulse caused by absorption of a
non-empty pulse. In these terms, dark counts contribute φdc2 to the bit-error
rate φx. If the adversary is able to get perfect transmission, she can suppress
single-qubit pulses up to a rate of ηab, thereby increasing the rate ηmq of multi-
photon pulses by 11−ηab . It follows that if bb84-qot, comm, and Rand 1-2
QOT ℓ are secure in the (φx +
φdc
2 ,
ηmq
1−ηab )-weak quantum model, then their
implementation is also secure, provided it is accurately modeled by these four
parameters.
Likewise, a variety of imperfections specific to particular implementations
may be adapted to the weak quantum model.
9.1.2 Generalizing the Memory Model
The bounded-quantum-storage model limits the number of physical qubits the
adversary’s memory can contain. A more realistic model would rather address
the noise process the adversary’s memory undergoes. For instance, it is not
hard to build a very large, but unreliable memory device containing a large
number of qubits. It is reasonable to expect that our protocols remain secure
also in a scenario where the adversary’s memory is of arbitrary size, but where
some quantum operation (modeling noise) applies to it. If we do not substitute
Hmax(ρE) with the number of qubits q in Term (2.6) in the privacy-amplification
Section 2.5, then our constructions can cope with slightly more general memory
models. In particular, all our protocols that are secure against adversaries with
memory of no more than γn qubits are also secure against any noise model that
reduces the rank Hmax(ρE) of the mixed state ρE held by the adversary to at
most 2γn.
An example of a noise process resulting in a reduction of Hmax(ρE) is an
erasure channel. Assuming the n initial qubits are each erased with probability
larger than 1−γ when the memory bound applies, it holds except with negligible
probability in n that Hmax(ρE) < γn. The same applies if the noise process is
modeled by a depolarizing channel with error probability p = 1 − γ. Such a
depolarizing channel replaces each qubit by a random one with probability p
and does nothing with probability 1− p.
The technique we have developed does not allow to deal with depolarizing
channels with p < 1 − γ although one would expect that some 0 < p < 1 − γ
should be sufficient to ensure security against such adversaries. The reason
being that not knowing the positions where the errors occurred should make
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it more difficult for the adversary than when the noise process is modeled by
an erasure channel. However, it seems that our uncertainty relations are not
strong enough to address this case. Generalizing the bounded-quantum-storage
model to more realistic noisy-memory models is an interesting open question.
9.2 Conclusion
The bounded-quantum-storage model presented in this thesis is an attractive
model, in both the theoretical and practical sense. On the theoretical side, it
allows for very simple protocols implementing basic two-party primitives such
as oblivious transfer and bit commitment. New high-order entropic uncertainty
relations have been established in order to show the security with the help
of techniques such as purification and privacy amplification by two-universal
hashing. These uncertainty relations can also be applied in different settings
like quantum key distribution.
On the practical side, the protocols do not require any quantum memory for
honest players and remain secure provided the adversary has a quantum mem-
ory of size bounded by a constant fraction of all transmitted qubits. Such a gap
between the amount of storage required for honest players and adversaries is not
achievable by classical means. The protocols can be adapted to tolerate various
kinds of errors and in fact, they can be implemented with today’s technology.
A collaboration of people from the computer science and physics departments
of the University of Aarhus is currently working on the implementation of these
protocols1.
In summary, one can say that the bounded-quantum-storage model has
passed its first tests by proving its power (the possibility of oblivious trans-
fer) and by inspiring beautiful theoretical results (quantum uncertainty rela-
tions). It is a good sign that the protocols for the basic primitives are simple
in structure. In principle, enough instances of these protocols could be used to
implement more involved cryptographic tasks like secure identification, which
reduces essentially to securely checking whether two inputs are equal (without
revealing more than this mere bit of information). However, it is a natural
next step to find more efficient, direct protocols for those tasks, secure in the
bounded-quantum-storage model. Such a direct approach gives a better ratio
between storage-bound and communication-complexity and is the topic of a
recent paper [DFSS07].
A major open problem is the optimality of the bounds on the adversary’s
quantum memory. The bit-commitment protocol comm for instance appears
to be secure against any adversary with memory less than n qubits, but our
analysis requires the memory to be smaller than n/2 (or n/4 for strong binding).
Also, finding protocols secure against adversaries in more general noisy-memory
models, as discussed in the last Section 9.1.2, would certainly be a natural
and interesting extension of this work to more practical settings [DSTW07].
Furthermore, there is still a lack of simple and intuitive security definitions for
1See http://www.brics.dk/~salvail/qusep.html for further information on the QUSEP
project.
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primitives like 1-2 OT etc. with rigorous composability results (like universal
composability) in the quantum setting. Very recent results in this direction
have been established in [WW07].
Notation
General
log binary logarithm
ln natural logarithm
N natural numbers: 1, 2, 3, . . .
R real numbers
[a, b] set of real numbers r such that a ≤ r ≤ b
(a, b] set of real numbers r such that a < r ≤ b
x|I substring of x consisting of bit positions in index set I
x|◦I as above, padded with 0s
Bδn(x) set of n-bit strings with Hamming distance at most δn from x negl(n)
negl(n) any function in n smaller than the inverse of any polynomial
for large enough n
[+,×]b + for b = 0 and × for b = 1
δi,j Kronecker delta
Classical Information Theory
PX|Y conditional probability distribution of X given Y
E[R] expected value of the real random variable R
δ(P,Q) variational distance between distributions P and Q
P ≈ε Q P and Q are at variational distance at most ε
unif independent and uniformly distributed binary random variable
unifℓ ℓ copies of it
E event
1E indicator random variable of event E
X↔Z↔Y Markov chain
Quantum Information Theory
Hd Hilbert space of dimension d
P(H) set of density operators on H
ρ density operator: normalized, Hermitian, non-negative
tr(ρ) trace of ρ
1 fully mixed state
δ(ρ, σ) trace distance between ρ and σ
|b〉θ classical bit b encoded in basis θ
ρXE cq-state
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Entropies
h(·) binary Shannon entropy function
πα(X|Y ) α-order sum of X given Y with joint distribution PXY
Hα(X|Y ) Re´nyi entropy of order α of X given Y
H∞(X|Y ) min-entropy of X given Y
H2(X|Y ) collision entropy of X given Y
H(X|Y ) Shannon entropy of X given Y
H0(X|Y ) max-entropy of X given Y
H˜α(X|Y ) average conditional Re´nyi entropy of order α
Hεα(X|Y ) ε-smooth Re´nyi entropy of order α of X given Y
Hε∞(X|Y ) ε-smooth min-entropy of X given Y
Hε0(X|Y ) ε-smooth max-entropy of X given Y
Hα(ρ) Re´nyi entropy of order α of the state ρ
Hmin(ρAB |σB) min-entropy of ρAB relative to σB
Hmin(ρAB |B) min-entropy of ρAB given HB
Hεmin(ρAB |σB) ε-smooth min-entropy of ρAB relative to σB
Hεmin(ρAB |B) ε-smooth min-entropy of ρAB given HB
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